

## Everyday Politics and the Absent Presence of the State in Lima, Peru

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## **Abstract**

Amy Mortensen: Everyday Politics and the Absent Presence of the State

In Lima, Peru

(Under the direction of Marisol de la Cadena)

*Everyday Politics and the Absent Presence of the State in Lima, Peru* is a theoretical and ethnographic inquiry into the presence of the state in Huaycán, a shantytown on the outskirts of Lima. Through an analysis of state programs (including day-care centers, police stations, and communal kitchens) and political practices among neighbors in local associations, this dissertation argues that state power influences everyday politics and the lives of citizens in ways that cannot be analyzed through dichotomies. Specifically, I contend that the state is neither simply present nor absent and that citizens' complex relationships with the state cannot be defined as simply formal or informal. While, on some levels, the state is directly active in the daily life of residents (it provides schooling and medical care, for example,) there are many other realms where the state is markedly marginal in the regulation of daily life for citizens in shantytown communities. This dissertation explores the ways that this fringe effectiveness of state presence in shantytowns compels some NGOs and community members to produce programs and projects that compensate for state ineffectiveness. In this sense, state absence is ultimately productive in places like Huaycán because it

indirectly shapes and directs the goals of citizens who are excluded or otherwise removed from centers of state power.

Based on over twenty-four months of field research in Huaycán, *Everyday Politics and the Absent Presence of the State* makes three contributions to scholarship on democracy, the state and contemporary Peru. First, by studying how residents profoundly engaged with and gave substance to different levels of government action in Huaycán, it challenges the dominant analytical approach that separates formal and informal politics. Second, this dissertation contributes to a more nuanced and ethnographically grounded understanding of state power as it reveals the complex consequences that connect marginal subjects of governance to the state. Third, by illuminating the inevitable relationship between the state and people often referred to as second-class citizens, it demonstrates how inequalities perpetuate in spite of, and at times through, the very governing practices that are meant to redress inequality.

**For Katty, Yesenia and Jimmy**

Les quiero mucho

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## **Introduction**

This dissertation looks theoretically and ethnographically at the presence of the state in a shantytown called Huaycán located on the outskirts of Lima, Peru. I approach the kinds of state and governing relationships created in neighborhoods like Huaycán from different directions. The first dynamic questions the sense of distance that is usually construed to exist between the state and marginal places. I look at how part of the problem of social exclusion is cast as a problem of distance from, or absence of the state in neighborhoods like Huaycán. I also show through the different ethnographic examples I present how even the apparently partial relationship between residents of Huaycán and the state is a full relationship. There is a full relationship between poor citizens and the state that is obscured by thinking of poor citizens' ties to the state as somehow incomplete or lacking of dominant values and standards – albeit this relationship between the state and poor citizens is still an imperfect relationship, full of problems and misconnections. The actual relationships and connections between states and citizens are therefore at least partially improvised, cobbled together and otherwise not as expected; but it is also true that they still have power.

In theoretical terms I explore the inter-relationship between Foucault's idea that power is everywhere and the notion that the state is a process – a social and cultural

process and not a thing. Because I work with a population that is excluded and socially marginal in terms of ethnicity, gender and class, the idea that power is everywhere is more complex. I need to account for how power is mis-used, how there is also unintentionality in governing practices and that unintentionality also has real effects in the kinds of government relationships created in places like Huaycán. This creates contingent and brokered access to the state for poor citizens; indeterminacy and inequality are routinized through these kinds of practices in everyday reality.

The chapters that follow are centered on different examples of citizen experience in Huaycán. I analyze relationships with the police, a state-led daycare program, the fact there are two local government associations when according to local statutes there should be just one, as well as how residents of Huaycán are often registered to vote elsewhere in the city of Lima to talk about how everyday politics is another arena for learning about the state -- how there are also contingent, contextual uses of the state like this.

### **Changes in the Urban Landscape of Lima**

Lima, once a relatively small city concentrated around the central plaza in colonial and early republican times, has grown exponentially over the last 60 years into the sprawling, expansive urban area it is today. The amalgamation of innumerable and different lapses in order makes the sprawl of Lima seem chaotic, although each small lapse away from order is tangled with a mess of persistent conventions. This contrast provides the kind of frenetic energy that seems to drive the city. Black sooty streaks of

car exhaust coat the buildings of Lima where it barely ever rains, but this is contrasted by the white painted tree trunks of its innumerable and well-manicured parks. The hollowed-out piles of metal the abandoned but antique cars have become along the residential streets of inner-city neighborhoods like Surquillo are almost cancelled out by the modern bank towers of glass and steel in central San Isidro. The incessant sound of car horns, used en masse to protest things like a stop light taking too long to turn green, accompany the traffic that is dominated by the buses and vans that make up Lima's "public" transit system, barreling down all of Lima's main avenues and highways then braking hard while often closing in sideways across lanes of traffic to pick up passengers standing on the curb. All this makes it seem the city runs on a mix of frustration, self-absorption and frenzy. It is also striking how most present-day construction in Lima leaves the outside of buildings unfinished. The ties that run through reinforced concrete pillars are left with lengths uncut and protruding from the top floor of buildings and many homes and stores are only finished on the front. The side and back walls are left unplastered and unpainted. On the outside of things the plans to add more are made a part of concrete; everywhere in Lima there are people making it obvious they plan to build more of the same someday.

Lima however was a very different city before the 1930s. In Colonial and early Republican Peru, well-to-do families lived in Barrios Altos, later expanding to Jesus Maria which now seems so close to downtown being immediately west of the city center. Although the neighborhoods of Miraflores and Barranco on the Pacific coast are an uninterrupted part of the city today, in Republican times, especially Barranco was

where more well-to-do Limeños would spend their summers at the coast. It wasn't until the second presidency of Leguía (1919-1930) that residential development began to spread outwards from the city center and the traditional neighborhoods of old Lima and up along the Avenida Arequipa amalgamating into Lince and Miraflores.<sup>1</sup> Poorer families moved into the neighborhoods the more well-to do were leaving (especially neighborhoods like Barrios Altos), dividing the housing up to accommodate more and more people. This is a process of urbanization Gustavo Riofrío and others call *tugurización* (*tugurio* is tenement or hovel in English). These formerly well maintained neighborhoods declined as the poor moved in and divided the housing into smaller spaces (Riofrío, 1978:5).

On the cusp of the wide-spread migration that would forever change Lima, the city suffered a devastating earthquake in 1940. The manner in which city residents coped in the aftermath of the disaster introduced new forms of urbanization that would become enduring patterns of development for the city. It is in the aftermath of the earthquake that the first true *barriadas* are established in Lima (which for lack of a better word in English I translate as “shantytowns”) where people invaded undeveloped spaces and co-opted them to build residential dwellings they largely built themselves.<sup>2</sup> The poorer residents in the city center who could not afford to re-build damaged structures after the earthquake moved onto unclaimed or unused spaces in

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<sup>1</sup> Avenida Arequipa was built in the 1920s (Riofrío, 1978:7).

<sup>2</sup> According to Matos Mar there are 5 neighborhoods that are created before this: Armatambo, Puerto Nuevo, Matute, Leticia and Santa Rosita (Matos Mar, 1977 in Riofrío, 1978: 11). Riofrío however asserts that these neighborhoods were not really *barriadas* but areas with a high concentration of poor (Riofrío, 1978:11).



the city itself. According to the social scientists who are expert on the evolution of the *barriadas* from this time period like Gustavo Riofrío, this is how the neighborhoods of Ciudadela Chalaca, Azcona, Mendocita and Caja de Agua were created (Riofrío, 1978:12). The first struggles to create *barriadas* comprised largely of families who had migrated from the provinces begin around 1945. These initial *barriadas* were located very near the city center, behind the district called Rimac, along the left bank of the Rimac River and around the *cerro* San Cosme. This is the area today known as La Parada and El Agustino. The urbanization that grew at the foot and up the slopes of the *cerro* San Cosme are now a part of the municipality of La Victoria, but they were *barriadas* in the sense that the residents “self-constructed” their homes and laid the streets themselves (Matos-Mar, 1977:18).

The patterns of urban development in Lima began to change dramatically in the 1950s and *barriadas* quickly became a mainstay of the urban landscape. While there is no definitive answer to the reasons for large-scale migration to Lima and other provincial cities, most agree rural poverty, population pressure and the lure of access to modern services and employment led to mass migration to Lima (Vega-Centeno, 1992:22). This presented a problem in Lima, where there was little in the way of existent accessible housing for the poor migrants trying to gain a foothold in the city. The *barriada* phenomenon began to intensify around this time.<sup>3</sup> Migrant families populated the newly founded *barriada* neighborhoods like San Martín de Porres (1953)

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<sup>3</sup> Atocongo, along the southern stretch of the Panamerican Highway was also established around this time (1954) and there is debate as to which was actually first.

and Comas (1961) to the north through the 1950s ,Degregori, Blondet, and Lynch 1986:43; Matos Mar, 1977:24). As Gustavo Riofrío explains, this was the beginning of a process that seemed to be producing a city with two sides; the *cuidad legal* (legitimate or legal city) and the *barriadas* (Riofrío, 1978:9).<sup>4</sup> The co-existence of formal and informal has become a defining feature of present-day Lima.

### **The Global Nature of Urban Poverty and Shantytowns**

This historically specific account of the development of the *barriada* neighborhoods in Lima is paralleled by other ways of accounting for the rapid increase in informal urbanization more broadly and around the world. Two different perspectives dominate understandings of informal urbanization in the social sciences. The first perspective focuses on forms of exclusion that are particular to the societies where the shantytowns are located. For example, residents of marginal neighborhoods are those people excluded from society more widely on the basis of society-specific terms of race, ethnicity and class; they represent a kind of bottom in a hierarchy of who has power and privilege in particular societies. At the same time however, shantytowns are also considered a global phenomena and the result of the interplay of the broad dynamics that define our increasingly capitalistic world system. These two frameworks each draw significance away from the specific communities themselves. Excluded and largely at the bottom of their particular societies but also devoid of those society-specific frameworks on a global scale of significance, what does transpire everyday in shantytowns is represented as empty and bare. These two dominant frameworks work to further

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<sup>4</sup> Riofrío identifies a third category of neighborhood in Lima as well which he calls a *tugurio*, an area where housing has been divided up and is in decline (Riofrío, 1978).

isolate and section-off the significance of the local and the everyday that transpire there, making daily relationships and quotidian events seem irrelevant to any wider significance of shantytown neighborhoods.

These are the interpretations that dominate recent publications about urban marginality. The UN Habitat report titled *The Challenge of Slums* for example gives a summary of various different case studies from cities around the world, faulting the more particular, society-specific aspects of exclusion that I introduce above. According to the wide-cast comparisons highlighted in the findings of the report, slum-dwellers are marginalized on the basis of racial, ethnic or religious differences and because particular states have failed to effectively check rapid urbanization. The report also emphasizes that the problem of informal urbanization is exacerbated because efforts to curb it are often reactive and not proactive (The Challenge of Slums, 2003:198). It is only after poor citizens have already imposed themselves en masse in this way that municipal governments take steps to try to dissuade and discourage this kind of urbanization.

Other authors emphasize macro-level factors like structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF. Structural Adjustment Policies have mandated that governments cut social spending, exposing those most vulnerable to the vagaries of the market (Davis, 2006:151). For example in *Planet of Slums*, Mike Davis broadly compares and contrasts the cities of Lima, Mumbai, Lagos and Dar-Es Salaam to argue that immiseration and the development of slums is a universal effect of these policies (Davis, 2006). In this light, shantytowns represent a kind of bottom for particular societies in

socioeconomic terms, but they also overwhelm and supersede other conventional frameworks at the same time. Shantytown residents are marginal to their particular societies but they also preempt local and national phenomena; as if shantytowns are a global problem being imposed on particular governments. In his book titled *Dispossessed*, Mark Kramer even talks in terms of a 'Squatter Nation, 1 Billion Strong,' conflating socioeconomic conditions in neighborhoods of Mexico City, Manila, Nairobi and Cairo, to cast the growth of slums as a fundamentally global problem where national and local specificities seem almost irrelevant (Kramer, 2006:3).

It is thus that the residents of marginal neighborhoods are poor and excluded but they also defy the criteria of the cities they surround and/or punctuate at the same time. They are outcast but also anomalously hyper-urban, marking a failure on the part of governments to keep up with urban pressures. Turning again to *Planet of Slums*, Mike Davis emphasizes that squatter settlements and shantytowns are a surprise, they are an unintended consequence of capitalist development the world over. In this way shantytowns and the burgeoning problem of urban poverty in the Third World are overwhelming standard frameworks for the political incorporation of citizens (Davis, 2006, 14:55-56).

Shantytowns are also stereotyped as improvised and extralegal. One reason inclusion always seems elusive for residents is because they defy the proper channels for acquiring property.<sup>5</sup> This paints marginal neighborhoods as intrinsically exceptional

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<sup>5</sup> I choose to use the word extralegal instead of illegal because this kind of ambiguity or fluidity is often more the result of a lack of regulation rather than being something explicitly illegal.

places -- where government and people apply standards and strategies that are inherently different from the formal ways of constructing and organizing neighborhoods. Partha Chatterjee for example stresses the extralegality of marginal neighborhoods in *Politics of the Governed*; where in the examples he examined clearly exist at odds with the law and the status quo (Chatterjee, 2004:40). In Peru however, the urbanization processes that create *barriadas* are ceded significant space and legitimacy, and as I will discuss further below, this was especially the case in Huaycán, the neighborhood that is the focus of my dissertation. While individual shantytowns might seem improvised and spontaneous, there is often a great deal of planning and coordination involved in the physical invasion. Politicians become the allies of particular associations looking to establish a housing project, and associations can register as official organizations within the pertinent municipalities and with the civil registry (*registro civil*) of Peru (Riofrío, 1991:28).

Conceptually these different ways of framing shantytowns come together to eclipse the actual relationships and the details of daily life within marginal neighborhoods themselves. In *The Politics of the Governed*, Partha Chatterjee argues that informal neighborhoods are illustrative of the nature of the relationship between governments and poor citizens, which he describes as 3 quarters of 'contemporary humanity' (Chatterjee, 2004: 3). Following Gramsci, Chatterjee defines political society as another set of relations that are more heterogeneous, less permanent, more strategic and changing than the classic scope of what is understood as liberal civil society (Chatterjee, 2004: 3). For Chatterjee the politics for this part of the world's

population is a form of political society but not civil society. The values and freedoms of liberal civil society are restricted to Northern countries and only the elite and intellectual circles of countries like India or Peru (Chatterjee, 2004: 41). The politics of marginal neighborhoods are thus representative of a corresponding and little understood lower-order of politics.

In my view however the ways that residents create relationships and meanings themselves complicate Chatterjee's characterization of marginal politics as definitively another kind of politics. In the chapters that follow I develop examples where everyday citizens make demands and try to assert their rights, defying the idea that their relationship to governments are devoid of liberal associations about equality and justice for instance. Chatterjee wants a framework that explains how the relationships between governments and marginal populations are different, but this obscures how such differences are more gradations of an uneven and complicated process than separate and exclusive spheres of politics. Very little analytical attention is paid to the ways different levels of politics pervade the creation of these settlements and connect with formal and legitimate frameworks. The significance of those connections is diminished.

Shantytowns are also misconstrued because they are treated as if relationships are actively being cut off in their creation. In *Planet of Slums* for example Mike Davis uses the term immiseration to describe slum populations, as if moving into a shantytown impoverishes people, or it is their option of last resort. At least in Peru the process is more complicated and marginal neighborhoods are creative spaces, on the

part of residents and the state and government. Residents of marginal neighborhoods are aspiring to something. They are not losing property, possessions or even power, at least not in any simple sense. They are creating these in shantytown neighborhoods. In a similar light, investigative journalists emphasize how shantytowns and urban poverty are ethical and humanitarian dilemmas. For example in his book titled *Dispossessed*, Mark Kramer tries to invoke a reaction at the inhumanity of shantytown settlements. To me understanding shantytowns as simply inhumane and depraved is not seeing them as the creative places they really are. It's not recognizing the ways the residents themselves are aspiring for inclusion, not accepting defeat or succumbing to the status quo. Strictly speaking informal neighborhoods are not examples of immiseration because they are about change and creation. There was no better way to live before and there is no non-shantytown space for these residents to go back to. Residents are not declining from something better, they are either seeking this life out, or being born into it.

### **Aligning the Terms of Difference: Deep Verticalities in Lima's Sprawl**

The generalized sense of urban marginality on a global scale that I have described above also combines in powerful ways with frameworks of difference in Peru. One example of this is the notion of *desborde popular* developed by José Matos Mar (*desborde* means overflow in English) (Matos Mar, 1984). In Peru the cultural differences between the white *criollo* population of the coast and the people of the provincial highlands and other provincial regions of Peru are considered insurmountable and the reason why there will forever be at least two sides to Lima. Matos Mar extends

his *desborde* metaphor to this kind of argument, and while his argument is meant as a kind of warning that *criollo* society will soon be overwhelmed by the new Lima, he is still asserting the fundamental incompatibility between the different parallels of Peruvian society. The growth of the *conos* in terms of population is also symbolic of the insurmountable differences between informal, migrant and formal, *criollo* cultures. The informal is the mix of urban and Andean or provincial influence, and *criollo* is the formal, largely white traditions and society of the coastal population (Williams, 2002:233).

Although migration from provincial areas has increased Lima's population in unprecedented ways, the idea that the growth of the *conos* without apparent integration into the dominant *criollo* culture and formal state system means the insurmountable difference between the two different Perus remains solidly in place. Essentially, this kind of metaphor about cultural difference in Peru leaves the reified categories of difference in place, in spite of the great changes that have occurred. The fundamental reason people are so different in Peru is in the Andes, or the *criollo* and Colonial past, or an aesthetic in the present-day elite neighborhoods of Lima that allows the *conos* to be talked about at such a figurative distance.<sup>6</sup> With this kind of framework shaping our arguments, we barely have to address present-day relations, especially in the *conos* themselves— and the *barriadas* remain largely invisible analytically because we already know to a great extent how and why they are excluded. Daily life in the *barriadas* can only be thin on meaning or a contrived version of something more

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<sup>6</sup> There are many migrants to Lima from other provincial origins as well such as the north coast and the jungle regions of the country.



authentically provincial or about a deeper Peru. *Barriada* neighborhoods are however a full, complete and relatively successful stake in Lima. A more fluid analytical framework is needed in to order to explore the microprocesses of difference at work in Lima.

The way that other researchers cast these differences in terms of formal and informal mirrors this same discussion (See for example de Soto, 1987; Grompone, 1990; Gandolfo, 2009). Formal is the white *criollo* society of the coast and the informal is the provincial, peasant and indigenous traditions that newer migrants have brought to the city. For example in works like *Cultures in Conflict*, or *The City and Its Limits* Susan Stokes and Daniella Gandolfo describe a set of clashing value-systems and a formal system overwhelmed by the sheer number of migrants and the incompatibility of their lifestyles; reinforcing the idea that there are at least two separate worlds in Peru. This difference is used as a point of departure to explain the divergent trajectory the *conos* seem to be taking; where urban development continues to intensify but in ways that also somehow leave the inherent difference between formal and informal Lima in place (Stokes, 1985; Paerregaard, 1997:1.) Referring to migrants to Lima in her recent book, Daniella Gandolfo picks up the terminology used by Hernando de Soto and Romeo Grompone and calls the residents of the *barriadas*, *los informales* (the informals) (Gandolfo, 2009:20). She explains how more affluent and traditional Limeños believe the *informales* actively create at least some of the terms of their own exclusion, disrespecting formal laws and tainting the state apparatus (Gandolfo, 2009:20). Gandolfo uses the notion of taboo to explain how the *barriadas* are places unseen to upper and the traditional middle class Limeños and not of their city (Gandolfo, 2009:10).

It is thus that the frameworks of material poverty and cultural difference overlap easily in talking about urban marginality in Peru. They align comfortably in interpretations of the significance of shantytown life, politics and class relations in Lima. The people living in shantytowns are migrants and therefore culturally other, they are also excluded again because shantytowns are preemptively exceptional places, not just in Peru but worldwide. Describing Lima's poor in ever more elaborate ways as other-worldly is now like a dogma; and that cultural difference is viewed as something that can be taken-for-granted, and used as a departure for analysis instead of something to actively question in the analysis in and of itself. This places all the life of the *barriadas* at a figurative distance from the formal city. Moreover, the different shorthands used to describe these differences in Lima -- *petucos* versus *informales*, or the more recent practice of referring to the different socioeconomic sectors of Lima as *clases A,B,C,D, or E*, condensing socioeconomic and ethnic distinctions in a single set of categories, also help to take these differences as givens (Murakami, 2000:9).<sup>7</sup> However, the daily struggles of shantytown residents are also about transcending and contesting the dominance of these differences in multiple ways. As Riofrío explains, "...the popular sectors don't just inhabit the *barriadas* of the city, and those that do live there also circulate and occupy all of Lima. You don't understand popular Lima just from the far away neighborhoods, but also by crossing (*recorriendo*) the Plaza San Martín, the Avenida Abancay, the Plaza 2 de Mayo and the Parque Universitario, places central (*neurálgicos*) to the city,

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<sup>7</sup> Clase "A" refers to the white, *criollo*, upper class and clase "E" are the extremely poor, Migrant, Barriada dwellers. Clase "C" generally refers to the upwardly mobile migrant and second generation (there now being almost a third generation as well) migrant classes who might be successful business owners or professionals like teachers in neighborhoods like Huaycán for example.

impregnated with the color, taste (and smell) of poverty, marginality and abandonment that a few minorities have submitted the majority to" (Riofrío, 1990:18). The *barriadas* are not neatly external or otherwise to the city, they were a response to the rapid pace of change, and a response to the shortage of other viable housing alternatives for the poor (Riofrío, 1990:26). Part of the reason the *barriadas* exist is the draw and promise of Lima itself. Although there is little recognition of this, the existence of an informal Lima is not the kind of threat to the formal city it perceived to be. In many ways, through domestic employment, construction and informal production and commerce it actually serves to support and maintain the formal parts of the city as they are (Riofrío, 1978:25).

Although the cultural and socioeconomic frameworks of difference seem to easily align in discussing Lima, demarcating strong and obvious lines of exclusion across the city, they do not necessarily delineate the same dynamics in every instance. There are ways that economic inequality is not entirely equitable to cultural difference, and the most successful entrepreneurs of Huaycán for example have some power and position in the community they did not have before. More careful understanding of the interrelationship between cultural difference and socioeconomic status can more accurately explain the microprocesses of exclusion to which the people of *barriada* neighborhoods are subject.

Shantytown residents thus re-work their lives in spite of the powerful ways trajectories of cultural difference are practiced apart in Peru. The particular stories of

urban migrants are more about fixing these apparent verticalities of Peruvian society and cultural difference on a relatively more immediate and complexly contested plane.<sup>8</sup> The life stories of particular residents challenge these separate and parallel teleologies specific to Peru and bring them into a shorter span and focus. Huaycán for example was hobbled together by associations of potential plot-owners largely based in other poor neighborhoods of Lima over the space of a few months in 1984. There is a set of archaeological ruins in Huaycán that have no straightforward association to the shantytown city that now surrounds them; the ruins represent the ancestors of no one now living in Huaycán, and you would have to explain centuries of movement and change to make sense of the connections. In the same way, making an association between the informality of the *conos* and the influence of Andean culture through simple metaphors of otherness also obscures the degree of movement and change in the real experiences of people who have migrated from the highlands and other provincial areas of Peru. It is only in a very complex way that the people of Huaycán are made products of the cultural differences usually evoked as parallel and incompatibly together in Peruvian society. These processes also involve the formal framework that is often thought of as independent from informal Peru.

This rigid framework of cultural difference has obscured the significance of the changes that have occurred, especially for those parts of the Peruvian population that

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<sup>8</sup> *Peru Profundo* is a phrase made famous by the historian Jorge Basadre and it is often evoked to describe the complexity of difference in Peru, like the phrase *el Peru legal y el Peru real* that is highlighted by Poole (Poole, 2004: 61). Jorge Basadre's legacy in this regard is also explained by Luis Arista on the following blog: <http://catedrabasadre.blogspot.com/2009/08/recado-de-jorge-basadre.html> (accessed July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2010). In *Peru: Problema y Posibilidad y Otros Ensayos* Basadre and Sobrevilla say they coined the term *Peru Profundo* in 1947 (Basadre and Sobrevilla, 1978:195).

are poor and urban. Changes are undermined by how life in the *barriadas* is tied back to these dominant cultural frameworks. There are many ways that the real and concrete, loud and chaotic everyday of modern-day Lima is in defiance of the old cannons of cultural and class difference. How are individuals, even shantytown dwellers, transected and affected by the violence of absences and other mismeasurements in certain populations? In spite of exclusion, there have also been countless efforts at inclusion and some attempts at undoing inequality -- even if they ultimately failed -- or were really only capable of something partial and smaller than what they set out to do. They may have had different levels of success, but reforms and programs instigated during the Velasco years, for example, continue to resonate in almost every corner of Peru in very important ways.<sup>9</sup> You can still feel the influence of the Velasco regime in the way children line up for school even in places like Huaycán that did not even exist at that time. The impact of Velasco-era state institutions like SINAMOS in the *barriadas* of Lima in the 1960s and 1970s was important for the formal recognition of *Organizaciones Sociales de Base* (OSBs) or grassroots organizations in poor communities.<sup>10</sup> The 2 Peru approach makes it seem as if there are very few cracks in the frameworks of inequality in Peru after decades of more inclusive politics. The dependency on dualistic categories that talk in terms of wholes are not allowing researchers to gauge the full weight of partial changes, and how the terms of difference have shifted and been recombined or

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<sup>9</sup> Velasco was president of the military regime that led the Peruvian government from 1968-1975. His regime is known for instituting many changes for the urban poor and peasant communities.

<sup>10</sup> SINAMOS stands for Sistema Nacional de Apoyo al Mobilizacion Social. It was a Velasco era state agency that trained and otherwise supported what today are referred to as grassroots organizations, or OSBs (*Organizaciones Sociales de Base*)(Gerd Schönwälder, 2002: 64-66).

changed. If they are still the old racisms at their core in Lima and Peru, how are they shored up and connected to new discourses? How is it Lima has changed so drastically but is also (and in the same breath) fundamentally the same in regards to exclusion and social class?

Without diminishing the fact that inequalities based on race, ethnicity and social class are rooted somewhere deep in Peru's past, it is also important to think of all the complicated ways they have survived the changes and defiances through decades of more inclusive politics; and to also analyze what the lingering, albeit imperfect, effects of those changes and defiances have been. There needs to be the space to explore a positive ground on which to anchor attempts at change, and to analyze that change instead of dismissing it, just because we can also still see all the old racisms in place. Some shifting and recombination in these relationships after decades of more inclusive politics has occurred. The pervasiveness of categories like *informales* or *lo popular* are not letting us see the full impact of those changes.

One productive intersection for example, is the way that '*invasiones*' or land invasions have become an important part of the relationship between the poor and the state in Peru. *Invasiones* are a kind of assemblage, one of these creative if more loosely discursive formations – as a practice – where even the municipality of Lima took up a specific project to help create one with the example of Huaycán (Li, 2005). Partha Chatterjee stresses how land occupations in India are illegal and not embraced by the state to the extent at least some seem to be in Peru. In Chatterjee's example one reason

the state does not embrace such communities is because they are illegal. This justifies holding them outside, seeing everything else that happens there as exceptional somehow -- but it is not that simple in Peru. These settlements are always planned and negotiated through authorities in some way, especially the stronger and most successful ones. They are not the spontaneous kind of invasions they are assumed to be (Riofrío, 1991:29).<sup>11</sup> There is a process to gain legitimacy for those who acquire plots in this way, that have been made even easier since the Fujimori's administration forward with the state titling agency COFOPRI.<sup>12</sup> Although I don't deny there is a dark side to these policies, that they are forwarding a neoliberal agenda, Villa El Salvador was a project with the backing of the central government (Riofrío, 1990:29). Villa El Salvador evolved from a shantytown into a municipality in the space of 25 years. Instead of taking the norms and practices at face value, with more scrutiny invasions are more sanctioned and justifiable than a trespass in Peru. Enough so that people will fight sticks and stones with the police officers trying to evict them, calling a police officer "*malo*" (mean or bad) for enforcing laws against his own people.

The understanding of present-day politics is also exacerbated by these divisions. Politics seems to caricature these apparent parallels, where Fujimori setting foot in a village and wearing a *chullo* and Toledo evoking his four suyos and using the *chakana* as a party symbol is depth enough because cultural difference is already so taken-for-

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<sup>11</sup> Ley 13517 was passed in 1961 that recognized the inevitability of this kind of urban development in the city (Riofrío, 1991:31-32)

<sup>12</sup> COFOPRI stands for Organismo de la Formalización de la Propiedad Informal and they are an agency charged with simplifying the process of gaining official title to property in urban areas.

granted that it requires no thinking. Clientelism took center stage as the explanation for the support of Fujimori in the shantytowns, and clientelism combined in powerful ways with the frameworks of race and poverty and metaphors for social analysis that I stress here. Support for Fujimori was because of lack of education or political manipulation and leads this politics to an apparent dead end. It is not worth the time to know more about it, and we can bury it along with the traditions that are incompatible with formal Peru. Politics thus layers on these kinds of understandings. They are academic understandings but they are also sociological understandings in the sense these kinds of characterizations line up while shantytown residents remain in the same marginal place; politically, racially, socioeconomically. They are also are sociological understandings in the sense that it is the analysis used in newspapers, everyday conversations and politics. They add to the layers of distance between different kinds of everyday citizens and the state.

In sum, it is very easy to conflate cultural difference with the pervasiveness of poverty in Peru as if they were almost the same thing. It makes it seem like socioeconomic, ethnic and racial distinctions put all poor Peruvians in the same place, and they can be used interchangeably without analyzing the connections that help to create an entire society between them. There are contemporary processes and ways that these distinctions are separate. We also need to examine how they manifest in the present and we should not always attribute them to the past as if they are insurmountable and not even of our doing. Only a very schematic understanding of the real and concrete modern-day Lima is really accomplished with these kinds of



frameworks. There is subtlety and complexity in these differences, despite the ugliness of discrimination and the smugness of prestige.<sup>13</sup> Understanding difference so diametrically reinforces old inequalities; it is like putting another layer down to help cement those differences, instead of showing how to think through them. We lose sense of the energy in people's present-day efforts. It is another way to do violence to the people out there waging their everyday battles, in spite of it all. In this way the *barriadas* challenge understandings of marginality and the state. Despite their peripheralness, shantytowns are connected in numerous and complicated ways to all the different centers that make Peru, and they are a full product of all that has gone into Lima's growth.

### **Trajectories Forward for Lima's Informal Side: *Conos* and *Megacentros***

Although in terms of administrative political divisions Lima spans roughly the same area it did since republican times, (in 1857 for example Lima was comprised of Magdalena, Surco, Miraflores, Chorrillos, Pachacámac, Ate, Lurigancho, Carabayllo, with Ate encompassing what is presently La Molina, La Victoria, Santa Anita and San Luis) the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century brought rapid demographic growth and land-use changes, especially on the outskirts of the city. I described some of the larger and most important neighborhoods created in the 1950s and 1960s above. The 1970s were marked by the founding of Villa el Salvador to the south of the city (Riofrío, 1978:44). As the 1980s

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<sup>13</sup> Popular and informal culture is seen as something not progressive, as disdainful or distasteful in this regard (Williams, 2002: 215).

wore on, the war between the Shining Path and the State brought even more migrants to Lima looking to escape the danger and violence especially from the south central highlands and valleys. The 1980s saw the creation of newer *barriadas* like Huaycán and expansion within older *barriadas* like Villa Maria del Triunfo and San Juan de Miraflores (Riofrío, 1991:85).

The outlying areas of the city that experienced most of their population growth in the form of *barriadas* are now referred to in a more incorporative, systemic way as the *conos* (the direct translation for *conos* is cones, which refers to the physical pattern urban development takes into areas that extend out in long bands to the north, east and south of the city). These are the Cono Norte, Cono Este and Cono Sur. The *conos* are outlying areas of the city where there is a great degree of informal development and large and populous *barriadas* (Joseph, 1999:21). The commercialization of the *conos* has increased in the past decade and there are now big department stores and supermarkets with retail establishments located in the *conos* themselves, like Plaza Veá, or Metro.

The commercialization has also blurred the strength of some of the economic differences, or recombined bringing these old tensions out in a new field, with some measure of conciliation towards the brute economic potential of more informal processes of urbanization. Others see this not as evidence of conciliation or incorporation of the *conos* and the formal city, but how each continues to follow its own trajectory. There are neighborhoods now like *Los Olivos* (a region formerly of San Martín

de Porres) in the Cono Norte where the rents are higher, and where there is a greater degree of retail business and more sense of economic well-being. Los Olivos is also where one of the largest and most well-known shopping complexes of the *conos* is. Despite these little inroads and conciliations however, the layout and distribution of the city continues to reflect socioeconomic divisions, as well as the difference between migrants to the city and those who were born in Lima and those with families have been Limeños for generations.

The conflation of different ways of understanding marginality has impacted the way the *cono* regions of Lima and the *barriadas* are understood. As Riofrío states, “in the same way the existence of the impoverished sectors of the population have been understood as marginals (*marginales*) to the society they sustain, they have also wanted to ‘marginalize’ the understanding of the *barriada* as an important part of the city, that has served to alleviate the popular demand for housing” (Riofrío, 1978: xii). Despite the fact there are complex connections and the *conos* make up the bulk of the population of the city, the fact these residents are informal, poor and largely (though by no means exclusively) from provincial areas is taken-for-granted as a primary reason for the development of these peripheral places. As developed above, most explanations seem to hinge on cultural difference as the primary reason the *conos* have developed as differently as they have from traditional Lima. There is less attention paid to how the *conos* are also a response to processes from within the formal city itself – the lack of other affordable and accessible options for poor residents. Riofrío’s point is that marginal people are not just failing to incorporate or adopt the appropriate values in the

city; their development is also because there is a lack of other viable options for the poor within the more formal city system itself. While they appear marginal on both the social and physical fronts, there are ways the *barriadas* are integral to the kind of formal city Lima is. There is more depth and more associations with the formal system than is assumed on the surface. The poor also use the city of Lima (Riofrío, 1990:17).

### **Huaycán: Planning and the Invasion on the 15 de Julio**

It is in this general context of socioeconomic tension, pressure for affordable housing and growth in the city of Lima that Huaycán, the neighborhood that is the focus of my research, was created. Huaycán is a large *barriada* on the eastern outskirts of Lima, located in the Cono Este. Huaycán traces its founding back to July 15<sup>th</sup>, 1984.

Huaycán stands out from other land invasions around the city because it was an anticipated and planned invasion. 23 different associations were involved in the project to create Huaycán, and they did the work of recruiting interested people for the project and signing people up. With the support of the municipality of Metropolitan Lima and mayor Alfonso Barrantes of Izquierda Unida, about 4000 people first settled in Huaycán with *esteras* (reed mats) for walls (Arévalo, 1997: 61; Muñoz, 1999:87). The largest association for example was called AA Caceres (named after a former president of Peru from 1886-1890), now the name of one of Huaycán's main streets (Arévalo, 1997:61).

Modeled on other neighborhoods like Villa el Salvador, there were many different voices that went into the creation of Huaycán. Not all residents were impoverished and dispossessed, at least not in the sense of the stereotype; they were

political party members (some militant), construction workers, and state teachers for example. Others had friends or relatives who were part of the associations involved in the Huaycán project, and were encouraged to join through word- of- mouth.

Professional architects were enlisted to help orchestrate and plan community development and a design was officially registered with the Municipality of Lima. This project design was especially important for the first few years.<sup>14</sup>

The design and execution of the special Huaycán housing programme (sic) was to be carried out at two levels: by the municipal authority and by grassroots organizations. At the municipal level, the elected mayor entrusted the technical and social preparation of this programme (sic) to his closest colleagues, with backing from IDEAS, a non-governmental organization specializing in architectural design and town planning (Arévalo, 1997:61).

The project was novel because it was clearly intended for residents who really were in need of housing. You had to be resident on your lot. There was no acquiring of lots to later sell at a profit.

My dissertation will not directly engage this early movement and the different stories of contentious struggle over the founding and creation of Huaycán. Local leaders are still making claims to this local history and working hard to make it more public themselves. You can find entries for Huaycán on the internet, in the Spanish language version of Wikipedia and in articles published to internet-based journals (Arévalo, 1997). You can also find YouTube footage that documents some of the more dramatic incidents in Huaycán's past. For example, one of the most remembered incidents was a protest by Huaycán residents in the plaza mayor of Lima in 1988 to pressure the government about

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<sup>14</sup> The lot size in Huaycán was smaller than other communities like Villa El Salvador, and there was more intention to use communal services than other projects that preceded it.

the lack of services like water and electricity in Huaycán. The first government of Alan Garcia turned on those gathered in the plaza and a *rochebus* (a small police tank that Peruvians call *rochebus*) crushed into the crowd, killing resident Flores Echevarría and wounding another.<sup>15</sup>

I don't want to claim any ownership over the early struggle in Huaycán by publishing the details of that history as a part of this research. A lot of the activism of local leaders involves making the story more public in order to tell the story of those early years.<sup>16</sup> This present study is less an ethnography in the traditional sense. I do not spend considerable time first describing a place and explaining the details of its history. I let some of those details emerge as they are relevant to the problems I outline in the text.

In the early 1990s a new wave of migrants came to settle in Huaycán. These new migrants were largely displaced by the violence and other effects of the war between the state and the Shining Path in the highlands and valleys of Ayacucho and other parts of Central Peru. The different kinds of migration have contributed to the dynamic of division within Huaycán itself that will be especially pertinent in chapter 4 of my dissertation. In Huaycán the *partes bajas* are the older parts of the community that were part of the original project and the *partes altas* are the newer regions, that tend to

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<sup>15</sup> You can see video footage of the beginnings of Huaycán at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=ES&hl=es&v=cloTVOqFYvo> (Accessed August 9<sup>th</sup>, 2009).

<sup>16</sup> The research published in conjunction with the final report for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission traces some of the history of Shining activity in the region (Final Report, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003).

be more precarious and are still lacking some essential services, especially water in the most precarious and outlying parts of the neighborhood.

### **Everyday Politics: Formal and Informal in the Daily Lives of Residents**

The ethnographic approach I take in the dissertation sketches the diffuse, inconsistent and often contradictory ways that people who live in shantytowns like Huaycán experience official politics in their daily lives. Everyday politics provide the day-to-day context for more obviously organized forms of political involvement: like social movement membership, participation in local state institutions, or voting. This complexly interweaves concerns of the domestic, personal, community, public and state, making it hard (if not impossible) to draw a line between political and non-political behavior, except perhaps by paying very close attention to what aspects people impart political importance to in their everyday lives.

In many assessments of the state of politics in the Third World, the ambiguous relationship between institutions and society is unduly dismissed and also inadvertently acknowledged at the same time. For instance, researchers like Larry Diamond conclude that one problem in state-making and politics in Latin America is that the separation between state and society is weak. At the same time however, the actual ways the state continues to work without the definitive separation are rarely examined because that falls beyond the scope of the models. Diamond argues that the weakness of institutions is the reason strongmen (caudillo) type leaders like Alberto Fujimori, former president of Peru, can take advantage of institutional foundations, building regimes that only

superficially parody a legitimately democratic government. The poor buy into these regimes built on populism, clientelistic practices and corruption. Here analysts at once acknowledge the importance of society to institutions and expulse it from their frameworks. Instead of considering how the social is constitutive of the very idea of institutional autonomy, like those who take a cultural turn to the state such as Philip Abrams, Philip Corrigan, Derek Sayer and Timothy Mitchell, they take the formal state framework for granted and do not try to understand how the society balance produces and continues to function with that weak institutional separation. If only societies like Peru and their corrupt governments could respect institutions, the political situation in the Third World would improve. In this way the politics of *barriada* neighborhoods are also considered marginal because of a lack of formalness, and it further eclipses the understanding of everyday life in the *barriadas*. In this perspective, politics understood this way helps to maintain the idea that what happens in Huaycán is only very marginally relevant to the formal framework.

These kinds of tensions that seem exclusively conceptual and academic also impact real politics. The model that state institutions should be strong and separate from society also has a real-life impact because many governments are trying to make it at least seem like they are actively emulating the models they do not live up to at the same time; continuing to try to build stronger separations between state and society. This means that we still need to keep an understanding of the separation between state and society in mind, but not as a framework for the conceptual understanding of the state, more as model that governments and states are aspiring to.



## **The Symbiotics of Government and State**

The productive tension between government and state is also pertinent to the way I analyze the state in this dissertation. As Victor Vich explains, “If on the one hand, when talking about the state, reference is made to a whole political institutional apparatus, on the other, they also name a type of ‘cultural artifact’ that generate diverse beliefs and complex connections”(Vich, 2005:11). In Peru, weakness and a troubled sense of institutional coherence is already inherent to the artifact being carried forward, where the way the state is carried through different regime changes is one of the difficulties that impacts everyday citizens (Vich, 2005:10). Yet, as Timothy Mitchell following Foucault explains, the strength and coherency of all states is fundamentally questionable as well. He explains that,

government is a process ‘at once internal and external to the state, since it is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private and so on’ (Foucault, 1991:103). For this reason, Foucault suggests, the state probably does not have the unity, individuality and rigorous functionality attributed to it (Mitchell, 1999:88).

Mitchell points out however that even if the state does not have the unity we assume it does empirically, we still need to explain how it is people come to believe it has this unity. Mitchell calls this the metaphysical dimension of the state, how the state has the power to seem like a coherently functioning entity, even when we know it is not (Mitchell, 1999:85). Many of the political processes I analyze in the dissertation have

this kind of back and forth. On a conceptual level they are not what they seem, and I analyze them as such; but in an empirical or ethnographic sense there is still some substance and power even to how they seem.

This back and forth in regards to the concept of the state is true to all nation- states, but there is a further dimension to the dynamic in discussing processes of state formation and government in nations like Peru because an implicit comparison is always being made. This always seems to construe states like Peru as somehow less-than complete where compared to the countries of the First World. This further cements the notion that the Peruvian state is either weak or absent into the metaphysical aspect of its presence (Vich, 2005:10). In this dissertation I try to problematize the fact the state is a European concept while also trying to acknowledge that Peru has its own full historicity, no matter how the dominant models have wanted to cast the political system as somehow partial or incomplete. At the same time however, the sense that Peru is a weaker, less complete state is something reproduced in daily life, especially with all the discussion in the media and from analyses by NGOs, and even in the scholarly literature, that Peru is (still) in transition and working to overcome the disadvantages that wide-spread poverty inflicts on the political system and aspirations for social inclusion (Vich, 2005:10). This perception of weakness becomes a part of what people believe about the state, it is part of the image portrayed and so there is some power exercised in that notion. Despite the shortcomings that the comparisons between make seem inherent; inter-

relationships between Peruvian citizens and the Peruvian state are complete if still not openly like ours.

For Mitchell, these more abstract properties of the state, that seem cohesive and solid by are not as coherent as they project, are held together by a national project, making the state seem composite even when it is not. Peru is a country that is pluricultural and multi-ethnic, while possessing extreme levels of socioeconomic inequality as well (The World Bank figures for poverty in Peru are 48.6 percent and extreme poverty at 17.1 percent in 2004).<sup>17</sup> The Peruvian nation-state is inarguably less homogenous than the other national projects that this kind of approach compares Peru too. What does making comparisons between states really do to improve our understanding of state power? The lack of homogeneity appears to reinforce the idea that Peru is somehow less-than-complete or a weak state. However, in Peru as elsewhere 'power passes through finer channels and is much more ambiguous' than the state framework seems to allow for (Foucault, 1980:72).

In this dissertation I use government and state almost interchangeably. In my example of the state in a shantytown in Peru, it is clear how the government is not coterminous with the state, but the relevance of a state that exists independent of the political interests of government is more problematic. The state at a minimum can be defined as the idea that there is an organized body of institutions that manage and

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<sup>17</sup> Figures obtained from [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPERU/SPANISH/Resources/JavierHerrera\\_IRD.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPERU/SPANISH/Resources/JavierHerrera_IRD.pdf). Accessed July 12, 2010. See also the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática <http://www1.inei.gob.pe/perucifrasHTM/inf-soc/cuadro.asp?cod=8327&name=pob17&ext=gif> accessed July 12th, 2010.

regulate society. For example, the electoral process that defines how governments assume power is established and formalized by state institutions. The state is an idea put to paper and made more concrete still by the buildings that house institutions and agencies that practice on its behalf. In this way the state seems to be something that endures the changes in government, but it is also the framework the government uses to meet their own objectives. The state is less taken-for-granted in Latin America and as a result it often seems to be more subsumed by the politics of particular governments. It is not that the state is necessarily weaker or incomplete in Peru. Many of the same processes and similar ambiguities are still a part of how the state works in Europe and North America, although processes are more taken-for-granted there, and there seems to be less that makes them openly problematic. The inconclusiveness of this relationship between government and state in Peru seems to be one of the problems, but there are also questions to ask about the effects that insisting it is a problem also has out there in how politics transpire and how government interrelates with society.

As I will develop further in the dissertation, Huaycán and neighborhoods like it take some of the expected direction out of governing techniques. Disciplinary powers also pervade shantytown communities, but our understanding of the way that power is exercised through these institutions is taken-for-granted, as if schooling everywhere achieves very similar results for example. We interpret the molding going on in terms of our own (meaning European or First World) ideas about what the military and/or educational institutions are and what they try to achieve of subjects instead of following what it really achieves. There are many aspects in the state framework that are used

unquestioningly or with only slight adjustments made to the basic model in order to accommodate the circumstances elsewhere. At the same time other states (meaning non-First World) are also trying to fit that same model (even if they do not) so it creates a very ambiguous ground to tread, between expectations, efforts to meet expectations and the real and everyday historical reality of how Latin American states like Peru have developed over time, including the setbacks and failures. There are ways the state is historicized from and about Peru that is deeper than we tend to give it credit, and with associations made that are not necessarily the same as our own but that have also built. These processes are not necessarily producing the same kinds of subjects.

### **Outline of the Dissertation Chapters**

The dissertation is organized around a number of key ethnographic examples that highlight the relationships that exist between residents, the state and the different levels of government in Huaycán.

In Chapters 1 and 2 I take an ethnographic look at different expressions of the state in Huaycán itself. Chapter 1 deals specifically with encounters with the police and chapter 2 focuses on the national daycare program, Wawa Wasi. I use these examples to give a framework for the kinds of state presence that I analyze at the local level in Huaycán. The state encompasses differently than at the center and the relationships of power are multidimensional and do not always follow the directionality that governing processes are assumed to. At the same time however, there is still the omnipresent sense that the state is always present in other ways, adding yet another dynamic of influence and making the effects more ambiguous still. These multidimensional and

unconventional aspects of state presence influence daily life more than they are usually given credit for. This makes it inaccurate to define the problems in marginal neighborhoods in terms of a lack of state action. While the way we expect to find the state in terms of formal expression might be stark and bare in this environment, there are many other ways that the state and other social forces fully produce the margins. Chapter 3 is a discussion of the different concepts used to help flesh out anthropological approaches to the state and where we need to further reflect on the interconnections and productive powers of state and government. The concepts we use still fall short of explaining many aspects of the kinds of processes I am trying to engage. Chapters 4 and 5, focusing on local leadership and municipal elections, show the surprising ways that some straightforward examples of state presence are used in the neighborhood. The chapters emphasize how participation can be different than assumed at the center but how those assumptions from the center remain significant despite how local reality diverges from them because they are used as a measure of local politics, they are the framework for understanding the ways that Huaycán is different. They are used to compare Huaycán to other neighborhoods like it, and to gauge the kinds of politics that transpire there.

The qualitative differences in citizenship experience seem to arise because the state acts with duplicity, treating one kind of citizen better than another. In the chapters that follow I stress how these differences arise at a deeper level than what is obviously duplicitous – they are elusive precisely because they emerge at the level where the state is striving for universality and treating citizens the same. The relationships between the

state and citizens need deeper consideration than the level where the outcomes seem duplicitous, because inequalities in citizenship experience, like those that lead to second class citizenship for example, do not arise from the state treating citizens differently per se. The levels on which the state seems to treat people differently, i.e., gearing specific programs towards the poor for example, come after the fact -- they are instituted on the basis of universal principles to justify more specific programs and politics. Different social programs are created on the foundations of this universalizing framework in order to reconcile the kinds of differences produced in large part by processes that also help make the state in the first place.

### **Lima's *Barriadas*: On Hillsides, from *Esteras* and with Politics**

Shantytowns are often viewed as sites of systemic social abandonment. However, abandonment implies that there are a myriad of potential relationships being actively cut off.<sup>18</sup> Squatter settlements and shantytowns are different because there is an element of improvisation inherent in their existence. They are something new vis-à-vis the state, and they represent not a breaking of ties but the creation of new and different kinds of relationships, elaborated as a result of improvising and even imposing a new community on the city and state. Existing ties are reworked in new ways. As Gustavo Riofrío explains,

The importance of those means of overcoming the crisis that arise from below cannot be ignored [desdeñada]. In a country where everything is still to invent itself, it is better to learn from and systematize the popular experiences than from those manuals and orientations that come to us from

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<sup>18</sup> There are complex ways that individuals within the framework of Huaycán have experienced different degrees of social abandonment as Biehl develops in *Vita* – drug users, prostitutes, gang-members, but shantytown residents as a community do not experience what is meant by bare life, at least not completely (Biehl, 2005).

abroad. In spite of being bastardized and marginal, in spite of having developed with no understanding, respect or help, we can find more in the implicit proposals the poor develop out of urgency and thinking in the immediate than in the supposedly proper elaborations or adaptations that they build on the basis of models that are not ours. It should be clear, nonetheless, that the proposals that come from reality are not right as they are presented. Their nature as practical proposals to deal with concrete problems and of elaborations that have not had modern infrastructure in being implemented gives them an artisanal and unfinished characteristic. There sheer importance is evident when proposals of this kind not only know how to root themselves in the traditions and customs at present in Peru, but when we notice that even unfinished they are successful at competing with the belief in those formulas that – unfruitfully – they try to develop with all the technical, financial and political infrastructure that the others lack (Riofrío, 1990:14-15).

Strong metaphors of cultural difference are superimposed on the differences between formal and informal Peru; reinforcing the idea that Lima is surrounded by a belt of misery that is incompatible with white *criollo* society and in danger of overwhelming the formal and ordered system. These metaphors conflate some very complex processes as if they essentially point to the same exclusion; informality perpetuates in Peru because of both cultural differences and socioeconomic inequalities at once. Gustavo Riofrío argues that researchers need to change their understanding of Lima. Instead of taking formal Lima as the true heart and form of the city and everything else as exception and otherwise, the *barriadas* are a product of the formal system too, as a response to population pressures and a general lack of accessible housing for the poor in Lima. Tying empirical evidence of informality to deep assumptions of cultural difference negates an important level that also needs analysis. In analyzing the *barriadas*, more effort is spent tying actualities to the apparent parallels of cultural and socioeconomic difference instead of paying attention to the new meanings people are creating and how the networks they use displace or aim to displace those old parallels. Sorting through the new activities of shantytown residents to tie them back to the old frameworks of



difference makes all the activity of daily life and the new politics in the *barriadas* strangely irrelevant to any significance they apparently have.

Huaycán might look like any other shantytown, but there are also ways that it defies the stereotype. At least in a technical sense, Huaycán was not created by illegal trespass. Yet reflecting the real power of assumptions yet again, the idea from outside and the assumptions of mainstream society even in Peru itself reinforce the idea that formal property laws are breeched and that trespass is a defining feature of a shantytown, means that Huaycán and other neighborhoods like it are largely treated as such, regardless of their actual and politically sanctioned beginnings (Riofrío, 1990:30). The legal and political openings in the formal system for creating *barriada* neighborhoods are overlooked, obscuring the ways these marginal places are more of the formal system than we think. Shantytowns are also construed as places for the destitute and the dispossessed, ignoring that they are creative places where people have livelihoods, build homes and generate new terms of inclusion themselves, albeit in ways that can remain elusive to the mainstream. Although the actual relationships the residents of Huaycán maintain with the government and the state do not necessary conform to the models in place; in some instances those models remain important because it is in the interest of the community to work hard to make it look like they are trying to conform to the status quo.

## **Chapter 1: Giving Substance to Rights and Citizenship from Below**

In this chapter and the next, I discuss specific examples of how the state and government are present and function in the everyday in Huaycán. In what ways are the people in Huaycán included but also somehow still excluded from politics and Peruvian society more widely in their relationship to state programs and services like the police and state-led daycare?

Building on the influence of scholars like Philip Abrams, Timothy Mitchell, Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, I argue the boundary between state and society is a social process and not a distinction that can be clearly or definitively made, given that the state itself is a process and not a thing. This means that daily relationships where authority is established and the everyday government practices that transpire are also important sites where the state is produced. This dimension of the state is rarely incorporated into research on political systems because the informal dimensions of politics are relegated to a category apart from formal expressions like state institutions and what is officially sanctioned. Promoting the state as a thing makes it difficult to see the ways that important state dynamics also emerge and are practiced in an everyday and otherwise 'informal' context. The more ethnographic approach to the state that I take in this dissertation demonstrates that local expressions of government and state do not necessarily conform in every way to the hierarchies that emanate from the center.

The local gives substance to many centralized state policies and procedures in ways that de-center them. The present chapter will establish the framework I use to try to understand the Peruvian state from the perspective of Huaycán. Most of the examples discussed in this chapter focus on a particular resident of Huaycán named Yolanda. I use the way Yolanda is active in the community and her personal experiences with the police to explore the kinds of tensions created between the state and citizens in trying to exercise their rights in Huaycán.

Yolanda is an active member of the community and participates in a number of different organizations in the neighborhood. At the time of my research she worked as a promoter for a foreign-coordinated Catholic women's center.<sup>19</sup> She helped coordinate workshops and provided support and guidance to women who found themselves in violent domestic situations or were suffering from other personal difficulties. Yolanda had also been active for many years in the catechesis of the local parish church. Many residents of Huaycán know her in that capacity as well. From time-to-time Yolanda also worked as a paid field assistant on my project. She made appointments for me with local leaders and *Organizaciones Sociales de Base* (OSB) participants and was present at many of my interviews. She was also instrumental in helping schedule interviews with local leaders for the research team working for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The TRC compiled information on Shining Path and government activities in Huaycán. Yolanda is a very active and outspoken member of the community.

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<sup>19</sup> Warmi Huasi is the project of two Irish sisters, funded through contributions to their organization.

I use Yolanda's experiences with the police below to show how different realms for exercising citizenship rights in Huaycán are incommensurate; albeit each is important to what citizenship is for people like the residents of Huaycán. NGOs are spaces for participation and exercising rights, but they cannot be considered just another extension of government, as if they were delegated responsibilities and tasks that were once the responsibility of the state. While it might seem to be stating the obvious, the interaction and interrelationship between government and NGOs is complex and they are never simple substitutes for the other. At the analytical and conceptual levels, the governing power of NGOs is treated a lot like the governing power of a state, especially in how NGOs are considered new and increasing agents of 'transnational governmentality' by many anthropologists (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Baker-Cristales, 2008). I will discuss how government and NGOs impact the everyday and individual participants quite differently below.

Using many different ways to exercise their rights in their daily lives, general citizenship parameters take on new kinds of substance at the local level. They become more meaningful as people use their rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis society to solve community and personal problems. The ways these local meanings are incommensurate with some of the wider frameworks (the state or international models of participatory democracy and citizenship for example) imparts unevenness, it shows there are also interstices to the way the state has power. This unevenness in the ways policies are applied and norms are enforced is of consequence in the politics of Huaycán and for

understanding exclusion in Peru. Sometimes local substance and meanings compensate for that unevenness, making sense of contradictions between different state policies for example, or at least making the contradiction somehow useful to local authorities and residents. There are other times however when the local networks and ways of dealing with community dilemmas seem to feed the kinds of exclusions that the residents of Huaycán face, as people who are poor and living in a marginal neighborhood.

Recent ethnographic work on the state has identified some of the more ambiguous and everyday processes of the state that I am also drawing attention to. In her essay titled *Signatures of the State*, Veena Das explains how the iterability of state practices and documents is an unrecognized dimension of state power. The fact that state practices can always be interpreted differently than their original intent makes them 'iterable,' and these alternate readings and contextual applications are another way that the state works. As she explains, "one of the methodological observations that follow is that to study the state, we need to shift our gaze from the obvious places where power is expected to reside to the margins and recesses of everyday life, where such infelicities become observable' (Das, 2004:227). Furthermore, there is conceptual significance to the way that local processes de-center the state. The hierarchies that seem so straightforward at the center and in the official version of politics can manifest differently in the everyday politics of particular communities. Although the dominant views of hierarchies and social organization – the official version of what is the state – seem to trump local specificity, there are still differences produced through the

implementation of such logics into specific communities or populations. That difference is viable in spite of the way the official version might seem to overpower and obscure it and shows the surprising directions that everyday life and local politics take the state. The official is just one of many real versions of politics, and those other real versions often diverge in important ways while still also remaining reflections of the state. Although more ambiguous and less clear, these everyday realities are another way that power works. They are an important part of how the system functions day-to-day in Peru.

### **Different Awareness of an Absence: The Relationship between the Police and Community Residents in Huaycán**

Police presence in Huaycán has an ambivalent past and present. Although officers are now permanently stationed at a police facility near the central plaza in Huaycán and regularly patrol the neighborhood, it was the cooperation of local leaders that brought the local police station (*comisaria*) to Huaycán, requiring the active work of local authorities and government together in order to get the *comisaria* put in place (Final Report, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003:434). Like most other examples of state presence in the neighborhood, it was the *gestiones* (negotiations) of local leaders that did the work of conciliating between the community and the state in order to even have a *comisaria* created in the first place.

The *comisaria* was established just as Shining Path influence began to decline significantly in Huaycán (Arévalo, 1997: 73-74). While this is one reason for some of the

initial tension with the police (because the *comisaria* represented yet another of Fujimori's anti-terrorism incursions in the neighborhood), animosity towards the *comisaria* developed in other dimensions over time as well. Many residents believe it brought a new set of dilemmas to the community – adding procedures that made it more difficult to deal with certain forms of crime in the neighborhood. This coupled with widespread rumors of police corruption imbibing daily police operations (mainly in the form of accepting bribes) means legitimacy is often questioned by community residents and hard won for the police.<sup>20</sup>

This troubled relationship with the community is the context in which the *comisaria* of Huaycán organized a small conference to respond publicly to rumors of police corruption and ineffectiveness while I was conducting my field research. Just after dark one evening and from the tarmac of a local high school, a number of invited experts on policing practices and community relations formed a panel to speak about the difficulties of policing a community like Huaycán.<sup>21</sup>

Opening the discussion, the officer representing the *comisaria* on the panel explained the conference was being held in response to long-standing misconceptions about the police in the community. These misunderstandings were damaging the relationship between community residents and local police. Local residents are quick to

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<sup>20</sup> Such rumors are not just specific to Huaycán. They are part of generalized impressions the public have of the police throughout Lima and Peru. Community residents who criticize the police for accepting bribes for example are drawing on this common impression and not just something specific to Huaycán and the practices of its own *comisaria*.

<sup>21</sup> The conference was held at a private high school in Huaycán.

criticize the *comisaria* and police effectiveness because trouble-makers are back out on the street within hours of committing a crime. The officer representing the *comisaria* of Huaycán on the panel wanted to step out of his role and speak more abstractly to those in attendance about some of the reasons it is difficult to police a community like Huaycán.

When those causing problems in the neighborhood are quickly released after being picked up by police, the assumption among residents is that the police are taking bribes from the perpetrators to secure their release. In *the Spectacular City*, Daniel Goldstein also describes a 'barrio perspective' in a neighborhood of Cochabamba, Bolivia, where residents are frustrated with the inaction of police in regards to petty crime, and live in what he describes as a constant fear of being the victims of robbery (Goldstein, 2004:187). Similar to Goldstein's example of the 'barrio perspective,' the residents of Huaycán also feel that police inaction and state indifference reflects a general, society-wide lack of consideration for their own rights as everyday citizens. The quick release of petty thieves leaves residents vulnerable to revenge, of being victimized by the same perpetrators again. In this way it feels like yet another risk to even report a crime in the first place. There are many stories circulating in the neighborhood of the police crossing the line between legal and illegal even with ordinary citizens and victims; asking for gas money to patrol the streets or charging arbitrary fees just to file a report. It is very easy for residents to believe the officers also take money from the perpetrators.



The officer at the conference however wanted to stress what he believed was a little known fact to most community members. He explained that police response to the kinds of crimes that are widespread in Huaycán is also limited by the established norms; the police too are restricted in what they can do by the state as well. The officer told how the written norms of the state restrict not just everyday citizens but also what the officers can do, explaining to the people present at the conference that state norms establish a person cannot be physically detained for a theft of less than 800 soles.<sup>22</sup> The police do not take money from the people victimizing residents (at least that kind of corruption is not as widespread as assumed); the perpetrators are released back onto the streets a short while later because it is unlawful to detain them for any longer. This also means that many of the robberies that occur in Huaycán are below the threshold where the state sanctions detaining the perpetrators for any extended period of time. Although the officer did not have to state something that was obvious to those present, 800 soles (about 300 dollars) is a significant amount of money in a neighborhood like Huaycán. At the time of my research it was more than a teacher or police officer makes in a month.

The officer was frustrated because the local *comisaria* took the brunt of the community's criticism and shouldered the burden of these little known idiosyncrasies

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<sup>22</sup> It is not within the scope of my argument to consider whether the 800 soles norm has the kind of impact the officer claims it does in policing practices in marginal communities or not – I cannot make that kind of causal argument from this example. What this demonstrates for the purpose of my argument is how state absences can be productive, and that even the local police recognize there are different kinds of needs in the neighborhood that are not being met by the state. It is in this way that the margins make some state limits more obvious.

that pervade the law, and how these show the kinds of indifference that indirectly play out towards daily life in poor communities, even on the part of specific institutions of the state itself. It is the officers who appear incompetent or corrupt in the eyes of the community, but a large part of the ineffectiveness is also due to what the norms allow for the police to do. Obviously frustrated but also encouraged at the rare opportunity to speak openly about the dilemma with an audience, the officer explained that the state takes no interest in the kinds of tensions this creates between the police and residents, and the misunderstanding is simply allowed to perpetuate. This is productive in a damaging sense because it affects the relationship between the police and residents, making police work even harder because the expectations the community residents have cannot be met by the local police in the ways they expect. In this case, state inaction is productive of a dilemma that is actively damaging the relationship between the police and residents. Withholding information or just not even being cognizant of how its own limits actively impact relationships like this enables these kinds of accusations that are damaging to the legitimacy of local police authority. The state is also indifferent to the fact the public believes that police corruption is that widespread, doing nothing to help local police dispel the rumors that corruption is the primary cause of police inaction at this level.

The way the police feel restricted in what they can accomplish locally by the state itself -- and how residents are uncertain of the benefits that police presence truly serves to them personally -- is an example of the kind of disjunctures that occur

between different aspects of the state that are productive of the ambiguity that characterize state presence and politics at the local level. The police conference at the local high school was a rare instance where the productive effects of this kind of absence were being overtly acknowledged. In a public display of self-analysis, at least one police officer was being reflexive of the dilemma the lack of understanding and acknowledgement of this disjuncture caused for them locally. The police's function, the impact of state norms and the needs of the residents of the neighborhood were all incommensurate but still in a relationship, together producing one of the real areas of ambiguity in how the state affects the local. Whereas residents feel that corruption is the primary reason there is such a distance between the police and the needs of the community, the officer was explaining that the norms also make the police seem indifferent while also being witness to many of the everyday problems in the community. While there is obviously corruption that comes into play too, the corruption happens within the context of this same framework of disjuncture or absence. It is also illustrative of the productiveness of these kinds of disjunctures that the police conference was poorly attended.<sup>23</sup> There were so few people in the audience that the police had to actively create one at the last minute. I was one of those last-minute audience members, along with the women who worked in the Catholic women's center.

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<sup>23</sup> The fact there were few residents in attendance at the conference is illustrative of the kind of troubled relationship the police had with the community. The panel was held at a busy time of day for most residents. It was after 6:00pm on a weekday, when most people are just getting home from work and the children who go to school in the afternoon are also arriving home. The police were not very proactive in publicizing and encouraging attendance at the event. The women at the catholic women's center described below for example were unaware of the conference until the female officer arrived to invite us personally.

The Catholic women's center was run from the ground floor of a house that the coordinator rented, facing one of the paved and busy thoroughfares of Huaycán. Workshops were usually held in the evenings, teaching women *manualidades* (handicrafts). The center would also arrange workshops on domestic violence explaining what women can do to be more assertive and communicative with their partners. We were in the middle of one of those workshops when the *comisaria's* only female officer appeared in the doorway to the background of evening traffic noise from the entire bustle outside. After the initial hellos and introductions and without much of an explanation other than there was an event going on at that very moment, the officer said she was sent by the *comisaria* to bring us with her.<sup>24</sup> The women from the center agreed to go with no hesitation, especially at the prospect of getting chauffeured to the event in one of the new police SUVs. The *comisaria* was worried about how it would look to invited guests at the conference that there were so few community members in attendance.

The way the conference transpired is a reflection of the different levels of indifference and ambivalence felt by both police and residents. The problem of police ineffectiveness at dealing with daily crime is caused by the interplay between different aspects of the state and particular community dynamics. Firstly, the police represent a mandated authority to many in the general public. The police are not usually seen as an

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<sup>24</sup> The women's center was very excited at the recent appointment of the female officer. They hoped she might be an asset to their own activities and a better representative of women's issues vis-à-vis the police.

agency that has to maneuver the subtleties of the community (even if they do have to); their kind of authority seems absolute and one of the more straightforward dimensions of state power. The public takes-for-granted that following legal norms would make the police effective also for the citizens of Huaycán. Like those sitting close to me at the conference, this was the first mention I ever heard of the 800 soles norm, though I had been told innumerable little stories of police corruption everywhere in Huaycán. Why is corruption the easier, most available and popular explanation for local police ineffectiveness? Why were residents so unaware of the way the procedures and processes of the state itself lead to these dilemmas? As Das explains in her essay titled *The Signature of the State*, one way the state wields power is through examples of illegibility like this. She explains that, “because the bureaucratic-legal processes are not legible even to those responsible for implementing them, that the state can penetrate the life of the community and yet remain elusive” (Das, 2004:245). Neighborhoods like Huaycán come up against these kinds of impasses in the state itself, an aspect where there is very little acknowledgement on either side that there is even a problem. The ineffectiveness of the police and the disillusionment of everyday citizens are produced in part by this particular and overlooked impasse. The 800 soles norm has its own impact, directly effecting the kinds of policing carried out, but the fact the state does not overtly recognize this as a problem or acknowledge the resulting consequences (like the problem the *comisaria* had with its public image in Huaycán) also has productive effects in the community.

Even if a sort of underlying truth about the limits of police presence in the community was revealed at the conference, this was a fleeting moment and police and community continued to relate with each other in terms of the status quo, where there is a kind of distance perpetuated between the police and community residents because of the kinds of crimes and violence that are an everyday occurrence for the residents of Huaycán. Rumors of corruption build another layer into this distance. Authorities like the police officer who organized the conference are an interface into the dimension of the state I am addressing in this chapter. When encountering the local in a place like Huaycán the state can actually bring a series of limits on its own influence, but such limits are more actively productive than often recognized, and they still represent a kind of state power in at least two ways. The complex interrelationship between the 800 soles norm, the police, residents and the rumors of corruption show how little absences and indifference in terms of state involvement are also productive of social reality (in this case the everyday tension transpiring between police authority and residents in Huaycán), they have a viable impact on the neighborhood and the way that citizens inter-relate with state officials and agencies. As developed in more depth in Chapter 4, there is another level of consequence and productiveness as well – how that inaction and lack of regulation also compels additional behaviors and conduct that is constitutive of everyday relationships with citizens (for example citizens turn to means besides the state to assure their personal security or use accusations of corruption to help explain police ineffectiveness). Therefore when it comes to services like policing, the state can be made ineffective because of the limits there are to its own authority as established

by the law. The way that shortcomings also have an impact is inherent to all state practices and for all citizens, but they become especially obvious in marginal places like Huaycán.

The citizens of Huaycán are no less the subjects of the state than those in less marginal neighborhoods, although it seems the problem is a question of the state being less present in Huaycán. It is more like the way the state is present has a different result. The 800 soles norm also applies to affluent neighborhoods, it just affects the everyday citizens there differently. This shows how universal criteria also create distinctions. This creates a situation where the residents of shantytown neighborhoods have less recourse to state authority to protect their property, although the police are active and present in Huaycán. The norm allows indifference to how much money 800 soles is for poor families, diminishing also the trauma and fears for personal security that also result of these kinds of crimes. Many of the thefts and robberies that occur in Huaycán are below the threshold where the state sanctions detaining the perpetrators for any extended period of time.

### **Local Tactics to Fill State Absences in the Everyday**

The conference above acknowledged a specific impasse between the police and the residents of Huaycán; a problem that impacted the relationship between police and residents based on misunderstandings about corruption and the way that norms can limit police action in ways that make it difficult to meet the immediate needs of residents. There are also interesting ways that the police try to actively bridge some of

this distance between them and the community that can also be read as another level of productiveness that emerges from this dilemma about the state in marginal communities. The *comisaria* is creative at times in the kinds of events and activities it plans for the neighborhood. For example, on another occasion, the *comisaria* in Huaycán held a community awareness event to commemorate the *International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women* in order to raise awareness about domestic violence in the general population.<sup>25</sup> As I will illustrate below, what was interesting about this event is how the *comisaria* adopted NGO-like tactics to create awareness in the community, innovating in small ways, reaching out to NGOs active in the community to help coordinate efforts geared towards public awareness in Huaycán. The cooperation between NGOs active in the community and the *comisaria* is interesting, especially when also compared and contrasted to the kinds of dilemmas vis-à-vis the community that were highlighted in the conference described above. The shows the ways the local police station tries to reach out in other ways and compensate for how it is present but also ineffective -- trying to live up to some of the expectations on the local level and find other ways to be pertinent in the community.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> November 25<sup>th</sup> has been designated the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women since 1981. It was officially recognized by the UN in 1999.

<sup>26</sup> Local officers are making an effort to be of service to the community in innovative ways. They also received the award of best *comisaria* in 2007 but this was based on the success of the operations they conducted, for example, the amount of drugs decommissioned was mentioned specifically in the announcement about the award ([http://www.muniate.gob.pe/noticias\\_det.php?id=278](http://www.muniate.gob.pe/noticias_det.php?id=278)) accessed January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2010.



My friend Yolanda was asked by the local police to participate in the community awareness event about domestic violence organized by the *comisaria*. Yolanda is someone openly engaged with women's issues and she is also well-known in the community, especially to the kinds of women the *comisaria* was trying to reach for this event. Yolanda had a knack for getting even the poorest and most marginal women in the neighborhood to come to these kinds of events – events with local leaders and NGOs that sometimes the most marginal woman in the community avoided, either because they are too busy or the reason they could possibly benefit from attending is just too intangible and unclear. Yolanda however could rally single mothers and women in abusive relationships -- the kinds of women the police and NGOs were interested in working with and reaching out to. The endorsement implied by Yolanda's presence would also impart a degree of sincerity and forethought in the effort the police station was making, and make women more comfortable attending the event. Flattered by the invitation and looking forward to the event, Yolanda eagerly accepted the opportunity to participate.<sup>27</sup>

This event to acknowledge the *International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women* is also significant because it is an example of a specific tactic the *comisaria* uses to engage with the community and to appear committed to wider issues,

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<sup>27</sup> Yolanda was asked to participate in the community awareness workshop while we attended an event hosted by another state agency in Huaycán-- where SEDAPAL (the state-owned water authority in Lima) met with local leaders and interested residents to discuss the difficult logistics in bringing water to more homes in the *zonas altas* of Huaycán and the application of a controversial monetary gift for that purpose from Japan.

like women's rights in this instance. They hold workshops and invite community members to events.<sup>28</sup> It shows a kind of creativity on the part the *comisaria* and how they too have some room to negotiate the relationship between the state and local politics, and in this case even an international dimension given this was the acknowledgement of a world-wide day calling for the elimination of violence against women. In this way the police represent the presence of the state but there are also local dimensions to the kinds of influence they use. It shows the *comisaria* adapting and responding to particular articulations of community problems. They used the *International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women* and local activist networks to show police commitment to these principles and community problems. In this example the *comisaria* employed NGO-like tactics themselves, promoting and sharing information on the resources available to women and instructing them on the measures they can take to prevent violence in their own lives.

### **Limiting down through the Peripheries: Indirect Influences that are Productive of Everyday Huaycán**

In Huaycán there are other ways that norms impact askew of what they are intended to at the center, having consequences and effects that go under-recognized, because of the assumptions that accompany norms that emanate from the state about social life. Those assumptions do not always coincide with the everyday reality in Huaycán. For example, a further source of contention between residents and the

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<sup>28</sup> The *comisaria* continued to carry out this kind of event to commemorate the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, like they did with the NGO Samusocial in 2007 [www.samusocialperu.org/castellano/publicaciones/informes\\_anuales/i\\_anual2007.pdf](http://www.samusocialperu.org/castellano/publicaciones/informes_anuales/i_anual2007.pdf)

government is the proliferation of *discotecas* along Huaycán's main streets. Residents complain that the *discotecas* operate in defiance of municipal by-laws. During my field research some establishments opened their doors in the mid-afternoon, making it easier for children who are barely teenagers to sneak in to the *discotecas* on their way home from school. *Discoteca* owners maintain a lot of leverage at the levels higher up because they are viewed as entrepreneurs by the municipality. *Discoteca* owners, asserting their role as business owners, can use the rhetoric of economic development and progress to support their claims.

Residents on the other hand accuse the municipal government of granting the *discoteca* owners a kind of impunity because the municipality is lax at instituting and enforcing by-laws. Residents believe the relative lack of oversight of the *discotecas* contributes to recent problems with gangs and crimes committed by the youth in Huaycán. In her dissertation, Kairos Marquardt argues that there is a similar sentiment in Ayacucho, where the problems associated with the *discotecas* and nightlife have been addressed by citizens and governing officials using a framework of citizen security (Marquardt, 2009:31).

Although the state is most obviously implicated in this dilemma surrounding the *discotecas* by the fact that it seems that bylaws are rarely and only randomly enforced (or better said, skirted and avoidable in practice), the state is also an influence in other ways in this particular example. Again this sense of the 'barrio perspective' that Daniel Goldstein identifies applies, where residents feel the rights of business owners are

valued above their own (Goldstein, 2004:187). What is framed as the rights of everyday citizens is more diffuse, less concrete and not a set of concretely and clearly enforceable values in this local context. Residents say the dilemma surrounding the *discotecas* is indicative of a wider problem where the rights of the average citizen are secondary to the rights of business owners.

Notions like progress and development also have this kind of indirect but still concrete impact in Huaycán, where they end up justifying practices that can be exclusionary and restricting access in ways that were not intended and harder to perceive. Many entrepreneurs and government agents take for granted the modernizing and free-market reforms contribute in a positive and progressive way. Pro-entrepreneurial policies are promoted as if they are unquestionably beneficial to society at large and contribute – even when implemented piece-meal and without effective protections for everyday citizens – to a general framework that will secure progress and more prosperity for society at large. This contributes to the unevenness in the way some values and norms seem to be applied in Peru. A very similar logic also allows people to rationalize many extra or special citizen protections for the residents of neighborhoods like Huaycán because they are either expensive or impractical and should not be necessary given the universal applicability of the logics employed.

The example of Huaycán demonstrates ways that actions meant to benefit and contribute to a notion of progress can create impasses and additional barriers and add to the complexities for everyday citizens. Programs may be implemented with good

intentions but what they have not considered in trying to apply these programs also continues to have effects at the everyday level. The specific and partial actions of governments and states have wider consequences. Albeit indirectly, the assumptions carried with policies create barriers that also restrict and shape behavior, creating problems of efficacy and access as well as dilemmas where business owners receive impunity in the eyes of everyday citizens.

In this way the assumptions accompanying particular government actions are also a part of the governing process, and become part of how the residents of Huaycán experience the state. The interaction of different kinds of reforms and policy do not necessarily create the expected outcomes in neighborhoods like Huaycán and for the citizens who live there. They can have other effects, producing more or otherwise than expected. Residents feel they are likely to be persecuted for trespassing if they protest the *discotecas*, while the state and government appear to do very little to enforce age requirements or prevent the *discotecas* from operating in a way that targets young teenagers. In this way these two separate examples of government regulation attenuate a problem for residents; contributing to the problem but also restricting the options that residents have to deal with the problem. These factors also contribute to how the local residents eventually choose to deal with the dilemma. Dilemmas like this perpetuate in part because of this unevenness and how profoundly administrators believe in the accompanying assumptions as truths that hold everywhere.

The contradictions and uneven influence come from the way the intentions of administrators and the actual effects of the reforms impact the community. This might seem elusive but there is still a tangible experience of the state to glean from these more indirect effects. The kinds of impasses and disjunctures described so far seem random, small and fleeting but they are not insignificant; Huaycán's everyday politics and position vis-à-vis the state have to contend first hand with these dilemmas as the way the state is present in their community. Another dimension of the kinds of power the state has is manifested in these examples. Residents are frustrated by a system of established norms that seem to protect the rights of perpetrators at the expense of the everyday citizen (see also Caldera 2000 and Goldstein 2004 for a similar discussion in a different context). It is relatively easy to attribute this kind of reading to the 800 soles norm for detaining someone in Peru that I explain above. The norm creates a threshold above what is already a significant amount of money in Huaycán. The 800 soles norm exists because restricting personal freedom for a theft of less than 300 dollars of property is unjust. The contradictions these norms create are just the surface of a dilemma at this level that often goes unseen at higher levels. This disjuncture has different levels of impact -- the fact 800 soles is a disproportionately significant amount of money to different citizens is another impasse worked into the processes of the state, another kind of unspoken effect the state has and does not address at the same time. It is also a real problem the residents of Huaycán and the police there need to contend with, even if it remains largely unseen, or the state remains indifferent to it and there are few ways to openly protest these kinds of contradictions for the people living them

except in terms of a 'barrio perspective' on the law (Goldstein, 2004:187). The norm is therefore also a threshold that builds into and helps to perpetuate the everyday dilemmas of policing in a community like Huaycán.<sup>29</sup>

Although it was never intended to create exclusion for everyday citizens the way it does, the 800 soles norm does create a form of impunity for the theft of certain levels of property, all under the shadow of police authority in Huaycán. The coupling of police presence and police inaction in this way is indicative of the kind of redundancy residents experience in exclusions; the layers of difficulties in access and asserting rights pile up to the point where residents do not often report 'small' crimes. This creates a relationship that is circumscribed in different ways – not normless but subject to an array of norms that are not including and encompassing residents' realities as intended or expected. They slip into gaps between different norms, a gray area where many of the limitations there are in the negative and there is not much understood about what is actually produced. What is more, it is also productive how governing officials rarely and then only tangentially address these extra consequences. They seem like only fleeting concerns that are difficult to make substantive in the eyes of government. Even in the example of the police conference that I focus on in this chapter, there were only the frustrated comments of one police official at a conference that not many people attended as recognition of the kinds of dilemmas that can be created by these kind of

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<sup>29</sup> The 800 soles norm has some impact as described by the officer at the conference above, but if the crime perpetrated is violent then that would complicate the charge and be a reason to detain the perpetrator. This is outlined by the penal code in Peru. The actual amount varies as the law is written.

disjunctures – in this instance the tension that is created between norms, actual effects, and what the public thinks of the state. People are left to improvise their own reactions to everyday kinds of crime, whether that reaction is buying locks and barring windows, forms of vigilantism in the extreme examples or choosing to do nothing at all. This is an example of the way the state also becomes a site that reiterates and potentiates the intricate and different positions that constitute marginality.

We therefore need to go beyond conceptualizing this marginality as a simple lack of encompassment, to think of Huaycán remaining somehow outside or not fully incorporated in formal state relations. I think it is more useful to examine how the different dimensions of state power operate to create and enable this kind of liminal position, where shantytown residents are citizens but not, and how they are included but not included at the same time. This demonstrates that the problems of exclusion and marginality are more complex and multidimensional at their core. Simply lowering the amount that allows police detention in Peru would not address the root of this kind of problem (and this would cause another set of problems in its own right). The difficulty is not contained to just the norm itself, it is also the way we are unseeing of the uneven but elusive ways that such norms and state goals impact different parts of the population. In this respect the 800 soles norm is a small window into a more complicated set of relationships between the state and marginal citizens. The absence created by that norm resonates at the local level, it damages and determines relationships between the police and the residents of Huaycán. Although it is tempting



to talk of this in terms of a lack, like it is simply a question of the absence of a particular protection, the imperfect relationship of a marginal citizen and the state is still a complete one.

Despite the presence of the *comisaria* in Huaycán, the police also represent the ways state presence is absent. The police have the power to deal with extreme crimes like murder and rape, but they are also more indirect in their engagement with many other instances of insecurity and violence. This is also an example of the way that material poverty folds back on the community through the actions of the state, in this case acting as a filter on the population, helping to determine the ways that certain norms will apply. This is another layer that explains the marginality of shantytown residents. This specific example of exclusion happens without precluding general citizenship rights at all.

How does this kind of relationship to state programs and governmental authority shape subjects/citizens in Huaycán? As I will continue to develop in later chapters, the everyday citizen in Huaycán is *not* the subject of some kind of all-seeing and powerfully prescient governmentality. Although a number of authors have recently used the notion of governmentality to talk about the processes similar to what I discuss here (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002; Baker-Cristales, 2008), I think the use of this term obscures how the outcomes to exercising power are importantly different. The government in the examples I discuss makes spaces where there is little coherent knowledge of the real consequences and where the state is largely unaware of or at least indifferent to what it

is creating. How the government conducts in Huaycán is different in unintended and subtle ways – not absolutely absent – but in the end it articulates an included exclusion with a tangle of government programs that have trouble and often fail at conducting the kinds of populations it has to and leave many gaps in how they engage everyday reality. State power in Peru is comprehensive and incomprehensive at once, there are patterned absences that also constitute and define what is really a fundamental part of the state as well. Another important distinction from the way governmentality is used (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999) is that the forms of government are not taken-for-granted in the same way and this impacts subjectivity vis-à-vis the government in important ways.

### **Layers of Different Ambiguities in the Presence of the State**

Veena Das has explored similarly ambiguous examples of state presence in local communities in India that show similarities with how I frame the state in Huaycán. Das explains that one of the idiosyncratic characteristics of the state is that even when being critical or acting in defiance of the state, at the same time people are still somehow dependent on the state or subject to its actions. There is also something productive about the simultaneity of the different layers and dimensions of state power. In this way, as Das explains, one of the 'uncanny' characteristics of state power is that you are never truly outside of state action. In her essay she uses the example of a conflict over government compensation for wrongful death in a protest against the government. The government granted compensation to the widows of the men killed when tradition dictated among this particular ethnic group that money should go to the husband's

family. The families and widows in turn came to their own compromise, drawing up deeds of divorce that agreed how they would split the compensation (Das, 2004:229). Das shows how this is an example of using the state (through the deeds of divorce) against the state (the decision to give the money to just the widow). Das goes on to state that:

I hope these examples show the mode in which the state is present in the life of the community – its suspension between a rational-bureaucratic entity and a magical entity. As a rational entity, it is present in the structure of rules and regulations; community customs are made to appear valid in the shadow of these rules and regulations. But its magical qualities are apparent in the uncanny presence it achieves in the life of the community, even at moments of the community's defiance of the state – as though the community derives its own existence from a particular reading of the state. (Das, 2004:230).

Like Das' example from India, part of the state's ambiguousness is that those who appear most outside of state influence are still subject to state power in ways that have a lot of impact on their lives. For example in Peru, citizens are denied certain state services and social privileges like opening a bank account if they do not have the necessary documents, like a national ID card. Even those residents of Huaycán with passports are excluded from tourist visas and other legal avenues of migration to other nations because they are poor, a practice by foreign states that also contributes to what makes them certain kinds of citizens from Peru. The fact that residents who resist or reject the state (or do not actively participate otherwise in the state) are also somehow still indirectly subject to it are part of the many ways that the relationships between states and citizens are ambiguous. Like Das, one way to fully appreciate all the ways the state is positioned and used in Huaycán is to see it as a particular reading and experience of the state (Das, 2004: 230).

One way that Das' perspective helps to build my own framework for state power is how she emphasizes the iterability of different kinds of government documents. This helps to show that even local and marginal variations of state presence (how the state can be different to particular communities) are still relevant to how the state works more generally. These variations or 'different readings' as Das explains are a dimension of the state's overall ambiguity. She argues that the negotiations and re-interpretations and the little transgressions that occur 'around the thin lines between the legal and the illegal' are part of the everyday life of neighborhoods and are an important dimension of how the state continues to be present (and powerful) even in its apparent absence or illegibility (Das, 2004:244).

A key aspect of the state in Huaycán is that programs and norms are more obviously unsuccessful at circumscribing all aspects of the everyday, at least relative to how they do at least seem to under gird the everyday more completely and comprehensively for other populations, and especially in the North American and European states we have in mind when we think of governmentality and the subjectivity of citizens. Boundaries of encompassment and inclusion in Huaycán seem more partial and contingent, sometimes haphazard or only pertinent to very specific aspects of daily life while they also leave a lot unencompassed for residents, because their lifestyles are otherwise, not what is expected or not what is to be modeled. This struck me when I was interviewing a functionary for the Wawa Wasi program, a state-led childcare program that is the subject of the next chapter. She was explaining how deficient the

program viewed the childrearing practices of women in neighborhoods like Huaycán, and how part of the programs utility was to help instill better nutritional and childrearing habits in mothers. This is an example of how significant parts of daily life are beyond the state in the sense the state has no interest in knowing or fomenting those kinds of practices they wanted to change. In this way, although the state is present in specific aspects of daily life for the residents of Huaycán like schools, ID cards, voting, and services like comedores and policing, there are also aspects of daily life in neighborhoods like Huaycán that run up against the state's ideals and work at odds with what the state is willing to promote and assist.

This shows how despite the state's power to be present and affect all citizens, the type of administration and control in Huaycán is hard to call a system of surveillance or governmentality (conduct of conduct) as is usually implied in the use of the term (Dean, 1999). There is an intermittent, inconsistent and discontinuous sense to governmental control for the citizens that live in neighborhoods like Huaycán that brings the state in at a level of detachment that is not absolute but a process, meaning at the same time it does become a part of daily life in a complete way. The detachment is fully consequential because it is lived and as citizens, residents have a complete relationship to the state, albeit one that also includes how the state's indifference impacts their particular experiences.

In this way the citizens of Huaycán are subject to at least two different power claims made by the state that places them in this kind of included and excluded position

in relationship to the state. The state is omnipresent and everywhere and has the power to articulate what is even possible, with the idea that administrative programs and state remedies are external or independent of Huaycán's reality and local and specific problems. In the administration of daily life state intervention isn't taken for granted or necessarily expected but obvious in Huaycán: engaging life only in certain moments, like the way the state is obviously present in schooling and hospitals. In Huaycán everyday life is improvised on the tensions in the interplay between these omnipresent and administrative claims of the state. For example, by law, students are entitled to reduced fares on 'public' transit. However, the result in Huaycán and elsewhere in Lima is that combi drivers speed past kids waiting for the bus on their way to school in the morning rush. Picking up reduced-fare paying children makes less money than shuttling full-fare paying adults. If children and high school students are picked up they are not allowed to sit down and take up the seat of a potentially full-paying passenger. Kids as young as 5 or 6 are made to stand on the aisle or to double-up in a seat -- sitting on each other's laps, because they pay less. Students complain of being late and having a hard time even getting to school as a result. This is a further example of how norms can unintentionally enable or potentiate new forms of discrimination and violence in the way daily life is situated vis-à-vis the state in neighborhoods like Huaycán.

Therefore, another space where the state is actively created is between the interplay of the omnipresent and administrative dimensions of state power in contexts where the state also does not know, control or invest in all dimensions of the lives of

people. I argue that what the state does not know or vest in is also productive, also a consequence of being governed that the residents of Huaycán have to contend with. For example, the conference at the high school shows how a particular officer at the *comisaria* struggled with their local significance. The officers themselves recognized gaps in their effectiveness at policing the everyday; even if they could do little more than acknowledge that fact and make public their own dilemmas about the gap. In this example, the way the state is indifferent the everyday level in poor communities like Huaycán is like an impasse that is allowed to perpetuate, to continue to have its effects. How the state is absent and the ways it does not know are substantiated (filled with meaning and substance) by personal strategies and individual ambitions at the local level.

### **Local Substance to Wider Categories: Giving Citizenship Rights Meaning in Huaycán**

The way that many state services and citizenship rights fall short for neighborhoods like Huaycán is also evidenced in how the significance of participation is developed and elaborated locally. In this section I will explore some of the ways that Yolanda and the association she volunteered for gave meaning to state practices in Huaycán.

One day while riding in a *combi* on the way into Lima, Yolanda had her purse snatched. It was a busy time of day and when she got on the combi, the only seat left was right by the sliding door. Passengers do their best to avoid this seat when they can, especially if they are carrying bags or parcels because every time the *cobrador* slides

open the door, spilling out onto the pavement in order to shuttle passengers on and off the bus, it exposes you to the street. At a stoplight the *cobrador* might even walk a few feet away and into the crowd trying to convince potential passengers there is still a seat and that this bus can also get them where they need to go.

Yolanda was still in the seat closest to the door when the *combi* arrived in Ceres, a busy market crossroads along the Carretera Central. The *cobrador* opened the door and stepped down to help passengers off the *combi* more quickly and someone ripped the bag Yolanda was carrying from her lap. There are always rumors about there being thieves among the crowds of Ceres, and that even from the moving *combis* there is a danger they will steal from you through open windows and the sliding door.

Yolanda decided to take the time to file an official police report about her stolen purse. When I asked her why she was going to the trouble of filing a report, she said she wanted to make an official complaint about the loss to substantiate the kinds of rumors everyone heard about Ceres by showing it really happened to her. That way, Yolanda could make the police and other community members aware that she was robbed and the rumors about Ceres are true. At a minimum, she did her part as a citizen, doing the kind of thing she learned as an NGO promoter; she followed through and reported the incident. But there was little chance of getting her purse back: whether that is because the police do not follow procedures or whether the procedures themselves are ineffective, or because Yolanda herself never followed up on the eventual outcome ; all possibilities are part of the ambiguity in this kind of action in Peru. Yolanda used the fact



she filed a report to tell friends and family about the incident. In her work with the victims of domestic violence filing a report is something they try to encourage women to do to document the cases, even if the immediate outcomes of filing the reports are not always beneficial. It also made Yolanda feel less naïve for having sat in that seat and being robbed.

The attitudes of individual officers are also barriers of access for many everyday citizens. In Yolanda's work with the victims of domestic violence, one obstacle to getting women to press charges against their partners is the police themselves. Individual police officers can react in ways that are chauvinistic and that belittle the women. The promoters at the women's center said it is common to hear that officers make fun of and mock women who report domestic violence. For example, some of the women the promoters have worked with were asked by police what they did to deserve the beating in the first place. Although there are official avenues through the police to report abuse and there are procedures for reporting the abuse of authority on the part of individual police officers, in practice these are made less accessible by the kinds of interactions officers and the public have. The apparent access that women have to ways to address abuse via the state becomes a circumscribed openness, and the attitudes of the officers themselves becomes another barrier to addressing these kinds of crimes. The localizing, personalizing and in this instance gendering of administrative behaviors is another way the state is made inaccessible. In practice the state seems to take the officers' attitudes for granted, not really educating or even controlling, policing) male officers to be

sensitive, respectful and aware of women's issues. In this way authority becomes meshed with their personal views – and an assumption on the part of the state, (stating male police officers will be sensitive is enough of a guarantee they will be sensitive in neighborhoods like Huaycán) – is another kind of sticking point in how the points of access residents have to the state are indeterminate.

Thus, one obstacle to getting women to press charges against their partners is the police themselves. The women's center where Yolanda worked addressed this dilemma using a number of different strategies. They explored other ways to find assistance for women, through NGOs, private shelters or church groups. The women's center also found it encouraging when a female officer was assigned to the comisaria. They felt they would be better able to achieve their goals vis-à-vis the police with her presence. The impressions and assumptions held by the staff at the women's center about the male officers, real and perceived, thus affected their attitudes towards the comisaria. The women's center expected the woman officer to be more empathetic and was hopeful this would be an important change. It was like they were gifted the potential for better access to state to help implement strategies to help local women.

### **Non-Governmental Organizations: Complimenting Government and Elaborating Citizenship in Huaycán**

Participation in NGO projects and NGO authority on how to address social problems more generally are central to the citizenship experiences of many residents in a community like Huaycán. NGOs that promote transparency and women's rights for

example are central to how many residents make sense of their everyday reality and create opportunities for action in the neighborhood. Therefore, any examination of the relationship between citizens and the state also needs to consider the way that NGO projects parallel and elaborate state actions. For instance, it is hard to make a definitive separation of Yolanda's experience as a promoter and her experience as an everyday citizen. Her work for the women's center is an integral part of how she gives meaning to her role as a citizen. Yolanda creates a depth to her role as a citizen in daily life through her work as a promoter and she gains a space to alternately critique the state and apply her rights as a citizen at the same time. More complexly still, in her role as promoter she is also creating space for other women in the community to participate, and become more proactive about their own rights as women.

In the influential essay titled *Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality*, Gupta and Ferguson consider the increasing role that NGOs play in forms of governance evidence that NGOs are now agents of a new form of transnational governmentality (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Gupta and Sharma, 2006). As a result, Gupta and Ferguson argue that NGOs and state bureaucracy need to be understood within the same framework as more formal realms of government and state action. They argue that both state and NGOs are inseparable in understanding processes of governmentality in countries like India and regions like Africa. Other scholars have also pointed to the prominent role that NGOs are assuming in governing practices. Aihwa Ong explains that the increased role that NGOs and other civil society groups play

is an example of how flexible government frameworks have become (Ong, 2006:76).

Mike Davis also stressed how NGOs are changing the face of social development, service-providing and community problem-solving in poor urban neighborhoods worldwide (Davis, 2006:77).

Although the presence of NGOs is evidence of growing transnational influence, even in the everyday politics of communities like Huaycán, I think the relationship between particular state bureaucracies and NGOs is more complex. I think it may still be too much of a leap to consider the practices of NGOs a form of governmentality; at least as they stand on their own and independent of the state bureaucracies they coordinate and operate within. Seeing NGOs as just another kind of governmentalizing agent does not really explain the dynamics at work, how the state and NGOs comprise different parts of the dynamic. The NGO is not replacing the state; it is elaborating other ways to do politics and to practice rights. There are myriads of NGOs with different specific purposes and goals. How can we so universally apply a framework of neoliberal governmentality to all these different goals and outcomes?

Even if we leave aside the question of NGOs lending a *transnational* element to governmentality around the world, there is also reason to question to what extent governmentality is the framework best suited to understanding the nature of NGO influence. I think governmentality describes a relationship beyond just the intent to govern or modify behavior. There needs to be a real impact on the subjectivity of citizens in order for it to constitute governmentality. At the same time, to what extent

are NGOs as they stand alone really conditioning the behaviors of project participants in a lasting way?

It is therefore important to take the influence that NGOs have in communities like Huaycán seriously while also clearly establishing the multi-dimensionality of the governing process. The actions of NGOs are limited and specific, different from the state and different from a governmentality kind of relationship at the same time; at least if we are referring to the impact NGOs have on the everyday project participants. Yolanda is an example of a local grassroots activist entangled in a complex relationship whereby institutions that represent the state – like the police in its local expression – depend on local grassroots activists to help give their actions and intentions meaning in the neighborhood, by holding workshops like that for the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women. NGOs and church groups help give substance to the abeyances in the kinds of bare citizenship that residents are the subject of. Yet as influential as NGOs are there are important differences in the scope of state action and the scope of NGO action.<sup>30</sup> They do not have coterminous influence on everyday citizens. NGOs complement and help to give substance to the relationship between state and citizens, but NGOs are also a product of the state and citizen framework

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<sup>30</sup> NGOs are also an important source of employment for residents, and employment or at least temporary or intermittent remuneration on particular projects with an NGO is something some residents aspire too. For example, Yolanda uses transnational organizations to articulate her rights and to be proactive in her community. Like others, Yolanda participates in NGO projects in order to gain employment or to make contacts that may increase her chances of future employment. It is not just a relationship based on convictions for residents.

themselves. In addition, NGO projects are very specific with a limited scope. It is hard to claim NGOs alter and influence people's subjectivity in a way that is comparable to the influence a state or government had or has on a particular society. As a whole the surge in the reliance on NGOs worldwide represents an important change, but that surge is not necessarily indicative of lasting impacts in how NGOs are affecting citizens' lives at the grassroots.

NGOs depend on funding opportunities to operate and can shift their interests away from particular communities or even stop operations in host communities altogether without much warning. In fact, during my field research Yolanda's employment with the women's center was reduced because the church back home made the decision to divert funds to new and more receptive communities. Yolanda therefore experienced a cut in pay, but was still invited to continue volunteering in the same capacity she worked in as a (better) paid volunteer. NGO projects are still circumscribed and controlled by traditional governments and national powers in important ways, and they are also subject to the limits of their own institutionality. In turn, it should be much harder to call the relationship and influence that NGOs have with everyday citizens' governmentality, because it is questionable how lasting the effects of NGO actions and involvement will have on the citizen's own conduct. It should also be harder to weave a common intent and a common impact among all the different kinds of micro projects there are in place.

NGOs also work on very specific projects and only a handful of the most established claim real permanence in the community. The presence of most NGOs is situational and temporary. NGOs often work on very specific problems with specific populations at specific moments. What kind of subjectivity is expected to result in the general population or citizen-participants if projects are limited and restricted and so specific? Are they effecting change in subjectivity and conduct (changes that are intended and direct) with such a limited focus? In this sense NGOs purposefully limit the kinds of subjects they want involved in their projects and the contexts for implementing projects. Moreover, the degree of their accountability to local populations is limited to the specific scope of action the NGO itself (sometimes with state oversight) created and imagined for their organization. They continuously innovate and move and apply for new and different grants. They can move to a new and more receptive area. When they close, move, leave or finish, how long do their projects have impact? Those implementing the project and those participating in the project are different subjects -- not every NGO project is successful at imparting change and lasting assistance. In this sense, while I think many NGOs strive to have the kind of impact implied by the notion of governmentality -- perpetrating certain ways of thinking and behavior in local populations -- it is still too much of a leap to assume that as individual organizations they actually have that level of impact on local populations. It is as if we are conflating the intent these organizations have to make a change with actually having an effect.

In this way, both NGO projects and more direct relationships to the state are constitutive of the kind of citizenship and political subjectivity experienced in Huaycán, but NGOs are not a stand-alone expression of governmentality. It is together and in different ways that both the state and organizations that promote citizen rights and empowerment articulate potential directions and important conditions of possibility. NGOs therefore contribute to the inter-relationship between different realms of community participation and political life, but they are not somehow replacing the state in any simple sense. They are different realms that each contribute in their own way to the complexity of citizenship experiences in Peru. Even shantytown residents, as marginal as they are, are fully engaged in the different directions and the multidimensionality of these different realms of political action. In Huaycán too there are multiple different kinds of citizenship experiences. For example, there are many residents who also do not participate actively in NGO projects and they have their own kinds of experience with trying to exercise their rights.

At the same time however, the rights-promoting organizations' position and inter-relationship in the community is situational, only vaguely orchestrated or planned beyond very specific encounters, and limited both in who these organizations voluntarily reach and the breadth of their action. This creates a dilemma in itself because in being so specific it is also determining where it will not act, leaving spaces for slippages, and these slippages allow for violence to be perpetrated in the gaps and despite good faith efforts to bring a more substantive citizenship to the residents of



communities like Huaycán. That everyone is a citizen and that everyone has rights are fundamental principles of the Peruvian constitution, at the same time my research in Huaycán shows that a lot of the meaning, richness and action are a local expression; the universal applicability of rights implied by the notion of citizenship is widely plotted on just a minimal set of criteria. In this way someone from Huaycán can be proactive and aware but at the same time always vulnerable and in danger of stepping beyond the well-articulated local expressions of a fuller citizenship into spaces where guarantees of citizenship are strikingly bare and absent. And where NGO participation and local grassroots politics don't provide recourse for the kinds of protections and rights people need.

### **Beyond Familiar Circles: Citizenship Parameters Outside of Local Networks**

Although a local activist and well known throughout the community, Yolanda experienced the unevenness and the interstices between these different frameworks for asserting rights one night on the way home from work. She was coming home late after working the afternoon shift as a security guard at a hospital in Santa Anita. All the buses going directly to Huaycán that passed by were full, and she was getting tired. She hopped on a bus that would continue along the *Carretera Central* beyond Huaycán, meaning she would have to get off at the entrance to Huaycán and transfer to another bus to take her the last 2 or 3 kilometers home. Yolanda fell asleep somewhere along the route however and missed her stop.

The bus continued on its route along the central highway and when it reached the end of its route and all the other passengers were off, the driver took the bus to a remote area just slightly off the shoulder of the road. Still asleep, the two men shook Yolanda awake and the driver and the fare collector forcefully began pulling at her clothes and trying to rape her. A passing taxi driver was suspicious of the bus parked on the side of the road and stopped. He banged on the windows and shouted and the two men fled. Obviously Yolanda was shaken and the taxi driver helped her get out of the bus and gave her a ride back home to Huaycán. He promised to help her file charges with the police the next day. Yolanda's rescuer, the taxi-driver, was encouraging Yolanda all the way back home to report what had happened, saying it was very important to report what happened so they could not do the same to anyone else again. Yolanda was lucky the taxi-driver came by when he did. They exchanged numbers with a promise to meet in the morning to go file a police report together.

In the light of the next day however, Yolanda's feelings towards the situation changed and she started to hesitate about what to do. The taxi-driver called her that morning and said he had run into trouble himself with the same guys that night as he went back to work. Someone who got in the back of his taxi threatened him with a knife and claimed they would harm his family if he helped Yolanda go to the police. The taxi driver, apologizing to Yolanda, explained that he would no longer help back up her story with authorities. Yolanda then went to ask an acquaintance on the police force in Huaycán what she should do. That officer said she would have to file the report in the

*comisaria* closest to where the crime occurred. The prospect of this scared Yolanda because the taxi-driver who assisted her had experienced a one-on-one threat while driving around Santa Eulalia, in a way that suggested the men who attacked her were also from or very familiar with that area. In the confusion and ensuing shock, Yolanda had forgotten her purse on the bus. In her purse was her work ID with her name and address. That day at work she kept receiving mysterious calls from a man that her co-workers refused to put through. Even her acquaintance on the police force suggested it might be best just to thank God she got away and forget about trying to press charges. In the end revenge on the part of the perpetrators seemed more likely than getting her report filed and having the men persecuted for attacking her.

Although the attempted rape is an exceptional event, this coupled with the other experiences with the police I have described above – the workshop the police held where they invited Yolanda to participate because of her influence with local women, and the report she filed when her purse was stolen on the *combi* – show the uneven ways that citizens like Yolanda experience the state. In Santa Eulalia and on that bus Yolanda was far from Huaycán, in a context beyond the reach of the NGOs she participated in and the networks where she felt comfortable asserting her rights, the organizations and the kind of activities that really seem to give substance to her rights. This shows how there are real difficulties in asserting the rights associated with citizenship for a citizen like Yolanda in the kind of everyday life she has. When faced with violence herself she did the opposite of what she would have counseled other

women to do, keeping quiet and not even filing a report. Yolanda was someone with a lot of the connections she could build in Huaycán, with ties to the ruling political party (which got her the job at the hospital) and she assisted the research team for the *Comision de la Verdad* (That is how I met her, through the researchers for the *Comision de la Verdad*.) Although she was very proactive about her rights as a woman in local contexts and with organizations active in the neighborhood, in this particular instance of the attempted rape nothing of what she had learned or gained from being associated with those organizations actually helped her in any substantive way. What kinds of participatory frameworks are we actually building? Do they have real impact on how citizens can assert their rights? Or are they just caricatures, not systemic? Or are they more useful for claiming stolen cell phones than something like attempted rape?

Furthermore, I have presented the events in this chapter out of chronological order. The attempted rape discussed just now actually happened about two weeks *before* Yolanda was invited as a community figure to participate in the workshop sponsored by police about violence against women. I presented them out of order so I could emphasize first how connected Yolanda was in the community. She was model citizen in the sense that she was very proactive about her rights as a woman through local NGOs and local public networks. While this would not preclude her from the attack itself obviously, it should give her the knowledge and the connections to assert her rights as a citizen afterwards and take action against those who attacked her. However, these different realms that affect her as a citizen are lived so differently by Yolanda that

it did not even strike her as the least bit contradictory or hypocritical of her police friends to ask her to promote the police station with women who are the victims of domestic violence, when the police were not helpful to her when she was a victim of overt violence herself. She does not necessarily conflate them, but we do.

As connected as Yolanda is in Huaycán, those connections do not travel with her to other parts of Lima. When I invited Yolanda to meetings with other activist groups outside of Huaycán, her position as someone well known in Huaycán was not the same as the activism of these other women from more mainstream organizations in Lima. In fact, her involvement with the church made some feminist activists suspicious of her stand on women's causes like abortion rights and made them doubt whether she would be an appropriate ally for their mission. What I saw as her power to influence and participate in a community like Huaycán didn't seem to translate easily or naturally into other public spheres in Lima. Despite how involved she is in Huaycán, Yolanda is marginal to many of the networks in Lima and lacks the kinds of connections that some activists living in other parts of the city have. As discussed in later chapters of the dissertation, Huaycán is a place mediated with the rest of Lima by a host of attitudes and prejudices about ethnicity and place. This also shows that a lot of the energy in encouraging participation at the local level does not travel well across space.

In her encounter with the police after the assault, Yolanda lost all the proactiveness that seemed to distinguish her from other residents of Huaycán in the day-to-day, and she fit easily into the category of a poor single mother with few

exercisable rights. Yolanda's relationship to the Peruvian state seems to flip/flop in this way. She can dedicate her days to promoting women's rights and participating in local networks but at other times it is made clear that as a citizen her real rights are only applicable in minimal ways, or there is an important space between her real rights and where that proactiveness applies. The same can happen to a wealthier woman from a better neighborhood of the city. It is another layer to the problem too that the wealthier woman might have the money and family connections to feel more secure in reporting the crime. However the power differential here between Yolanda and the wealthier woman is not because the state is acting with duplicity, the parameters of citizenship for these women are the same. It is not that we see the state acting differently towards citizens at the margins; it is more like the state is revealed more from what it minimally is. The social mores we assume are a part or a consequence of specific norms are not necessarily present in the same way at the margins. Furthermore, not all actions on the government's behalf can be guaranteed to have the same progressive effect in neighborhoods like Huaycán. For instance, would Yolanda have become more of a subject of rights, at least in that instance, had she actually been raped? For marginal citizens there is even more ambiguity in these gray areas (that are deemed less serious or only intent and not actual rape or murder for example) than authorities and experts often recognize and the different and many little ambiguities of these gray areas are layers of potential violence or injustice for the everyday citizens that live in neighborhoods like Huaycán. Within these gray areas reforms and attempts made to regulate daily life come undone, they are seen for the unevenness that really comprises

them, and the way their apparent progressiveness is ordered out of step and even without some of their apparent fundamentals. Different kinds of violence result from applying regulation not geared to the realities of poor citizens but to the realities of others (middle class, upper class and foreign.) In this way the inaccurate assumptions and the very basic and bare knowledge on the part of outsiders like us has concrete effects on Huaycán residents. The lack of knowledge and our own indifferent eye becomes yet something else that poor residents need to contend with in their daily lives, and is yet another effect confounding the experiences of the state for marginal citizens.

Had the attempted rape happened in Huaycán, Yolanda might have had at least a few more resources and networks to deal with it in other ways. Although the citizenship parameters would still be the same vis-à-vis the state whether this happened in Santa Eulalia or Huaycán, it is still an example of the kind of ambiguity I have tried to analyze in this chapter. In Huaycán, Yolanda could have appealed to acquaintances on the police force and the attack would probably become more public because of it being within the community and presenting a potential danger to others that Yolanda also knows. Her recourse to the state would have at least appeared less stark because those local channels do seem to give the state more substance. Yet all alone on that bus in Santa Eulalia she found herself somewhere her rights as a citizen more obviously were not enough to empower her. It also suggests how the efforts to increase participation

and inclusion among the poor are not being worked back into these deeper dimensions of governing in Peru.

## **Conclusion**

The examples I have discussed in this chapter are discontinuous, particular, even sometimes fleeting, but as I will develop in later chapters, they are significant to understanding more precisely how the residents of a neighborhood like Huaycán are governed. Residents are still controlled and conditioned, but these processes are not as taken-for-granted in the same ways as standard definitions of governmentality suggest (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999). As I will continue to show, there are many relationships where it is the residents themselves who are trying to approximate what they can to improve their own lives and the neighborhood. They themselves are trying in ways that are difficult to trace back to specific projects or the intentions of government. The influences that can be most productive at the local level can be indirect, and the government can be largely unaware of or indifferent to their effects. These two examples both demonstrate different directions in the impetus of being governed than is usually suggested by governmentality. In Huaycán the state is omnipresent in theory but not entirely systemic in practice and this produces the kinds of uneven effects where even unintentional consequences are still consequences of government. For the citizens of Huaycán, the state is present when you join the army, commit a serious crime, have an infectious disease or apply for a passport with very large but still totalizing brushstrokes. At the same time the rules and norms that are implemented by



the state also help to circumscribe day-to-day problems to ambiguous spaces beyond where the state regulates. It is therefore not a question of there being a simple absence or lack of the state. Yolanda was one day victim, next day empowered through the uneven but still complete nature of these relationships. She was representative of the effort to empower women, promoting the elimination of violence against women that was even taken up by the police station as well. In Huaycán there is a complex intertwining of norms and assumptions, where neither rights nor governing practices are taken-for-granted. The problem of marginality and shantytown communities is usually conceived as one of distance or exclusion but there are micropolitics and a depth of relationship in the kinds of citizens that the residents of Huaycán are.

This chapter established the framework I will carry through into the chapters that follow in order to elaborate on the ways the state is present in Huaycán. I discussed the impact the unintended consequences of applying particular norms and how those need to be understood as a component within the framework of state power. There are concrete ways that state intentions and community reality do not enmesh as expected in practice. Yet at the same time the idiosyncrasies of state power let this kind of administrative misfire perpetrate and continue, administering but without completely incorporating daily life in all the helpful ways program administrators and even citizens themselves hope they would. In this chapter I demonstrated how this can actually perpetuate new exclusions, creating gaps that are so concrete even the local police work to fill them; using local activists, NGO-like workshops and appeals to the public to

give more substance to their presence in Huaycán. Despite the enthusiasm for transitions and democratic change in Peru there is also an underlying permanence to how the state is unable to provide opportunities or allocate adequate resources for the majority of citizens. Layered on this is also that the Peruvian state does not exercise an all encompassing form of governmentality. Adding to the ambiguity further still is that there are concrete examples of the state trying to apply such a form of power when it governs. There are schools, hospitals and police that act as mechanisms of limiting and conditioning behavior in neighborhoods like Huaycán but this is not exhaustive of everyday life, and there are many residents who go to private schools and private clinics, making state influence more indirect still.

Yolanda's three very different, incongruent encounters with the police outlined above show that in diverse and sometimes contradictory ways, the exact nature of the relationships between the state, NGOs, grassroots organizations and everyday citizens are improvised – they might look like authentic connections to a participatory and full citizenship that we assume comes from some sort of center, but many of the problems the urban poor face are much more complicated than social programs give them credit for. Contrasting and comparing the different experiences Yolanda had with the police over time shows some of the unevenness in how her rights are applied, and where the substance of those categories comes from. In this way, Yolanda is also a subject of the ways her local networks and the state fail her. While the state promotes local ways for people to be full citizens as if it could just delegate these tasks away, these realms are

not commensurate and citizens like Yolanda become subject to stark contradictions. For example, she can be collaborator and friend of the police in one instance, but the same rights and recourse were also impossible to apply in the next. These micro-realities may be very personal and intimate and defiant of distinctions like center and margin or local and universal, but they are also real examples of the way that state power is productive. From apparently disparate frameworks of government action and NGO involvement Yolanda's experience as a citizen is made of very different realms of action that do not all coherently tie back to just one center. Ultimately the state by itself was too marginal a recourse for the violence of the attempted rape. What is shown to be tenuous in this example is the hold on meaning the center seems to have. How does the local substance of universal categories like citizenship impact our theories of the state?

## **Chapter 2: Directions of Administration that De-center the State: The Adoption of Local Models for National Programs**

In this chapter I will build on the framework I began to develop in the previous chapter showing that there are many different and complex ways the state is situated vis-à-vis the local level in Huaycán. On one level, many state programs prioritize the most basic necessities for poor citizens, and the less needs-driven aspects of daily life are set aside as less-pressing concerns by the state programs that try to intervene, understand and improve life for residents. As these programs attenuate and take away from the local in this way, determining specific points of intervention and prioritizing some problems over others, they also build. These programs build frameworks for dealing with local problems by establishing the different ways that individuals, community, businesses and civil society organizations like NGOs are made viable resources to turn to for help in addressing community-level problems. State programs also help delegate accountability between these different agents and the state. How is the everyday emptied by a process that adds to the community at the same time, building and creating access and incorporation for the residents of neighborhoods like Huaycán?

Among the most obvious manifestations of the administrative aspects of the state in a neighborhood like Huaycán are the programs addressing the basic necessities

for poor citizens, like childcare, alimentary assistance and building materials. For example, PRONAA, INABIF and the *Banco de Materiales* are national state agencies that provide assistance to citizens at risk for hunger, malnutrition and inadequate housing. This kind of state action involves a great degree of administrative complexity, and municipalities and the national government can both have a hand in administering programs that tackle closely related aspects of widespread and everyday problems. While the programs named above are administered by national agencies, the *Vaso de Leche* program and DEMUNA programs for example are administered at the municipal level.<sup>31</sup> From the perspective of the local, the relevance of both national and municipal governments overlap and build various levels of administration into the depth and breadth of different problems. This also has an impact on how complicated the state seems from the local perspective.

In this chapter I focus on the Wawa Wasi Program, a state-led child care program because it is a revealing example of the way the state operates at the local level in neighborhoods like Huaycán.<sup>32</sup> Although the Wawa Wasi Program is orchestrated at the national level through MIMDES, I argue the program is also an example of the different ways the state's influence is directed, defying any simple understanding of the state as a centralizing force and always above the local. The Wawa Wasi program is one

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<sup>31</sup> Vaso de Leche was created in the 1980s with Barrantes administration in Lima. DEMUNA was created in the 1990s. These are municipally administered but are national programs in the sense that municipalities across the country have a Vaso de Leche and DEMUNA program.

<sup>32</sup> Wawa Wasi is Quechua for Child House. MIMDES is a national ministry and stands for Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social (the Ministry of Women and Social Development).

example where the state tries to model the grassroots and build services that parallel existing organizations in poor communities at the local level like *comedores*, relying heavily on local organizations already in place.<sup>33</sup> The modeling of the grassroots that is represented in this example shows how the conventional view of the state encompassing the local is not the framework even the state itself adopts in every instance. Governments can be open to and inspired by the ideas and practices that emerge from a more local context.

I also use the Wawa Wasi example to begin exploring the impact this different directionality of state power has on how the local and everyday in *barriada* neighborhoods is conceptualized in Peru. How are the residents of Huaycán situated as citizens vis-à-vis the state? This question will also underlie Chapters 4 and 5 of the dissertation. Do these particular programs reinforce the way the margins are different from the center? What other more subtle parameters are there to the absent presence of the state?

### **The Multi-Functionality of a Childcare Program**

The Wawa Wasi Program was created in 1993 under the Fujimori regime. The child care program drew inspiration from a similar project implemented by the NGO Caritas in the Puno region during the 1960s (Alva, Asalde, Ospina, 2002).<sup>34</sup> Initially

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<sup>33</sup> Comedores are communal dinning kitchens that are organized by the community and receive state subsidies and donations of food and cooking utensils.

<sup>34</sup> Caritas is a faith-based NGO with a long standing presence in Peru. (see: <http://www.caritas.org.pe/resenha.htm>) Accessed June 24<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

financed with funds from UNICEF and with loans from the Inter-American Development Bank, this financing structure was changed during the Toledo regime. The program is now entirely state-financed.<sup>35</sup>

There are three different targets in the Wawa Wasi Program, which is meant to serve poor and extremely poor citizens in Peru. The program is primarily geared towards the children being cared for, but the children's parents and the *madres cuidadoras* (the direct translation of this term is care giving mothers but I will refer to them in English as day-care providers) are also beneficiaries of the program. There is a different set of objectives for each target group. The following is a short description of the different desired outcomes for each group of participants in the program.

Firstly, the program is geared towards providing supervised care for the children of poor and extremely poor families between the ages of 6 months and 3 years. Children must exit the program when they turn 4.<sup>36</sup> In addition to supervised care, another principal justification of the program is that the children enrolled receive nutritionally balanced lunches and snacks in the program.<sup>37</sup> Although the program provides

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<sup>35</sup> This was part of Toledo's agenda to reduce Peru's dependency on foreign lending. Parents also make a daily contribution to the *madre cuidadoras* who take care of their children, effectively paying half of the *madre cuidadora's* income. This detail will be discussed later in the chapter. The Peruvian state has taken over financing for the program as of February 2005. What this means for the women day-care workers in terms of pay structure they do not explain at present <http://www.mimdes.gob.pe/WawaWasi>). Accessed February 12<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

<sup>36</sup> There is another state program that is more education focused for older children called PRONOEI. This is administered through the Ministerio de Educacion at present.

<sup>37</sup> The program serves 53 0000 children, and gives out over 2 million lunches and snacks a day <http://www.losandes.com.pe/Economia/20090807/25483.html> Accessed August 15<sup>th</sup>, 2009.

childcare, it is also an opportunity for the state to intervene nutritionally with children who are at risk, and the meals are specially provisioned by the program and monitored for nutritional content. Program administrators recognize how early childhood nutrition is a concern because it affects later physiological and cognitive development (Alva, Asalde, Ospina, 2002:14).

Secondly, the Wawa Wasi Program is also designed to allow parents to work while their children are safely supervised. The program is meant to fill this need for parents who otherwise cannot afford to pay for supervised care. Single mothers for example are especially in need because they have fewer options for supervised childcare but also have to provide for their children; usually relying on other family members to care for their children. The program provides single mothers with a possible and affordable alternative. Parents are expected to pay 50 centimos a day (about 15 to 20 cents US) per child (Alva, Asalde, Ospina, 2002, 27). This money is paid directly to the *madres cuidadoras* and makes up about half of their monthly salary. The food the children receive is supplied by the program, the parents do not need to pay extra for or otherwise provide for the food the children eat during the day.

Thirdly, the Wawa Wasi Program is geared towards the daycare workers or *madres cuidadoras* as a source of employment. The state contributes roughly half of what the day-care providers make, and the other half of their pay are contributions from the parents. In Huaycán and for many Wawa Wasi's nationally in similar neighborhoods, meals and snacks for the children are prepared by a local *comedor* and



the program is coordinated by a committee of neighborhood women, further involving pre-established community organizations in the program.<sup>38</sup> These different targets give the program depth in the community. It entails more than just the children being cared for and it targets different people in the community in different ways.

### **How These Roles Figure in the State's Logic of the Program**

The assumptions about the role each target plays in the program are indicative of how the state imagines the everyday in a neighborhood like Huaycán. For example, the majority of the administrative and state-controlled management of the program is geared towards nutrition, assuming that many of the children in this socioeconomic category are at risk for malnutrition. A regional administrator explained that there is a great focus on nutrition because the people in this socioeconomic sector have little knowledge of the nutritional value of food. She explained that it is a common practice for children to drink soft drinks and eat foods with little protein at this age in this particular sector of the population. Part of the program was to try to intervene in the feeding habits of parents and show the benefits of feeding their children differently.

With this focus on nutrition there is less stress on developing activities for the children during the day and making effective use of the time the children spend with the *madres cuidadoras* provides. As Alva, Alsalde and Ospina explain, 'What is really happening is that governments still consider that education starts at 4 or 5 years old when children begin to attend an early education center [al centro de educacion inicial].

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<sup>38</sup> These points are also laid out in Alva, Alsalde, Ospina, 2002.

With this focus they only give care to those who are less than 3 years old in terms of their welfare and hygienic needs, without assuming them [*asumirlos*] as people who have rights, aspirations, needs and demands' (Alva, Asalde, Ospina, 2002:14). There were long stretches of the day while I was doing my field research in the Wawa Wasis in Huaycán where the planning of activities and play was largely left up to the initiative and energy of the individual *madres cuidadoras*.

Moreover, many *madres cuidadoras* have problems controlling the behavior of 8 children for an entire work day alone. Children pass through a number of very different development stages in the age span of 6 months to 3 years old (remaining in the program until they turn 4). Older children can bully and push the younger children around, upsetting parents, and creating interpersonal tensions between the parents and the *madres cuidadoras* that are difficult for individual *madres cuidadoras* to overcome given they receive little guidance or support on these issues from the program itself. At the time of my research individual *madres cuidadoras* had to shoulder these sorts of problems about the day-to-day routine with parents themselves.

Another central premise of the Wawa Wasi program is that the work the *madres cuidadoras* do is more voluntary than remunerative. The architects of the program modeled the program on other grassroots organizations, especially the *comedores* discussed in more detail below. This means they expect women participants to find inherent value in participating in the program because it benefits the children and the parents of their community. The Peruvian state created the Wawa Wasi Program with

the expectation the participant caregivers will volunteer of their time for the benefit of the community, like they volunteer in the *OSBs* like comedores and neighborhood associations, as well as NGOs and other community projects.<sup>39</sup>

It is also interesting how the Wawa Wasi Program is more of an idea than an institution, at least in terms of the physicality of how it is implemented. Although there are some Wawa Wasis *Institucionales*, buildings specifically designated for the purpose of having a Wawa Wasi, the overwhelming majority of Wawa Wasis are run from the homes of individual *madres cuidadoras*. . The fact most of the Wawa Wasis are run from private homes bolsters the impression the endeavor is more voluntary than remunerative, and if remunerative than the *madres cuidadoras* are being entrepreneurial and are never treated like employees of the state. Each woman who participates as a *madre cuidadora* has to have 8 children in her care. If she has less than 8 she risks being de-enrolled from the program and the children assigned to another *madre cuidadora*. The minimum of 8 children also has a direct effect on the pay structure for many *madres cuidadoras*. In order to remain a participant in the program a woman caretaker has to have at least 6 to 8 children in their care (the number was a firm 8 at the time of my research.) In Huaycán women sometimes accept children whose parents who do not pay their allotted share regularly or consistently in order to meet the minimum. The *madres cuidadoras* risk being removed from the program if a

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<sup>39</sup> Drawing on Janine Anderson and Caroline Moser, Alva, Asalde and Ospina also relate this point to a more general frameworks of gender. They explain how this is considered a ‘female specialization’ and how women’s work remains invisible and makes up for deficiencies in the state (Alva, Asalde, Ospina, 2002:17)

child stops attending because of their insistence in being paid. Since the fee is paid directly by the parents to the women caregivers and is not directly mediated or monitored by the program, the women can actually be receiving less pay than what the program intends or reports they make. They are making less than the 240 soles or 65 dollars a month intended. Even in testimonios published by the program the women explain that, 'my problem arose for me again, the mothers said they will pay me at the end of the week or the end of the month. The week or month ended and they didn't bring their kids and a lot of mothers did that to me... and I told the supervisor all this every week she came and she told me that it can't be that nobody pays me like that, that the only pay I is from the work the parents give me. That I had to tell the parents that if on the contrary that they don't bring the children' (TACIF, 1996:17) In my interviews with women daycare workers in Huaycán, they reflected similar sentiments, but that they often accepted children whose parents did not pay on time or as much as promised to keep their numbers up.

### **Parallel but Different: Organizaciones Sociales de Base and Local State Programs**

In Peru organizations called *Organizaciones Sociales de Base* (OSBs) like *comedores* or dining kitchens are legally recognized integral to Peruvian society.<sup>40</sup> As Blondet and Montero explain, *comedores* began to emerge in many popular neighborhoods in the 1980s as the economy grew more precarious in Peru. The idea to pool resources among families in order to prepare meals caught on and *comedores* were

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<sup>40</sup> See for example Ley 25307.

increasingly found in many different neighborhoods of Lima and elsewhere in Peru.

Outside organizations began donating food stuffs and cooking utensils to the *comedores* and the state eventually started to administer donations of foodstuffs, albeit inconsistently from government to government (Blondet and Montero, 1995: 37).<sup>41</sup> As Cecilia Blondet and Carmen Montero explain,

The communal *comedor*, as a popular women's organization, is a social phenomenon that developed in our country in the last 15 years, without parallel at the level of Latin America and probably the World. The comedores appear in Peru as the economic crisis worsened and the State relieves itself of its social function. In the constitution of [the comedores] multiple actors and interests intervene; on the one side, institutions and external agents that donate foodstuffs, money or assistance; on the other, the women of the popular sectors (Blondet and Montero, 1995:19).

Comedores are bolstered by the government, but they also have an anchor in local community organization. They receive food subsidies and donations through PRONAA, presently an agency of MIMDES, but they are not administered to the same degree as the Wawa Wasis. Their origins are squarely from local community initiatives, although now the idea is so pervasive and common-place that it does have parameters defined by society more generally. *Comedores* are considered one of the backbone grassroots organizations in poor communities in Peru.

The identification of the role that the OSBs play in the Peruvian constitution formalizes the importance of OSBs to Peruvian society, but it also one of the mechanisms that singles them out as different from other mainstream civil society organizations, assuring they will continue to work as distinguishable from more

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<sup>41</sup> Blondet and Montero explain that during the crises of the 1980s and the 1990s (due to hyperinflation and the 'Fujishock' of the early 1990s) the state decided to prioritize the delivery of services and instead of 'universally' providing services for all citizens, the state began to focus on particularly vulnerable populations in extreme poverty (Blondet and Montero, 1995:36-37).

mainstream civil society organizations at the same time. Identified as those organizations like neighborhood associations and *comedores* in the constitution, OSBs are community organizations but they are also a different sphere of action that the mainstream NGOs and civil society organizations at work in Lima and nation-wide. During my fieldwork I volunteered for a project called *Vigilancia Ciudadana* with the NGO Foro Solidaridad Peru where OSB representatives were preferred to individual participants from the same neighborhoods in the workshops because of the representative and activist role they play in their communities. OSBs are used by both NGOs and the state as a gateway to neighborhoods like Huaycán. In a similar way, the Wawa Wasi Program prefers that those on the local committees and those administrating the Wawa Wasi Program at the community level to be *comedor* or other OSB member. The Wawa Wasi Program uses local *comedores* to prepare the meals for the children.<sup>42</sup> In this way, *comedores* and other OSB organizations are made targets by the state and NGOs in a manner that also re-enforces how they are different spheres of action.

### **Modeling the Grassroots: Trying to Reproduce the Motivation Inherent in Community Organizations**

The Wawa Wasi Program shows the power dynamic between the local and the state is sometimes different. State and citizen relationships are not strictly top down and not all power dynamics are imposed by the state onto citizens. The Wawa Wasi

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<sup>42</sup> Meals for the Wawa Wasis are prepared apart from the other meal preparation the *comedor* does. The cook in charge of the Wawa Wasis at the *comedor* pays a local person to deliver the meals and snacks, or does the delivery work herself.

example demonstrates how the state is also being receptive to the inner-workings of local organizations and can be inspired by the activities of NGOs in ways that defy the hierarchical framework usually used to understand power.<sup>43</sup> This different kind of power relationship is obviously employed in conjunction with more conventional state co-optations and pressures, and this ceding to local energy is only ever partial in its scope and the kinds of dynamics it creates. Nonetheless, the Wawa Wasi program shows how one tactic the state employs is to mirror local initiatives in the hopes of reproducing momentum for self-improvement and community involvement found in more genuinely grassroots endeavors. The Wawa Wasi Program demonstrates there can be different directionalities in the way particular state programs interact with the local that require looking at the power dynamic between the local and the state differently.

The state's interest in reproducing this local level energy shows how local organization and the daily participation of citizens is also considered a universal and nation-wide possibility at the same time, something that can be re-created and replicated through poor communities in different parts of the nation. Although this focus on local participation can be attributed to the transnational influence of entities like the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank that mandate community involvement as a condition of meeting loan and grant agreements, I argue that examples like the Wawa Wasi program also manifest dynamics that are distinctly about the relationship between Peruvian citizens and the Peruvian state. This example

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<sup>43</sup> A pilot project for COFOPRI was carried out in Huaycán before Sendero presence became significant. This was administered by Hernando de Soto's NGO IDL.

shows how the state wants to parallel the kinds of organizations that are already there at the local, it is creatively trying to reproduce the energy of local organizational politics in poor neighborhoods.

Studies conducted by state administrators, NGOs and social science researchers in Peru itself are also exploring the impact and significance of these problems at the level of Peru. They seek to understand the local dynamics and the immediacy of problems facing poor citizens, and many studies I have used in this dissertation are examples of this other dimension of trying to gain knowledge of local dynamics.<sup>44</sup> Tania Li, criticizing James Scott's unitary vision of the state, points out similarly that,

Less visible in Scott's account are the missionaries, social reformers, scientists, political activists, ethnographers, and other experts who routinely diagnose deficiencies in the population or some segment of it, and who propose calculated schemes of improvement. These parties were active in colonial situations, sometimes aligning with and other times contesting the priorities of the ruling regime.<sup>7</sup> Today they are joined by the misnamed "nongovernmental" organizations, both national and transnational, which are involved in arenas such as public health, welfare, agricultural extension, conservation, human rights, good governance, and, increasingly, peace building—all elements of the hydra headed endeavor we have come to know as "development." The extent to which improvement schemes are concentrated in—or coordinated by—the official state apparatus is a matter for empirical investigation at specific sites and conjunctures(Li, 2005: 386).

There is substance to the relationship between the state and citizens beyond what the international agencies prioritize and focus on. Everyday problems in the *barriadas* are also windows into how central governing processes can produce different results, even if local dynamics get less attention as objects of analysis. Without denying the problems the poor face are brought into dialogue with wider international frameworks both as a strategy on the part of political and social actors (as a means to draw attention to a

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<sup>44</sup> The Alba, Alsalde and Ospina reference I cite in this chapter is one example. The publications that Riofrío did for DESCO is another.



problem) and through efforts to understand the fuller extent of the dilemmas that poor residents face in Peru, international influence is only part of a more complex and multi-dimensional set of dynamics. Sometimes international influence is more of a gloss or container for relations and problems that have other national and local factors underlying and undergirding them.

Community involvement in programs like Wawa Wasi is therefore more instrumental than just paying lip-service to global pressures for community participation.<sup>45</sup> COFOPRI (the state agency that grants land titles to residents in communities like Huaycán) is another example of a state program that evolved from an idea that was originally conceived in a non-state organization. The Instituto por la Democracia y Libertad (IDL), the NGO headed by the well known economist and author of *El Otro Sendero* Hernando de Soto, used Huaycán as one of the pilot sites for a project that experimented with granting official titles to informal property owners in *barriada* communities. COFOPRI is therefore another example of a state program that elaborates on already existing conditions like the proliferation of informal property-holding, in a parallel motion adopting ideas developed from agencies technically outside

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<sup>45</sup> I realize the motives for this creativeness are in the interest of the status quo, but I believe there is still something to be understood about the state as a concept in the process, even though this more imperialistic and hegemonic vision is still a truth. The process of trying to make something work at the local level merits understanding because it shows how these relationships of inequality are reproduced. I don't want to jump right to the conclusion these processes are suspect and in the interest of the status quo because that would make this more a discussion about the banks and governments and the analysis would continue to eclipse Huaycán. I am trying to develop a fuller sense of the effects of these processes for Huaycán.

the formal state. It is worth emphasizing again here that the Wawa Wasi program is not just an effort to model the OSBs; it was also inspired by an NGO project to begin with.

These examples further demonstrate how the state looks for creative ways to engender participation and the inclusion of everyday citizens, positioning itself differently vis-à-vis the local in such instances, as if it is trying to learn from local initiative and harness community momentum. As the program website states:

The program is implemented through the organized community [*comunidad organizada*] who are those who administer the resources for integral care [*atención integral*]. By way of a body [órgano] called the Administrative Committee [*Comité de Gestión*], which is conformed of five members elected in a communal assembly who belong to an OSB (Organización Social de Base) like the *Comedor Popular*, which will permit the success and sustainability of the Program (20.03.03 <http://www.promudeh.gob.pe/WawaWasi/servicios.htm>. Accessed March 5th, 2010).

In the passage above, the program makes specific mention of the kinds of organizations that are important at the local level in neighborhoods like Huaycán, and explains how the goal is to make instrumental use of the OSBs. In Huaycán, the Wawa Wasi Program also makes detailed use of the specific ways the community is ordered locally, running the program in terms of the zone and UCV number (see Chapter 4 for a more detailed description of how the neighborhood is divided). As Tania Li recognizes, local projects can be ‘lashed up’ by the state, but I think it is important to recognize that there are different ramifications to these kinds of efforts, and they are rarely just outright appropriation (Li (quoting Rose), 2005:386.) The way that the state instrumentalizes local organization gives this example much more dimensionality than co-optation or just appropriation. In this example the explicit goal is to actually have the program run itself to the extent possible, to use community momentum and local resources. This shows

some of the mechanics of the purposeful distance and self-managing dimension the state also creates in this endeavor.

In this way there is also an element of mimicry in the design and implementation of the Wawa Wasi Program, where the state is trying to reproduce local momentum of the grassroots organizations that run parallel to the state (Baker-Cristales, 2008:352). This represents a relationship with the local that also has a sideways dimension to it, that the state sees itself too as just one actor among many at the local level and not just top down, and shows the state wanting to generate local energy like the OSBs have. It is also obvious the national Wawa Wasi program is very contingent on local dynamics – dependent on the strength and willingness of local leaders the program works better in some areas and neighborhoods and even at the level of the different parts of Huaycán for example. When the program was trying to choose where to install the Wawa Wasi Institucional discussed below, the local leaders of the first choice made rejected the idea. Wawa Wasis Institucionales, usually 2 or 3 daycare providers working from buildings dedicated to the program, are an exception -- the majority of Wawa Wasis are run by individual women from their own homes. The Wawa Wasi Institucional I describe below was originally proposed for another area of Huaycán. As second choice, the opportunity to have a Wawa Wasi Institucional was then willingly taken up by the community leaders where the building is presently.

At the same time however, the instrumental way that the program makes use of community organization is different than what are more properly Organizaciones

Sociales de Base (or OSBs) like *comedores* (dining kitchens) for example. A group of neighborhood women usually take the initiative and decide to come together and start a *comedor*. They are largely considered self-managed or *autogestionarios* and after officially registering as such an organization they receive subsidies and donations from the state. *Comedores* also have a central place in the history of *barriadas* in Peru and they are one of the prime examples of what is meant by an OSB in Peruvian law.<sup>46</sup>

Although women in the Wawa Wasi volunteer to become part of the program, it is obvious that the bulk of the initiative and the interrelationship between the community organizations and the state are skewed differently in the Wawa Wasis than in the comedores. At times, the community dimension in the Wawa Wasi seems forced, and the dynamic and degree of that community aspect is different from committee to committee, even making community involvement in the Wawa Wasi program seems compelled at times, at least in some committees where there are difficulties in implementing the terms of participation. With the Wawa Wasis, the state is trying to model other kinds of community participation and have the Wawa Wasis parallel it. This creates a varied pattern of intersection between state power and local organization at the local level, a series of different organizations, some that are grassroots, some that are grassroots with state support, and some that are state programs trying to be more like the grassroots.

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<sup>46</sup> See Ley 25307.

This defies the top down hierarchies that are usually taken for granted in understanding the state and the local, but these different kinds of relationships happen at an everyday level that often goes under-recognized, only defying hierarchies in small and fleeting ways. However this does show how the state engages creatively with society even in day-to-day interactions. This is one of the complicated ways the state creates an absent influence vis-à-vis the local – existing grassroots movements are compelled to varying degrees to take up this opportunity and participate in programs like Wawa Wasi. There is a kind of distance created and given multiple dimensions at the same time in these kinds of relationships -- where the local organizations and the women who want to work in the program are delegated many of the tasks involved in managing the program on behalf of the state, that at the same time these tasks are construed as the same style of volunteerism inherent to the OSBs. Furthermore, the OSBs like *comedores* lost some of their grassroots legitimacy during the Fujimori regime and they were made more government than local organization through the kinds of political patronage and corruption that is argued to have occurred. Modeling and making instrumental use of the local and grass-roots dynamics in this way creates ambiguity in the relationship between the state and residents involved with the program. Through series of little parallels, volunteerism is justified in order to make the program more sustainable and participatory, but also the state is less accountable itself. It is the local and the women's own use of the program that fills in the kind of empty presence the state has in it.

## **Reconfiguring Absence: Reiterating Distances in the New Regime**

State-services and the state relationship to OSBs in communities like Huaycán grew controversial during the Fujimori regime, especially as the regime began to crumble. State influence among the poor through programs like Wawa Wasi and in the OSBs was used as a way to engender electoral support and political loyalty by provisioning gifts and other benefits under the Fujimori regime. The Toledo government continued to administer the same programs post-Fujimori, but worked to distance the programs from their more populist past and changed the financial structure of programs like Wawa Wasi. The Toledo government made changes so that Wawa Wasi would be a state-financed entity instead of depending on international loans and aid. The program is currently active under present Alan Garcia and operates now as an entirely state-financed entity.

The Toledo government was actively trying to work out a means of administration that would disassociate the program and others like it from the kind of leveraging and populist politics that occurred during the Fujimori regime while I was conducting my research. This section examines how the state communicated and enacted some of these changes and how this impacted the relationship between the state and the people who use these services in Huaycán. How did these efforts to change fit with the everyday politics that were already an intrinsic part of these programs? Shifts and adjustments were made, but in some instances these shifts reiterated exclusions and maintained an existing relationship without really

communicating effective change. Many of these efforts embellished at levels that did not effectively re-orchestrate into the heart of the program. One of the most telling changes was that made to the Ministry's name from PROMUDEH (which was the name the Ministry carried when created by Fujimori) to MIMDES and the new slogan became, 'from *asistencialismo* to developing capacities.' A lot of the government's energy was spent in proving an anti-*asistencialismo* stance. New signs were allotted for every Wawa Wasi with changes to the ministry name.

There were however tensions in the way such practices were replaced in the name of a more transparent government. Clientelism and political patronage was one kind of network of power that snaked through different organizations at the local level in the Fujimori regime: OSBs, comedores, and other programs like Wawa Wasi were all used by it to different degrees. As one *madre cuidadora* in the Wawa Wasi program explained 'When Fujimori was President he would give presents on Christmas for the children, but now we get nothing. We don't have medicine when the kids are sick, and the children get bored of the same old toys.' Christmas celebrations for the children were also something co-financed by the program in the past. Women day-care workers would get gifts on Mother's Day too via the program under Fujimori. Rather than fixate on the issue of the gifts and clientelism themselves, which for good or for bad did happen, I want to emphasize how the acts used to remove that association what a practice that re-iterated the same relationship, fixing the *madres cuidadoras*, parent

users and even the children in place – taking away the gifts of clientelism without replacing it with anything productively different.

In the Wawa Wasis under the Toledo government, the women were sent thank-you letters instead of gifts of food and toiletries. The women also received more ‘*capacitaciones*’ or training workshops to learn how to effectively care for the children but instead of getting bus fare to the workshops like they did under Fujimori, the *capacitaciones* were held in the locales themselves (making administration of these events more local). Shifts from clientelism made at this time just took out the material gifts and tangible benefits of the clientelistic relationship, but kept the same basic everyday relationship to the state in place – it remained bare, even distancing itself more from local administration without really involving the madres *cuidadoras* in the level of the wider meanings and the frameworks for change at the level of ‘developing capacities.’ As Miriam Shakow explains in her dissertation on politics and identity in Bolivia, politics is layered with different influences, there are not necessarily sharp disjunctures between populist politics and more transparent forms of democracy in practice (Shakow, 2008).

The rumors at the beginning of the Toledo regime were that many of the state programs for the poor would be axed and the fact that the women day-care workers contracts were only renewed at short intervals fueled this anxiety in the women. For a period of three months while I was doing research in the Wawa Wasis, a full year after Toledo came to power, the women day-care workers went three months without the part of their pay they receive from the state.



The Field Coordinator explained to me that changes being made to the Ministry were causing administrative problems.<sup>47</sup> The Field Coordinator said she knew the *madres cuidadoras* are anxious and unhappy about this but that the change process is difficult and the women would have to be patient.

At the time, the women day-care workers used the episode as an example of the kind of posture and treatment they received from the new government on the ground and in their everyday lives. The government wanted to emphasize that the poor would not get the kinds of things they got in the Fujimori regime. One condition of being permitted to work in the Wawa Wasis from program officials myself was that I could not give the mothers or parents and gifts or money. The Area Coordinator told me the government wants to foster a different mentality among the poor. They want people to stop expecting to receive things from the state like a gift, as they did when state programs were used for political means under the last regime.

The new government administration also shared a sense of the precariousness of social spending and scarcity of state resources with the women day-care workers. When the *madres cuidadoras* complained to local administrators they were reminded that this was a time of uncertainty in state programs -- they should quiet their critiques because it may make it easier to stop the program altogether than meet their demands. The *madres cuidadoras* were made to feel that if they press too hard for the state to meet

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<sup>47</sup> It wasn't until the third month without pay that the Field Coordinator explained to the women that the delay was due to the Inter-American Development Bank not depositing the funds for the program. I haven't been able to verify if this is the true reason for the delay. Toledo cancelled part of the loan that Fujimori had agreed to use to fund the program.

their demands the program might have to stop altogether. While I did my fieldwork the women renewed their contracts expecting the program to expire in December 2002, April 2003 and September 2003. When I interviewed the program's National Director at the time, she said the program is projected until February 2004 as structured at that time and financed with credit from the Inter-American Development Bank. Plans were in the works to change the financial structure of the program so it will be financed by the state's own resources and a greater contribution on the part of the parents but little of this was communicated to the women themselves. In fact, the Toledo government cancelled half the (IDB) loan that the Fujimori government signed to fund the program, fueling the speculation that the program was heading for huge cuts.<sup>48</sup>

The way that changes were made to the Wawa Wasi program during the Toledo government reinforced the wider sense of ambivalence towards the new government when many of these kinds of tokens Fujimori used were taken away.<sup>49</sup> The participants in programs like Wawa Wasi experienced a giant re-orchestration that also left many things as they were. In trying to wrestle social programs from Fujimori's kind of politics, more attention was paid to outside perceptions and meanings on an institutional level than was paid to the intrinsic relationship between everyday citizens and the state. It

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<sup>48</sup> The Wawa Wasi website states that the IDB recommended that Wawa Wasi be a permanent fixture of the state, and that the Peruvian state has taken over its financing as of February 2005. What this means for the women day-care workers in terms of pay structure they do not explain at present <http://www.mimdes.gob.pe/WawaWasi/>. Accessed November 11<sup>th</sup>, 2008

<sup>49</sup> Another rumor circulating at the time was that people would be made to pay back their loans from the Banco de Materiales. The consequences of paying back for homes built by way of this program becomes unpopular for another government.

was more meaningful to replace the signs on the Wawa Wasis than to pay the women day care workers on time. The government was concerned about making the program seem more transparently austere, but the same basic framework between the everyday citizen and the state was left in place. It was actively taking away from the local without being productive in replacing those relationships, at least not at this local level. The changes made were more about shifts in the levels above. Any benefit for the everyday participant in the Wawa Wasi Program from these shifts above was only indirect.

### **Evita for a Day: Dressing-up the Program for Distinguished Guests**

One Wawa Wasi stands out as strangely complete in the *zonas altas* of Huaycán. The *zonas altas* are the more recently settled parts of Huaycán, and many houses still have only make-shift roofs and dirt floors. As people save money and their families grow, people improve and expand on their homes, adding concrete floors and permanent roofs as they can. The Wawa Wasi Institucional is located a few side streets in from the main road in this part of Huaycán. It sits at the end of a row of houses and only a few doors down the sloping street from the *comedor* that prepares the noon-day meals and the snacks for all the Wawa Wasis in the area. The same *comedor* is also a regular *comedor*, where neighborhood women take turns each weekday preparing the mid-day meal for all the other resident members who use it in the neighborhood.

The Wawa Wasi Institucional is a fair-sized building, about 2 to 3 times the ground area of a typical house in Huaycán. The building had a finished roof, tile floor and the outside was carefully painted hospital-scrubs green. A small fence decorates the

front entrance, but the area enclosed by the fence is too narrow to be of any functional use for the children being cared for inside the building. The tiny front yard was also too full of plants and poured planters now covered in layers of dust. Inside, the Wawa Wasi is equipped with running water and a functioning bathroom, tables and chairs for the children to eat at and a set of shelves that serve as cubbies for a few toys and books. There is also an area for the children to take their naps in the afternoon. The building stands out in this part of Huaycán for looking so well-provisioned and complete.

This particular *Wawa Wasi Institucional* is useful for illustrating a number of different tensions that surround programs like Wawa Wasi and the government. Firstly, this building is a symbol of Fujimori-style participation in the *barriadas*. Construction on the building was completed just as the Fujimori regime was unraveling to an end. Administrators of the program under Fujimori managed to squeeze in an inauguration of the building just before the change of government. However, the locale was purposefully re-inaugurated again by the Toledo government. Peru's new First Lady Elian Karp was made the new *madrina* or godmother of the building in an effort to undo the strong association this particular project and the program more generally held with the Fujimori regime. For this reason, the building seemed uncomfortable for the new regime. When I asked for permission to work there, program administrators tried to discourage me by explaining the building was not representative of the program and that I should focus on those Wawa Wasis that are run by individual women from their

homes. I had already approached the *madres cuidadoras* who worked there and got their permission to do field research with them.

At the same time however, this Wawa Wasi Institucional had encounters with the centers of state power during the Toledo government that seem to contradict the awkward associations I describe above. This Wawa Wasi building in Huaycán was used as an example of the program for the First Ladies attending the Summit of Iberoamerican Presidents and Chiefs of Government in 2001. Five months into the presidency of Alejandro Toledo, the government of Peru hosted the summit. Wanting to highlight a successful example of women's organization, government officials arranged a visit to a real and functioning Wawa Wasi for the First Ladies (Caretas, Nov 25<sup>th</sup>, 2001). The Wawa Wasi Institucional in Huaycán was chosen to receive the distinguished visitors.

Program administrators made a lot of effort to dress the building up to receive the First Ladies. The three *madres cuidadoras* who regularly cared for children in the building were given a list of preparations to make. They worked many extra unpaid hours decorating, cleaning and preparing the locale for the visit. Program administrators brought new toys, supplies and mattresses to make sure the building looked well-equipped and cared for. All these preparations were carried out so the First Ladies could visit the Wawa Wasi and a nearby *comedor* in Huaycán for a couple of hours.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> <http://www.editoraperu.com.pe/edc/01/11/25/inf.htm>. Accessed March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

Ironically, the First Ladies were shown a Wawa Wasi in order to experience a real-life example of organization among poor women in Peru; however the visit was only a caricature of everyday reality in the program. Firstly, the First Ladies visited the *Wawa Wasi Institucional* on a weekend, when the program is usually closed, and the *madres cuidadoras* and the children were asked to come in especially for the visit. Very few children were brought in by their parents that Saturday. There are usually up to 24 children who attend the center on any given weekday, but the *madres cuidadoras* said there were maybe 5 or 6 children in attendance that day. The building was used to showcase the program to the First Ladies, but the building is also something the state shows discomfort with in other contexts. When I asked an administrator for permission to work in this particular Wawa Wasi she discouraged me, saying it was not representative of how the program is really meant to work. She explained that if I wanted to understand how the program works I should concentrate on the Wawa Wasis that are run from women's homes. I however had gone first to ask permission of the *madres cuidadoras* who worked there and had already started carrying out some research at the building.

The *Wawa Wasi Institucional* in Huaycán is thus an exception to something more central and more marginal at once. The more finished building is an exception to a program that is primarily orchestrated through the private homes of the women caregivers. A lot of this private and self-managed space is more unseen by the state than

in the Wawa Wasi Institutional. The Fujimori-era building in Huaycán was an anomalous, extraneous place for a program intending to give women the idea to run a Wawa Wasi from their own homes. Although the Wawa Wasi Institutional was used to showcase the program to the First Ladies, it was something that the administrators wanted to hide from me because it was like a relic of the kind of clientelistic politics the new government was trying to move away from. It was however the easiest and most comfortable way to showcase the program for the First Ladies. It made the program look a little less like nothing but an idea and more tangibly like something beneficial and recognizable as the state.

The *madres cuidadoras* on the other hand agreed to the visit of the First Ladies because they understood it as a rare opportunity to show the outside world what their everyday reality is like, what the need is like in programs like this and what it is like to be poor. This came up against the decisions made by program administrators to dress-up and embellish what everyday reality was like, eclipsing the real everyday processes with something more fake. Showing it as women's organization that has little to do with the state; but usurping it like a state that actually hid from view the community dimensions it claimed to be showcasing. The First Ladies left with the understanding the program was well provisioned with toys, mattresses, and a nice building. They also did not see that even in the nice building there are usually 24 children sharing 3 mattresses at naptime, that the children are bored with a set of toys that never changes, and that all

the children share one bathroom and rarely play outside because of all the dust and the insufficient hands to care for 24 toddlers outside in this Wawa Wasi Institucional.<sup>51</sup>

A few days later there continued to be aftereffects from this event. The toys and mattresses brought in to dress the building up for the visit were simply taken back by the administrators and the *madres cuidadoras* had to return to using the old supplies. This kind of anti-clientelism revealed how purposefully empty existing relationships are. Giving gifts and other extraneous benefits via these kinds of programs was not a part of the new government's agenda, but that was the end of their agenda to this level of citizen and state relationship in the *barriadas*. What were they replacing the gifts with? Why would they gift and then take away? There was little bridging of the 1000s of miles of distance that usually exists between the women who worked in the Wawa Wasi Institucional and the First Ladies who visited despite the apparent intimacy of the visit. It also shows how the government works to maintain the emptiness of the program for participants, not revealing the emptiness to the outside world, but not filling it substantively for residents either. Bringing the First Ladies in to witness an embellished version of the everyday conditions these women work in, the state took control of this specific example of community like it does not apparently do in the everyday home-

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<sup>51</sup> This is a common complaint when residents of Huaycán talk about political visitors. Another commentary that circulated among women in the community is that prominent and elite political figures like Lourdes Flores hurry to wash their hands after visiting with people in neighborhoods like Huaycán. The women I did my field research with took this to mean that Flores has disdain for the poor and felt she was above them. Flores body language suggested that she was uncomfortable with the way people live in neighborhoods like Huaycán. According to the *madres cuidadoras* who participated in the visit, the First Ladies kept their distance and didn't interact with the children. The women said it was as if these visitors spoke another language and couldn't understand the *madres cuidadoras*.



based examples of the program, expecting the *madres cuidadoras* to participate as they were told to, and cut off any chance they had to give the First Ladies their own interpretation of the program. In this sense the visit was a superficial and insignificant formality of the state, something to keep the First Ladies engaged and busy. Despite their good intentions or any genuine interest the First Ladies were shown something staged and with little respect for the actual organizations at all.

To program officials, Elian Karp and the First Ladies, the visit was a small and fleeting thing, but that attitude left some lasting impressions on the participants in the program. Program administrators assumed this was something that could be adorned with few lasting consequences. Yet the visit also impressed upon the community surrounding the Wawa Wasi. Residents there insisted the First Ladies must have donated something. How could they witness the poverty of this part of Huaycán and not leave something for the children and the community? There were rumors either the *madres cuidadoras* or the program administrators kept what was donated for themselves.

### **Layers of Distance between Residents and the State**

I argue that the incongruencies and awkwardness of the visit reflect the kind of state power that is often overlooked but still evidenced in these kinds of programs. The more indirect influences the state has in such contexts are rarely analyzed for the ways they are productive. The everyday reality in the program needed embellishment for the First Ladies so that well-being would be more recognizable. This is indirect

acknowledgement that the bareness of the everyday is still produced within the encompassment of the state, that the bareness is something the Wawa Wasi is actively engendering. The fact the government administrators were also uncomfortable with this emptiness and usurped this reality to show something more becoming to the First Ladies represents the kind of impasses being created, reproducing exclusions while also apparently working to overcome them on other levels and in other ways at the same time. Ironically, the reason the *madres cuidadoras* agreed to participate in the visit was to show those outside the community how they really live in Huaycán. Even program administrators underestimate the complexity of the relationships in the Wawa Wasis, and think of them as bare spaces they can just fill and un-fill at will.

The state is productive of the bareness in the Wawa Wasis, even if the government is unseeing of that fact, believing that most of the space is orchestrated by the OSBs, or the *madres cuidadoras* themselves. Yet there are relationships between the residents of Huaycán and the state being produced in the Wawa Wasis that have an impact beyond the explicit limits the government sets for them. The Wawa Wasi is more an example of the way the state is present for the residents of Huaycán, than an example of woman's organization as it was touted to the First Ladies. The *madres cuidadoras* and the local OSBs wanted to use this opportunity to reach out to some worldly figures, to show these important visitors that their situation is difficult, but the government wanted to showcase this as a success.

The fact that the administrators took the stuff away for the workers and program participants later shows the way that the logics being used in this transitional phase between governments made the Wawa Wasi even more bare. When I asked permission from the regional administrator to work in the Wawa Wasis, one condition was that I was not allowed to give the women any gifts because the government was trying to end the clientelistic relationships of the past. This shows how the implementation of the program can be rigid, giving a very two dimensional view of the problem in the sense that for administrators there was a lot of focus on eliminating the gifts and handouts, without substantive change to the relationships that do exist.

I tie these layers of distance created by indirect effects back to the absent presence the state has in neighborhoods like Huaycán. By this I mean the state makes its presence and involvement known in very specific or conjunctural relationships – but as I develop more fully in the following chapter, at the same time there are other dimensions of the state where it aims to be absent and only marginal, and that subjects essentially govern themselves, but its transcendence and omnipresence also have indirect consequences here. The government itself is unaware or does not admit to some of the productiveness. The effects of this indirect influence are ambiguous, but they are still productive. The distance and disassociation to other aspects of everyday life is also created. For example, in the daily routine of the Wawa Wasi- - there were obvious moments that were full of state involvement and regulation – where the program’s attention was focused – planned meals, calculated nutrition value (daily

protein intake), planned snacks and doctors periodically coming to measure the children's weight gain and growth. But in other moments of the day, lesson planning, activities, toys simulation, the bulk of their daily routine and time, the relationship between care providers and parents and children, there was markedly less regulation or attention from the program. These are also the same points they did not want the First Ladies to see. Less circumscribed, but not taking action within the scope of a state program is still steering in a direction.

There is a messiness and redundancy at local level of the state: only making slight redresses that re-articulate how they approach problems – prioritizing anti-asistencialismo and making a great effort to undo what was done —and so not actually moving forward or solving local problems. How the women stay where they were in this effort to change the dynamics of the program in upper levels. Do these changes squarely meet up with all the values? At least in ways that seem tangible and that they can see?

### **Mining for Meaning: *Concursos* to Distill Program Successes for the *Madres Cuidadoras***

One way that programs like Wawa Wasi extract meaning and determine the on-going significance of the program to the *madres cuidadoras* is to hold *concursos* or contests asking participants to write narrative essays about (or have others transcribe their stories about) their involvement in such programs. The contests ask the women to explain how the program has impacted their lives and what they value about their

participation in the program.<sup>52</sup> Drawing on examples from a set of narratives published by a *Concursos de Testimonios* in San Juan de Lurigancho and other sources,<sup>53</sup> in this section I will show how the state uses these kinds of *concursos* to glean meaning from women's participation, mining for more precise ways to argue that the program has impacted their lives. This expands and systematizes the kinds of impact the program has in the process. As the program director explains at the beginning of the collection of testimonials:

It is with a lot enthusiasm that we have collected a vast, multiple and rich variety of experiences by way of the CONCURSO DE TESTIMONIOS, precisely because we want more and more people to know how important it is for these women to share their experiences of taking care of and attending to children (TACIF, 1996: 3).

In this way, much of the systematization of how the program is intended to benefit women caregivers emerged as the program was being implemented. It was like a value-added meaning as the program evolved—the benefits the program carried for the women were not necessarily well-articulated from the program's outset. The *concursos* are examples of how state programs grow in scope or change as they are administered, and that the program actively seeks to understand, expand and improve the efficiency of their own impact. This shows how there is also a measure of uncertainty in what effects particular government actions will have. The testimonial kind of exercise is also now used to glean information from the parent users in the program and these

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<sup>52</sup> There are a number of these kinds of contests for participation in the state. There is one promoting nutrition for example where Wawa Wasi personnel can participate <http://www.ins.gob.pe/insvirtual/ins/concursocen2008/Base2008.pdf>. Accessed February 10th, 2010. There is another in regards to an adoption program at [http://www.mimdes.gob.pe/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1025&Itemid=37&lang=es](http://www.mimdes.gob.pe/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1025&Itemid=37&lang=es)

<sup>53</sup> San Juan de Lurigancho is another large *barriada* that is just East of Lima.

testimonials are available on the Wawa Wasi Program website. Another added dimension to the program in recent months is that parents can also attend workshops on childcare via their enrollment in the Wawa Wasi program.<sup>54</sup>

The testimonials emphasize how the program is accessible to women who are housewives or mothers themselves. The program is convenient and practical because women caregivers do not have to travel or leave their own children in order to participate. It allows these women to contribute financially to their households and the community, and so helps their self-esteem, especially with their partners. As one woman explained,

Working with children is a new life experience for me. Personally my participation in the program has been a lovely experience. Thanks to the program I feel happy and fulfilled as a useful woman [mujer util], I feel important and I hope they continue to give this opportunity to other women like me that need it because this helps every participant in the program with their self-esteem. Let the success continue... (TACIF, 1996:24)

The Alva, Asalde and Ospina's book that I draw on for this chapter is an analysis of the women caregivers' contribution to the program as well. It calls for more appreciation of the contribution the women make to the program as work and not just volunteerism or women's natural inclination to childcare (Alva, Asalde and Ospina, 2002). The notion that the women caregivers are more volunteers or entrepreneurs than employees is also implicit to many of these *testimonios*. It is also significant that the Alva, Asalde and Ospina study for Grupo Genero y Economia was funded by Oxfam, an international NGO

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<sup>54</sup> [http://www.mimdes.gob.pe/files/PROGRAMAS%20NACIONALES/PNWW/testimonios\\_pnww.pdf](http://www.mimdes.gob.pe/files/PROGRAMAS%20NACIONALES/PNWW/testimonios_pnww.pdf) (accessed March 18<sup>th</sup>, 2010).

(Alva, Asalde, Ospina, 2002:11). Different actors contribute to the multidimensionality of state programs, adding to the debate about the scope, reach and role of the state.

The following *testimonio* emphasizes the way the women might have to negotiate participation with their partners, one of the potential barriers to women volunteering their time and their homes to the program.

It was at that point that my life changed completely. It took a lot of work to convince my partner or husband (sic) to allow me to work because he always had lived by that saying 'women are for your home, and it is the man who works' and for those reasons we fought and I convinced him and I told him that I could also work without having to leave the house, giving him all kinds of explanations he accepted it and I was really surprised to see my husband very interested in this program that I dedicated myself to. That got me really enthusiastic about opening this program, I never thought he would let me work. He helped me prepare the area and he told me that I would work with my children there after I finished my training in the workshop ' (21-22)

The testimonials demonstrate how the *madres cuidadoras* benefit in many ways, and not only in terms of what they are paid in the program. In this example, the way the woman had to negotiate with her husband also has an impact on gender relations, making the program appear to have promise in this regard as well. These *testimonios* are also a window into how state functionaries view the inter-relationships within poor families in *barriada* neighborhoods. The program is considered to benefit the *madre cuidadora* in terms of making her role less dependent in her husband. Another testimonial emphasizes the way the work is also fulfilling to the women caregivers because it contributes to the community.

I feel fulfilled [realizada] in this work with which I help my community taking care of the children of the women who have to work. The Wawa Wasis are very necessary because many children are abandoned in the streets because no one can take care of them and here in the neighborhood there have been many accidents for that reason. At first my husband didn't want me to do this work, but I told him it was necessary and that we had to help the community because there were many children in danger because there was no one to take care of them. Little by little my

husband got used to the idea and now he helps me with some things (El Sistema Nacional de casas de Niños, Wawa Wasi, N.d: 4.)

For this particular participant the program also changed her relationship with her husband. It also gave her a sense of fulfillment. This demonstrates how the program is etched on assumptions about the day-care worker, women citizens, gender relations, families and children in poor neighborhoods. It also shows the aspects of the program that benefit the community, promoting the volunteerism dimension.

Another dimension that is more subtle but still apparent in the testimonials is that the position of the women caregivers vis-à-vis the community changes as she becomes part of the program that is run by the state. This shows some of the limits in how the state wants to interact with this population, giving insight into the nature of the distance and emptiness that is also created in-between the state the residents through programs like Wawa Wasi. In the position of being service-providers, the *madres cuidadoras* are made more aware of the problems affecting the families in the community. Yet through their testimonials we also see that only certain aspects of their relationship with other community members are encouraged and supported by the state; problems that fall outside the specific goals of the program also become problems for the women and are only very tangentially considered by the program. For example, in her testimonial one woman explained that "... most of the children have problems, for example they are without parents, orphans, with problems at home like a lack of affection..." (TACIF, 1996:11). In my field research in the Wawa Wasis in Huaycán the women talked about being witness to similar problems, and how they often felt



frustrated being made aware of the problems that families and children face but were also without any of the tools that could help. In their position as caregivers they see the absences better, how it is difficult for families to get access to help, or that effective measures do not exist for certain programs.

In this way, the *madres cuidadoras* become more aware of the limits the specificity of the program sets. As one *madre cuidadora* explained, "One day the mother of the baby who had problems with the father came and I suggested that she approach the *comisaria* but she said the father worked there as a national police officer..." The *madres cuidadoras* I worked with in Huaycán would also stress how being a *madre cuidadora* made them more aware of the different ways that material poverty impacted the families in their neighborhood. Some children were sent to the Wawa Wasi without essentials like a change of clothes or diapers. The daycare providers became more aware of their neighbors problems but they were also given few tools to help address these problems beyond the scope the program had outlined for them. This shows how state roles, even those as open and unofficial as the *madre cuidadora* role, still have considerable power to shape and determine the kinds of relationships these women have with her neighbors. Involvement in the program puts her in a service position in the community and she is made more aware of community problems. Yet the *madre cuidadora* also represents the state's specificity because there are many problems she does not encompass and is not expected to address. Domestic abuse for example is a problem that is dealt with by other state agencies like the police and DEMUNA. There

are other problems that arise that the state barely or only superficially deals with under different guises as well. As Gustavo Riofrío explains, the idea that shantytowns are spontaneous and a trespass lets the state assume a kind of partialness in provisioning and providing for *barriada* neighborhoods.

The misunderstood spontaneity is a consequence of the fact that even in those cases in which the governments have taken the initiative for the formation of popular neighborhoods, they haven't taken the necessary steps for the full development (*desarrollo integral*) of those settlements. In this way, they distributed the lots they could for the settlement of families, but the authorities of basic services were not alerted. For the authorities of those services, the *barriadas* appear without their consultation. Attending to their needs required in many cases modifying priorities and plans that they had for the development of services in the city. In carrying out a project of chalk outlined lots "lote tizado" (read *barriada* created by authorities), the authorities of those projects never alerted other authorities, that is, with those that disperse water and electricity, for example. For that reason, according to many planners, the best justification for their failure in planning the growth of the city and helping popular housing consists in señalar que las *barriadas* son *espontáneas*, that is, outside of their decisión and so beyond their help (Riofrío, 1991:30)

Thus, agents of the state pull aspects of daily life in different directions, affecting the ways that problems take shape at the local level, adding dimensions to the way that any particular problem is addressed. It shows the thinness of overt presences of the state in the community, but also the kinds of impact the absence and lack of action has on the everyday. Riofrío's insight above also shows how the multidimensionality of the state can lead to misunderstandings about dynamics at the local level, obscuring certain processes. Some agencies are even ignorant of the actions on the part of other government agencies, and this can cause the misconception this neighborhoods are improvised, and cause other forms of exclusion and difficulties of access for *barriada* neighborhoods.

The role of mother and daycare provider does not overlap as easily as the program assumes either, and it creates some tensions for the *madres cuidadoras*. Parents sometimes take advantage that the structure of the program is so informal and depends on the good will of a neighborhood mother. Some parents are disrespectful of hours, picking their children up late for example. The *madres cuidadoras* also do not want to risk angering the parents by complaining or insisting too harshly because as *madres cuidadoras* they need to keep a certain number of children under their care in order to remain participants in the program. Disagreements with the parents could have a negative impact for her. Taking care of her own children at the same time also draws criticism from some parents who argue the *madre cuidadoras* take better care of their own children and ignore the needs of others in their care. *Madres cuidadoras* also say it causes their own young children some stress and jealous feelings because of the attention they give to other children in the Wawa Wasi. All of these things are extra burdens that come with a job that is very poorly paid.

*Concursos* like the one held for the testimonials of the *madres cuidadoras* further demonstrate the points of inspiration that programs like the Wawa Wasi Program take from the local and grassroots. They show the multiple dimensions that are inherent to the state. The interface between the state and subjects like the *madres cuidadoras* is re-iterated in this way. The comments made by the program administrator, that emphasized how important the experience of participating in the program was to the women shows how they were actively looking for new and more

concrete ways to articulate how the program benefits the women workers as participants in an attempt to document the change and opportunity the program brings to these neighborhoods.

### **Delineated Spaces in Local Accountability**

The self-organizing emphasis the state places on services like the Wawa Wasi Program is significant in at least two ways. Wawa Wasis are one of a series of programs enacted by the government in the hopes that poor residents can improve their well-being through self-reliance and self-management. Yet by encouraging self-reliance, and an entrepreneurial attitude towards education, health and other aspects of everyday life like childcare— the state is creating opportunities based on a set of ideas that are already peremptory of daily reality; neighborhoods like Huaycán are assumed to be self-reliant and self-managing before and ahead of the state programs that are implemented to help encourage these kind of approaches. The frameworks for participation and points of access to the state in Huaycán are situated in function of this vision, creating a very two-dimensional view of daily life as a void to be filled, with little appreciation for the way things do transpire in these neighborhoods. Being self-managing and self-reliant becomes preemptive criteria for participation in programs made for the *barriada* populations.

Although the Wawa Wasi Program is one of the most direct examples of state action in poor communities, the program is tangibly little more than an idea, spread to potential participants through awareness campaigns, word of mouth and local

*comedores* . A large part of the infrastructure provided and the work carried out is conducted in the homes and with the bodies of *madre cuidadora* citizens. The testimonials described above also clearly show how their position as *madres cuidadoras* comes with limits. Involvement in the program creates a new relationship between the *madres cuidadoras* and the other residents of the community, but it's a role that also limits the way they are active in the community at the same time, encouraging the women to see themselves as either volunteers or entrepreneurs vis-à-vis the community. There are disconnections between state practice and everyday reality that are significant. The given frameworks do not exhaust the extent of people's lives and there is much about everyday life that does not fit or only very tangentially fits at this level. This puts the state's local framework for participation already at a considerable distance from the reality of daily life in a shantytown like Huaycán.

Scholars like Partha Chatterjee, Veena Das and Achille Mbembe each argue in their own way that recognizing the heterogeneity of the local and everyday is important in understanding the frameworks for politics and the state (Chatterjee, 2004; Das, 2004; Mbembe, 2001). This means that alternative frameworks of politics and community can be and are maintained in tandem with the state.<sup>55</sup> This revelation is important because it recognizes that the daily and local context for politics is not just a void to be filled or a bareness that is only given real dimension by the state. There are ways the state is

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<sup>55</sup> In the Chatterjee example he discusses heterogeneous time and tradition (Chatterjee, 2004). In Das she discusses alternate readings of the state and the way that different people where she worked used state policy to their advantage, to preserve their traditional ways (Das, 2004). Mbembe discusses the plurality of African societies (Mbembe, 2001).

marginal to the context of community politics, traditions and experience in resident's own lives. More specifically, Veena Das argues that traditional and contemporary practices co-exist, and traditional community practices are sometimes re-articulated through contemporary state forms. Das explains how the widows and fathers of victims in a riot circumvented government policies that favored the wife and ignored the traditional entitlement due the victims' fathers (Das, 2004). In Chatterjee's example, the illegality of squatter settlements is negotiated and even circumvented to some extent by residents of shantytown neighborhoods through the kind of power they have in electoral politics (Chatterjee, 2004:40).

The relationships the residents of Huaycán have with the state also show how the point that heterogeneity is important also needs to problematize the dichotomies that are drawn between the traditional and the modern. Advocating heterogeneity alone leaves the causal assumption that social exclusion is the result of the persistence of cultural traditions and 'radical otherness' (Gandolfo, 2009). This makes it seem that the fundamental reason the state has difficulty integrating and incorporating neighborhoods like Huaycán is because there is already a framework in place. However, the alternate spaces for interpreting the state are not only the product of surviving traditions or something other to modern politics itself. As Chatterjee argues some of these alternatives to the status quo are 'new products of the encounter with modernity itself' (Chatterjee, 2004:7). We need new ways to understand the ambiguity in the differences drawn between the traditional and modern, where this distinction is part of

what is produced in the relationship between the government and citizens. In the Wawa Wasi example the state does this with parents' feeding habits, casting these habits as traditional and deficient. It is not the simple absence of modernity or presence of difference that causes exclusion.

The way that Huaycán is impacted indirectly by the state is under-acknowledged, but these kinds of relationships are still productive of everyday politics for the residents of Huaycán. A lot about the way that the everyday in shantytowns is framed by the center might remain unspoken and diffuse, but this framework is productive of the way Huaycán residents are apparently different from the mainstream. It is this wider and more diffuse framework that allows the kind of ambiguity that makes a shantytown. What leads to exclusion is layered differently than presupposed, assumptions about the causes for social exclusion are a part of this framework, without being the undergirding truths about reality that they claim to be. Heterogeneity is a product of what is center as well, even in marginal places.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter demonstrates how state programs operating on a local level can take a creative approach to the community, operating in different directions and on different levels at once. Although programs like Wawa Wasi are state-initiated and a product of the conventional hierarchies of authority that situate the local closer to community than the overarching and encompassing state, community-based state services want to foster the volunteerism that characterizes more genuinely grassroots

organizations. Modeled on the OSB example of participation like *comedores*, Wawa Wasis are a state program that wants to reproduce local energy and parallels the grassroots. This shows there can be different directions to the dynamics between the state and the local, even those where at least in some instances the state takes a more submissive stance to community organizations, requiring more than just a top-down and one-way understanding and analysis of state power.

In paralleling grassroots organizations and wanting to engender a similar kind of community momentum, the state produces the kind of absent presence I have been describing in the dissertation thus far. The parameters the state expects residents to use towards self-management in programs like Wawa Wasi seem unproblematic – through the testimonies they are linked to wider social values like self-esteem and fulfillment for the women involved. The volunteerism that foregrounds the basic premises of the Wawa Wasi program shore up a more generalized framework for self-managing daily life. As the visit the First Ladies paid to the Wawa Wasi in Huaycán shows us, the material reality of those who are poor or extremely poor is largely held in abeyance through the politics of these programs. Although the state is active and people are participating daily in programs like Wawa Wasi, their material poverty is also routinized through the self-managing framework that melds state actions with their poor realities. In this sense the state actively builds into the emptiness and ambiguity in shantytowns. The margins do not conform in every way to their definition as a place where there is less of or a lack of state action, although that is often how it appears. While the idea



that Huaycán is marginal to the state can be dismissed theoretically or in an absolute sense, it is still an idea that is used to understand these communities, and to act on them.

The visit the First Ladies paid to the Wawa Wasi in Huaycán was not an everyday event, but the encounter brought many of the unspoken disconnections and tensions that I argue make a substantive part of the everyday relationship between residents and the state in neighborhoods like Huaycán to light. The dynamics of the event suggest that despite the overall discourse of pragmatism and austerity there is also a kind of shame and lack of fixity felt at the emptiness of the real state of things in the Wawa Wasis, a reality that was dressed-up for drop-in visitors. The program needed a temporary mask because the bare everyday is obviously not empty of the state – but the reasons it is such an attenuated and articulated kind of emptiness are too complicated to possibly showcase in a visit that only lasts an hour or so. So there were no wrong first impressions of the positive in keeping shantytown residents at their own material minimum, the First Ladies were presented with an embellished reality and a well-being that made the Wawa Wasis seem like a program working to make the residents of Huaycán a little less marginal than they are. However, the administrators emptied the space through the state again when they took the mattresses and toys away after the visit. This visit and the way the state felt it had to dress-up its actions in Huaycán was an indirect acknowledgement of how it also actively lets the place be. It was much easier for authorities to just embellish the bare components of reality in this instance, adding a

temporary layer whose meanings were more containable and recognizable than the real and more complicated albeit bare-looking everyday, filling in a distance manifested in the Wawa Wasis so as to reconcile the visit into something the state is more comfortable revealing to the First Ladies.

### **Chapter 3: The State is At Least Two Things: Between Productive Omnipresence and Administrative Absence in Huaycán**

In this chapter I will address how my research contributes to a more abstract understanding of state dynamics. Here I will explore a number of anthropological concepts that are helpful for understanding the different ways the state engages everyday life for the residents of Huaycán. This chapter is more theoretical than ethnographic in focus, although I will draw on the ethnographic examples I use and develop more fully elsewhere in the dissertation in order to illustrate how anthropology contributes to the understanding of the state and politics.

Until very recently many felt that globalization presented a threat to the organization and relevance of the nation-state. The increasing interdependence of the world was construed as a challenge to the traditional framework of the nation-state. Arjun Appadurai for example argued that the significance of the nation-state was declining with the increasing interdependency of regions around the world (Appadurai, 1996). In *Empire* by Hardt and Negri there was also this sense that the direction the current world order was taking would lead to the demise of nation-states as we know them (Hardt and Negri, 2000). It follows that the state was becoming less significant as an analytical concept because globalization was creating other avenues of politics and

membership in its place. However, more recent discussion of states and the new interconnectedness of the world have stressed that globalization and state interests are not necessarily opposed. States are also productive of relationships that seem to be established outside or beyond its scope. For example, anthropologists such as Aihwa Ong and Beth Baker-Cristales show how there are new forms of membership and control being created by states for citizens living beyond a state's borders (Ong, 1999; Baker-Cristales, 2008). Citizens within particular nation-states are also experiencing redefinitions of the terms of inclusion and migrants and non-citizens are seeing increased vigilance and being denied inclusion in some instances but at the same time there seems to be more attention to the condition of non-citizen and more awareness of the real life implications of being without certain national or state determined rights where one resides. While there are certainly shifts and changes in the extent to which the state is responsible and accountable for the well-being of citizens, it is also true that new kinds of relevance are being created for and by traditional forms of government.

As I discuss the work of different scholars in this chapter, I will focus specifically on how an everyday approach to the state shows there is a creative tension between the omnipresence of the concept of the state in notions of sovereignty and citizenship for example, and the daily, administrative aspects of government. I define administrative powers of government broadly, to include obvious examples like bylaws, police regulation and the kinds of institutions, programs and services the state administers. Although less the focus of this present research, I also include in this

understanding of the scope of government the biopolitical management of daily life, through the control of health and education more generally for example. I argue that the omnipresent power of the state has influences on a daily level that are not necessarily co-terminous, nor directly contingent on many of the more administrative reaches of the state. Created from the inter-relationship between these two different facets of the state there is at least one other identifiable field of state influence, one that is more contingent on everyday circumstances and particular community dynamics and is often found at the interstices between the state's omnipresence and its administrative reach. Important aspects of the state as concept and as an agent with power are evident in these everyday interpretations and daily practices.

### **Territory and Membership: Arbitrary Limits at the Margins**

State sovereignty is based on at least two principles that are fundamental to the omnipresent qualities of the state. Firstly, the Peruvian state has sovereignty over the land contained by its borders. Secondly, membership in the nation-state is extended to all who are born (or naturalized) in Peru. Furthermore, the state also generally has a monopoly on the (legitimate) use of force in a Weberian sense; any challenge to that monopoly may generate the use of force that is considered legitimate in order to preserve the system and the status quo, as occurred in the war between the government and the Shining Path. These principles serve as basic foundations and give us a basic framework of what is meant when referring to the Peruvian state.

These steadfast parameters of territory and membership seem most arbitrary at the margins. The margins of the state evokes many different notions but they are often visualized at least as those regions closest to the state's territorial limits. However, the margins are also where the definitions of membership do not undergird or encompass those living somewhere between inclusion and exclusion, because marginal people are also importantly influenced and apparently subjects of what is beyond the terms of membership as well. The concreteness of this ambiguity the state is instrumental in creating at the margins is rarely examined. As Deborah Poole and Veena Das explain, the margins are often viewed as 'containers' for people who are not sufficiently socialized (Das and Poole, 2004:9). This idea that the margins are less socialized than the center is largely how exclusion is understood in countries like Peru and "demands for popular justice were interpreted as an expression of facets of human nature that had not yet been mastered by rationality" (Das and Poole, 2004:8).<sup>56</sup> From a distance the reasons for not belonging seem to be outside and contrary to the state itself, having little to do with order or power per se. However at these kinds of margins the limits of the state and what is considered beyond or outside are in close proximity and are productive of each other, showing how citizenship for example is not an innocuous universal but a process promoting indifference and even seeking to make irrelevant what excludes. This shows there is often real and complicated ambiguity created by the arbitrariness that

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<sup>56</sup> While I am making use of definitions of margins that Das and Poole develop in the introduction to their edited volume, I want to make it clear that they also question and want to re-think this idea that the margins are spatially peripheral to the central state. The idea is that even at the center there are these same kinds of relationships and questions as to what the state is and how it governs (Das and Poole, 2004: 3).

someone is a citizen in a formal sense but everyday relationships and even dimensions of state regimentation itself create a reality that dictates otherwise.

This creates a whole series of dilemmas where basic citizenship parameters help to attenuate inequalities, having the secondary effect of creating an illusion of distance between the state and the substance of many differences. Applying citizenship parameters like this helps to further empty the margins of these differences, at least as they pertain to what is relevant to the state and politics. The basic citizenship parameters take precedence over differences through state practices, and the ways that citizens do not belong are conceptually distanced from what is state. To include the populations that are more generally excluded then, you need to apply tactics that further empty the everyday of differences or at least do the job of putting those differences in their appropriate place. Partha Chatterjee calls this tension the difference between the heterogeneous nature of everyday time in countries like India and the homogenous time of liberal citizenship in *the Politics of the Governed* (Chatterjee, 2004:6). Under-sets of citizens are created while universal citizenship parameters are applied, because the differences are being relegated to beyond what is strictly universal in this process. In this way, although seemingly innocuous, the basic principles of state sovereignty over people and territory are also highly productive of important dilemmas in Peru. Applying the principles also allows for the creation of various under-sets of people who are less than full citizens in practice, and they are less than full citizens by the very parameters of their inclusion in important ways. Our way of understanding the

state and society relationship conceptually separates these realms in ways that don't allow for the productiveness of the everyday to be understood with much depth. They are still thought largely in terms of 2 dimensions and as separate and distant realms; included is the opposite of excluded, modernity is the opposite of tradition, development is the only route out of poverty. Looking to where these distinctions are arbitrary however shows there is this everyday and highly productive dimension to the state where the interrelationship and lines between these apparent opposites are not as sharp.

Adding to the creation of these kinds of interstices and ambiguity is also the multidimensional nature of the state itself. The omnipresent and the administrative aspects of state power are not necessarily coterminous. They can work at counterpoints, and they can produce contradictions and tensions that shape the kinds of relationships that are evident in neighborhoods like Huaycán. The following discussion of relevant literature will explore a number of the key concepts that have emerged to describe and delineate these state processes ethnographically.

### **The State is a Multi-dimensional Process and Not a Thing**

One of the basic tenets in anthropological understandings of the state is the state is a social process and not a thing. Building on the approach by scholars like Philip Abrams, Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, what we call the state evolves through many different social and cultural processes that operate over time. Treating the state as somehow separate from the rest of society or as an essentially unitary, ahistorical



institution obscures state formation as a process, and negates many of the ties there are between state and society. Furthermore, the division between state and society that seems to objectively exist is really only the idea that separation surely exists in practice. The scholars following this approach in anthropology are generally interested in questions of state formation and the historical development of the state. The edited volume by Joseph and Nugent titled *Everyday Forms of State Formation* is an example of this state formation perspective applied to the Mexican revolutionary state (Joseph and Nugent, 1994). The articles of this edited volume explore how the revolutionary state in Mexico used elements from popular culture and more formal projects of state formation, combining the outwardly antagonistic projects of resistance and hegemony with some (qualified) success.

Building on the same insights regarding state formation, in *State/Culture* George Steinmetz asserts that seeing the state as a process allows us to ask questions about culture and society that are usually viewed as only tangentially relevant to politics and government (Steinmetz, 1999:2). The state is not the concrete entity it claims to be. The institutional processes and the people who do the governing are embedded in processes that are also a product of society more broadly. How does this kind of perspective change the unitary way the state is viewed? What kinds of different processes are significant and why?

### **Finding the State: Local Examples of State Administration**

The ethnography of the state approach builds on this understanding of the state as process and it points to some of the different ways that the state builds its influence and impacts the everyday lives of citizens. In their review of this literature for the introduction to *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*, Deborah Poole and Veena Das explain that anthropologists taking an ethnographic approach to the state find and map local instances of the state (Das and Poole, 2004:5). In another example, Blom Hansen and Stepputat point out in *States of Imagination* how an ethnographic approach to state practices shows the historical nature of state processes and how state practices can be a subject for ethnography. More local or more specific examples of state administration demonstrate how different and uneven practices are from agency to agency, and from program to program. Ethnographic writing about such local presence gives us a different perspective of state institutionality. It shows how such practices are embedded in everyday relationships and local contingencies, and how the state and society separation is more ambiguous in practice (Gupta, 1995:375) The way I discuss police presence in Huaycán and the Wawa Wasi program in previous chapters are examples of this kind of ethnographic approach to particular examples of state administration and service-providing.

Paralleling this approach, Gupta and Ferguson call for ethnographic attention to what they call the encompassment of the state. By encompassment, Gupta and Ferguson explore the way the state claims authority or 'verticality' over the local (Gupta

and Ferguson, 2002: 988). They trace the precise processes and the kinds of relationships created in these contexts -- looking at how the state practices its authority concretely, building hierarchy and using space. As Gupta and Ferguson explain, “the force of metaphors of verticality and encompassment results both from the fact that they are embedded in the practices of state institutions and from the fact that the routine operation of state institutions *produces* spatial and scalar hierarchies” (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002:981). This kind of framework draws attention to the sorts of processes that produce hierarchical relationships between authorities and citizens. For example, Gupta describes a childcare program called Aganwadi in India. This is a program that uses local women as the childcare workers to claim local ties. At the same time, Gupta argues the program serves to disavow the significance of local practices and variations in the program because it is not as easy to generalize at that daily and local level about the program as it is at the higher levels of the program. It is an example of the way particular practices contribute to establishing hierarchies (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002:988). These kinds of local approaches to the state demonstrate how states express universalizing tendencies and practices of particular historicities and specificities at the same time.

The edited volume by Joseph and Nugent called *Everyday Forms of State Formation* mentioned above is an example of the state formation perspective, but it also emphasizes attention to local variation of state practice and everyday understandings of the state (Joseph and Nugent, 1994:9). The contributors to this volume show the

different ways that the state can influence the local, and how that influence changes over time. As Joseph and Nugent explain in the introduction,

It is these actually existing forms of governance and the trajectories of institutions and representations of the state in various parts of the postcolonial world that this volume explores. Throughout we try to avoid the usual negative prefixes (weak, disorganized, incoherent, illegitimate, deinstitutionalized, etc) that still enframe the problematics and the puzzles to be solved in most political science and development studies literature on the postcolonial state. One of the most promising avenues away from this deadlock is to disaggregate the state into the multitude of discrete operations, procedures and representations in which it appears in the everyday life of ordinary people. By treating the state as a dispersed ensemble of institutional practices and techniques of governance we can also produce multiple ethnographic sites from where the state can be studied and comprehended in terms of its effects, as well as in terms of the processes that shape bureaucratic routines and the designs of policies” (Joseph and Nugent, 1994:14).

These examples all point to different aspects of the state’s multidirectionality that I will discuss in later chapters. Disaggregating the state as Joseph and Nugent explain above demonstrates how there are varied components to the way the notion of the state is created. Some are bureaucratic and mundane practices of the everyday. Others are based more on abstract notions of sovereignty and power and give the state a different kind of symbolic or even philosophical presence in social relationships and people’s lives. Others still explore the dramatic dimensions of the state and are based on spectacle. Finally, there are also the fetishistic kind of relationships that exist between everyday citizens and the state. I will discuss these in further detail below. As Das and Poole stress, ‘any effort to rethink the state as an object of ethnographic inquiry must start, then, by considering how this double effect of order and transcendence has been used to track the presence of the state’ (Das and Poole, 2004:5.) Both of the administrative and the omnipresent aspects are productive of the kinds of state and citizen relationships we are interested in.

## **Productive Centers at the Margins: De-centering the State as a Concept**

A second general approach that anthropologists take looks at the more metaphysical and abstract aspects of the state. This kind of position recognizes that the state is also present in daily life as a concept, shaping politics and people's aspirations. Daily life is not more the realm of bureaucratic routines while the centers of power are exclusive ground for the abstract questions. There are ways the state is pertinent and is made an abstraction from society-at-large in everyday life as well. Timothy Mitchell explains that the separation between state and society is an idea or belief (Mitchell, 1999:77-78). This means there is also a potentially ethnographic dimension to the state that can examine the ways people and authorities come to believe in and adopt practices that treat the state as an entity separate from the rest of society.

The approaches brought together in the edited volume by Veena Das and Deborah Poole in *Anthropology in the Margins of the State* explore what anthropological explorations of the state can contribute to more metaphysical questions about the state. For example, a more ethnographic approach can address how the state juxtaposes itself to notions of nature and irrationality through its practices at the margins. Building on the influence of Kant, Hegel and Weber, Das and Poole make the point that the state is fundamentally incomplete and that a key dimension of the way it maintains power is that it needs to be continuously re-created and talked about in order to exercise many of its functions (Das and Poole, 2004:7). As Das and Poole explain, "We wish to emphasize that for these and other foundational theorists of the European state

form, the state itself was seen as always in danger of losing its hold over the rational organization of governance by the force of the natural from within” (Das and Poole, 2004:8). In this light, the state can make totalizing claims to represent order vis-à-vis the apparent disorder and lawlessness of a society without government. The everyday focus of anthropological approaches to the state can show where these more abstract concerns emerge in particular and everyday practices. The idea that the state represents order vis-à-vis an opposition of disorder is an example of the kind of margin that is carried through to the fundamental essence of what the state is. Even approaching the state with the Weberian emphasis on the monopoly of legitimate force, an ethnographic approach can demonstrate how that monopoly is maintained and enforced on a day to day basis. Some of these conceptual struggles with questions of disorder will be evident at the margins, where the state is participating in the effort to make micro-improvements towards development, modernity and inclusion. The Wawa Wasi Program is an example of this kind of effort for example, where in recent months the parents’ childrearing practices have become yet another layer of action and practice added to the program as a target area it seeks to influence and improve.<sup>57</sup>

These approaches show how the state is also complicated conceptually because power does not emanate from just one center. Secondary and tertiary agents, like program administrators and local leaders can build power and influence in the lives of citizens by using state power in unscripted ways (Poole, 2004:61). Furthermore, Joseph

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<sup>57</sup> In recent months the Wawa Wasi program has begun to offer talks and workshops on childrearing to the neighborhood parents who participate.  
([http://www.mimdes.gob.pe/files/PROGRAMAS%20NACIONALES/PNWW/testimonios\\_pnww.pdf](http://www.mimdes.gob.pe/files/PROGRAMAS%20NACIONALES/PNWW/testimonios_pnww.pdf))

and Nugent point out that despite the realization that the state is not a thing but a process, there are performative aspects to understanding the state that are themselves real; it projects an image of cohesiveness and coherency while it might not really be everything it claims (Joseph and Nugent, 1994:20). The state tries to influence, impress upon and convince others of its power. This is another aspect of how the notion of myth is relevant to understanding state power. These more performative dimensions of the state are raised in interesting ways by Clifford Geertz in *Negara*, by Fernando Coronil in *The Magical State* and Michael Taussig in *the Magic of the State*. State agents also actively perform the idea of a powerful, integrated state and this is another dimension of its power. Although it is necessary to uncover the kinds of narratives the state uses to portray itself as an integrated thing and contrast that with the everyday reality that seems to un-do those claims and show that the process is more complex, the myth itself is still a reality and the state as a thing is still a dimension of the nature of the relationship between citizens and state. Constructing and performing the idea of a powerfully integrated state is another dimension of its power. There is an element of purposefully creating faith in the myth that makes it important for researchers to consider all these different dimensions of state action together.

Therefore at times the state needs to be examined as unitary in an empirical sense, even though as a concept it needs to be de-centered so as to recognize the many different ways that it influences the everyday. The state is largely treated like a thing by politicians and everyday people for example, and the state also acts like it has to

overstate, convince and impress upon others in order to effectively exercise its power (Roseberry, 1994:364; Sayer, 1994:375).: ). The state seems unitary in this regard but it is also used and applied in very different contexts, imparting it with multi-dimensionality as well. Therefore there are aspects of state power that are more local and de-centered, that can even contradict and work against the meanings and intentions at the center. Distance or absence of state action is not really the problem with the margins; there is complexity in the relative lack of strong ties between everyday citizens in marginal neighborhoods and the state. The ways these more indirect and contingent ties impact the lives of everyday citizens are sometimes underestimated and misconstrued. As Asad suggests in the conclusion to the Das and Poole volume, ambiguousness is similarly productive of relationships that are clearly at the center as well (Asad, 2004: 287). Anthropological accounts challenge the coherency of the state, showing how it is more multi-dimensional than it seems in all populations and manifestations.

### **Fetish and Magic in the Local Uses of the State**

The state is multi-sited and comprised of different processes that are not necessarily coterminous, which can produce ambiguity because of the partial ways these processes encompass and account for local realities. As the state comes undone in this way, there seems to be an inherent duality to the state. In her discussion of how the state tries to gain influence with migrant citizen organizations from El Salvador, Baker-Cristales stresses Taussig's position on the state, explaining that he 'demands that we attend to these ironies of the modern state: it works to rationalize human behavior, yet



it depends on mystification; its legitimacy is based on claims to protect against insecurity and chaos, yet it thrives on violence; it asserts sovereignty, yet it cultivates dependencies' (Baker-Cristales, 2008: 352). This makes it seem that the state is intentionally duplicitous, that it oscillates between essentially opposite stances to the populations it governs.

There are however different series of influence and in-betweens to these apparent oscillations and swings. The ways the state gains and maintains influence at the local level and in the everyday lives of citizens are examples of this. A number of anthropologists evoke the idea the state is 'magical' in this regard, that sometimes how the state gains influence in the everyday lives of citizens seems to defy explanation. Magic is used as a term to discuss the significance of the state in the works of Clifford Geertz, Michael Taussig, Fernando Coronil and Veena Das in different ways. What do these authors find useful about the notion of magic for describing state dynamics? Veena Das for example is interested in the 'uncanny' qualities of the state – its preternatural ability to be taken up and given life by everyday citizens and practices that seem far removed from the centers of power. In Taussig's sense the state is magical because of the ways people try to mimic and imitate state actions. Taussig is interested in the seductive attributes of power, how the state is magically powerful in this regard (Taussig, 1984:471,484).

Fetish is also commonly used to describe this same set of processes. Here again it is Taussig that explains how fetishes are 'invented wholes of materialized artifice into

whose woeful insufficiency of being we have placed soulstuff' (Taussig, 1997:3). This gives a mechanism for explaining how local meanings take on their own dynamism and can vary from how they are intended at the center. Achille Mbembe also uses the idea of the fetish to talk about the kinds of power the state has at an everyday level (Mbembe, 2001:120). Describing practices used under Biya's regime in Cameroon, Mbembe explains,

Under his rule, they were routinized and intensified; new ones were invented. For example, to illustrate the omnipresence of the *commandement* in the furthest corners of daily life, a medallion featuring the head of state accompanied by a "thought for the day" is published daily on the front page of the sole official newspaper, the Cameroon tribune. This is not only indication that, in a postcolony, power functions in an immense universe where self-adulation goes hand and hand with the claim of possessing the truth; (here, the effigy of the autocrat) is thus omnipresent, along with the amulets (the identity card, the party card, tax receipts, masses of papers, authorizations, licenses, permits) without which moving around in the postcolony is difficult (Mbembe, 2001:121).

In this context, the fetish concept explains how the state can take on a life of its own at the everyday level. In the conclusion to *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*, Talal Asad questions the usefulness of the fetish concept for explaining state dynamics (Asad, 2004:281-282). To Asad the state is not a thing and so it is not like a commodity being given animate characteristics (Asad, 2004:282). Practically speaking, even in neighborhoods like Huaycán, the local and the apparently 'fetishized' examples of state influence are a part of how the state works. There is a process and relationship with the apparent center created even in these examples where the state manifests alternately or people seem to fetishize what it produces.

Thus the unexpected, unscripted use of official politics does not move state and government squarely into something other than what it is at the top, and it is not just

local either. Whereas Das says the state can seemingly operate in two ways because it oscillates between the rational and magical, I think we need ways to be able to analyze both these dimensions simultaneously. At the margins it can be the people who perform and make the state real and tangible, albeit in ways that confuse hierarchies and what is expected – they are however still creating relationships, bringing the state into the everyday context in ways that remains powerful for the state. Such uses of the state are not hiding the real relationships as implied by the term fetish; they are creating relationships. Furthermore, following Asad, the state is not tricking people, local presence like this is also still in essence how the state accomplishes an important part of its work. A process embeds and connects the evidence of state idolatry, pictures, objects and documents in the everyday. Instead of questioning the process that leads to having this power and understanding why people want to create it, we assume that possessing this kind of power must be magical or satisfying as an object in and of itself to the people who are coveting it. We need to examine this process more fully and openly in order to give a more nuanced analysis of their dimensions. The state is not a thing and therefore it is not like a commodity being given animate characteristics (Asad, 2004:281). Practically speaking, even in Huaycán for example, the local remains a full part of how the state works .

Talal Asad's comments in *Anthropology in the Margins of the State* also seem to contradict Philip Abrams' perspective of the state as a claim. Whereas Abrams says the state is a claim to be something more solid, Asad argues the state is not an illusion. For

that reason Asad argues that the notion of fetish is inaccurately applied to the kind of dynamics at work (Asad, 2004:282). However, I think that each is framing different dimensions of the state, so that both are accurate and useful observations in their own right. Abrams wants to emphasize how the idea the state is a thing hides the varied processes that go into its making, and that the state is not a thing as claimed. This is not to deny that authorities and programs do have a measure of arbitrary power. However, there are still relationships inherent to even the most arbitrary of processes. It is possible to explain more fully how that arbitrary power was achieved and explore why people are accepting of the state's power over them. Although for Abrams the state is a fiction, an idea that covers and obscures other relationships, people do use the state to aspire for inclusion, approach it to help legitimate their projects and in order share in some way in the kind of power it has. It is in this sense that Talal Asad says the state is not an illusion and that fetish is unhelpful for getting at the nature of the state at the everyday level, or for discerning the wider levels of significance in how it relates with the margins.

The idea that there is a definite difference between the official and the unofficial makes it seem like there is a state and a parallel, informal state in Peru (Matos Mar, 1984:40). It is as if there is not any feedback between the two and that there is little creative role that the official plays on the more informal side. Yet there is a whole space of politics that this kind of thinking keeps in the shadows, that runs between and through these two supposedly separate sides. How can there be an official state despite

all the disorder and the skirting of norms? For example, in her essay in *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*, Deborah Poole highlights a common saying in Peru that there exists a legal Peru and a real Peru (*el Peru legal y el Peru real*). However, there are also real ways that the informal Peru is made through the politics of the official side.

Relationships are created in resolving little contradictions and addressing programs. In *On the Postcolony*, Mbembe tries to elucidate about how this relationship is significant.

He explains how:

In short, the public affirmation of the 'postcolonized subject' is not necessarily found in acts of 'opposition' or 'resistance' to the *commandement*. What defines the postcolonized subject is the ability to engage in baroque practices fundamentally ambiguous, fluid, and modifiable even where there are clear, written and precise rules. These simultaneous yet apparently contradictory practices ratify, de facto, the status of fetish that state power so forcefully claims as its right. And by the same token they maintain, even while drawing upon officialese (its vocabulary, signs and symbols), the possibility of altering the place and time of this ratification. This means that their recognition of state power as a fetish is significant only at the very heart of the ludic relationship' (Mbembe, 2001:129).

It is tempting to attribute marginality to either the incompetence of officials or outright neglect of authorities, but it is not that simple. There is an interrelationship between the official and informal and the political system is these two things at once, not schizophrenically either/or. The everyday is shaped by this in-between, even if it is sometimes illicit, unseen or secret, even if our first tendency is to construe it as other-worldly. How do we flesh out the ways these two sides are close in Peru? The state as a process and not a thing is only the beginning of the incompleteness, yet we still depend on this idea that these practices can be neatly assigned to either side of the official and unofficial dichotomy. This makes it seem that the essence of the dynamic is that there are at least 2 different faces to the state. The state would have to become something

else in a poor neighborhood in order to make sense of why it seems different there, and why there are worlds of corruption, informality and problems of legitimacy.

Therefore there is a lot we do not know about these productive interstices and the way that the two apparent faces of the state interrelate. This dissertation explores a number of these dimensions – for example by showing how hierarchies are used differently than expected locally and in everyday politics. In the next chapter for example I show where the national and the municipal are used in competing ways in this context. The ways the state is situated in neighborhoods like Huaycán is less a problem of distance than it seems. The state is not somehow impermeable to informal society or far from it either; although that is how it might seem in Lima. This underside is a full part of what the state is in Peru, even if it seems less than permanent and only partially articulated. There are also the historical and particular ways the Peruvian state has evolved, and the different interests that have been served by this. This also brings into question the purpose that certain reforms take, and asks us to consider what they want to create, what they are trying to build and to what end. The official and the formal have a kind of powerlessness at the same time. These are not what they seem, like there lacks a solid power. Moreover, this lack is complex, there is even intimacy in how these notions are empty and otherwise, despite looking almost the same as real participation and authentic democracy. Mbembe calls for attention to the productive aspects of the ineptness manifested in state power as well (Mbembe, 2001). He explains how there is also an inability to produce the intended relationships, but they produce

relationships none-the-less. This is another level in the analysis of the state that is not often recognized.

There is also a dimension of emulation inherent to this dilemma because the modern state is a model imposed around the world. Partha Chatterjee for example emphasizes how many of the liberal traditions and their European origins are taken for granted, and the tension this creates in and of itself is often underestimated (Chatterjee, 2004:3). Chatterjee argues that the notions of government, civil society, state and private interests are all applied in the name of building modern democratic societies, as if those components were benign, as if these were neutral and to be aspired to. However, aspiring to this kind of framework can produce different results. There are both margins of territory and citizenry that are constantly being negotiated, re-worked and re-construed.

### **Subjectivities lacking Deliberateness: Life and Power in Marginal Neighborhoods**

Governmentality is frequently used as a framework to explain the nature of the relationship between citizens and authorities. Often defined as the 'conduct of conduct,' this framework emphasizes how governmental practices aim to influence the behaviors and attitudes of citizens (Burchell, 1991, 48; Dean, 1999, 10). There is also an emphasis on the different ways that populations are delineated and the means of control used with a governmentality perspective. Examples are Timothy Mitchell's study *Colonizing Egypt* and Akhil Gupta's and James Ferguson's work in India and Africa respectively (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Mitchell, 1988). Partha Chatterjee also uses a

governmentality framework to describe the difference between liberal democracy and popular politics, following Benedict Anderson arguing that governmentality shapes the relationship between governments and the masses in the *Politics of the Governed* (Chatterjee, 2004:22).

In her dissertation on political movements in Cochabamba, Miriam Shakow argues that processes of governmentality in Bolivia are quantifiably different because officials can only talk of intent and not achievement. Many of the consequences of government are indirect and unintended (Shakow, 2008:23). Analytically, research in a governmentality framework tends to conflate intention in governing practices with the actual outcomes. To what extent do we focus on how these governing practices really impact subjectivities of the people in any given population?

There are at least 2 ways that governing processes that set out to condition behavior and attitudes would have to be qualified and described differently for an example like Huaycán. In Huaycán there are multiple agents vested in orchestrating programs for improvement in the population. Notions like self-help or *autogestion*, what Tania Li refers to as assemblages, are not sourced exclusively from the state or just one agent (Li, 2005:386). There are multiple authorities and different sources of influence like church projects and other grassroots organizations in the community that contribute to these kinds of dynamics. Furthermore, the other aspect to take into consideration are those practices the population adopts but that are not a part of government intent, that seem to be sourced largely from the neighborhood



organizations themselves and are turned into demands placed back on government. Being encompassed by the state in Huaycán was also a local struggle, and neighborhood associations even conducted their own census in 1985 in order to assert inclusion and to make themselves more amenable to administrative powers. This might look like cooptation or an example of conformity, but there are also ways that the purposefulness and intent is different than what is meant by governmentality and the government is less than genuinely engaged in directing and encouraging this kind of behavior. Huaycán was also ultimately a failure as a project for the municipality of Lima, but it continued to grow. It continued to become a neighborhood in its own right and local government officials in the municipality of Ate had to forge other kinds of relationships with the community.

It is thus hard to talk just in terms of the conduct of conduct in a neighborhood like Huaycán. There are other more indirect associations to make in how power works, that are part of a complex sets of assemblages (Li, 2005:386). Some of those associations are loose and are forged in the gaps between different scopes of administration. People can be subjects of too little surveillance and not enough security. The state does not control the lives of shantytown residents to the same degree they do in other populations or as observed in other societies; but it also does not mean that there is less state impact or an absence of government influence either. The firm and concrete problem in the political dynamics of Peru is that the state cannot control as

others do, and most everyday citizens cannot rely on that kind of relationship to the state.

A biopolitics perspective for example shows just how intimate this different kind of influence can still be. Marginal citizens are also influenced in embodied terms in the services they acquire at state hospitals or the schools they attend, while the effects seem more diffuse at the same time because of their marginal position. Rather than an absence of influence, there is still difference in what may seem like a similar kind of relationship.

An emerging perspective for understanding the state looks at sovereignty, not just in terms of territory but in engaging with the work of Agamben, researchers are looking more closely at the ways the state has sovereignty over life. Problems of belonging and not belonging also evoke questions about the kind of sovereignty states have over life. In this way it is possible to talk about state influence being close (rather than distant) to that which seems most exceptional or outside of the state. Yet the concrete examples that Agamben uses are bounded and intentionally exceptional in ways that shantytowns are not. Guantanamo and concentration camps strip people of rights, and there is an express intention to treat these lives as exceptional. Shantytowns are also not excluded intentionally per se, they are excluded through assemblages of different influences that are not actively or directly addressed by the state, and become something exceptional regardless. What kind of sovereignty over life does the state have in shantytowns?

Shantytowns cannot be considered exceptions in the same way. Agamben explains that 'bare life remains included in politics in the form of an exception, that is, as something that is included solely through exclusion' (Agamben, 1998:11) Although in some ways *barriada* communities fall beyond the reach of law and become a kind of exception because of their spontaneity and extralegality compared to other neighborhoods. The state therefore can actively and clearly deny the political life of subjects, as Agamben explains 'the very possibility of distinguishing life and law, *anomie* and *nomos*, coincides with their articulation in the biopolitical machine' (Agamben, 1998:87). What happens when that biopolitical machine has only disarticulated and very general intentions towards the popular classes? Do these notions of the exception and bare life help us understand places that are not made clear exceptions, where being more expressly excluded would put you at a different and more clearly definable and knowable kind of margin?

Life that happens with only very few intentional and sporadic controls becomes the bottom in the broadest sense as the state categorizes neighborhoods and resident citizens as poor and popular. The poor for example is a catch-all category that is defined more in terms of what citizens lack than what actually characterizes them. In Peru cultural difference is one explanation that seems to fill this space created by poverty, where immediately the shift for understanding poor citizens moves from the lack of economic resources to cultural difference. These are the lines of difference created

between different sorts of insides and outsides, working to include and exclude at the same time.

### **The State's Distance from the Margins**

It is also important to stress that there are ways the state is marginal to people's everyday lives. The state is both absent and present for the people of Huaycán in powerful ways (Das and Poole, 2004:30). Even when Shining Path activity was at its height in Huaycán in the 1980s and early 1990s, many people were only tangentially affected by the conflict between local leaders, Shining Path members and different state authorities. There were ways that conflict was marginal to many in the community, even though Huaycán is strongly associated with Shining Path activity (Comision de la Verdad). The war between the Shining Path and the state impacted local leaders and community figures, but this is on another level and committed by specific people. Daily life continued on routinely for many others although it was punctuated with military raids making people rid their homes of controversial books and flyers out of fears of association. The government also instituted a system where you could make anonymous calls to report people you suspected of Sendero activity, increasing the tension and suspicion down to the level of neighbors. However, most everyday people can tell stories of their daily lives in those years where the Shining Path was a looming problem, but did not dominate their everyday lives. The state is similarly marginal to the everyday lives of many, albeit it is also more of a universalizing force. The state is also different in its influence from person to person, though at the same time many programs and expressions of the process aim to accomplish more.

In trying to work against the dichotomies that subtly (or not so subtly) serve as frameworks for how we understand society, we also inadvertently reproduce them. Even here where I have talked about the state having less control and argued for attention to the more indirect influences of government, the tendency is to frame lack of control at an everyday level in terms of resistance. However there are other dimensions of the state at work and in place at the same time, for example the territorial principals of sovereignty also have a lot of power – so shantytowns are never entirely outside either – and the state also has sovereignty over the people who live there. The processes at work in Huaycán are not examples of what Agamben means by bare life because *barriada* neighborhoods are not abandoned, they are caught up in a complex set of processes that only produce as intended for some populations. There is not the coherence to being outside that scholars like Scott attribute to examples in *Weapons of the Weak*, where individual acts against the state are classified as a form of resistance. The example of Huaycán is significant because it shows some of the disarticulations in the logics that come from the center, it is an example of the many things the state does not know about everyday life but also what it does incorporate. The state does not control or secure in the same way in shantytowns. Yet the territorial principles of sovereignty are still very real – so shantytowns are never entirely outside either– they are also firmly spaces within.

Further complicating how to situate Huaycán is that the original movement that created Huaycán was also a claim to inclusion, and shantytowns are a challenge to the

bounds of their own societies. People have agency but they are also influenced by elements of the system – in this case they are even influenced by less than intentional aspects of the system. These are part of the layers of dis-order, not necessarily chaotic or confused, not entirely opposite or binary- just not constituting a uniform order. There are plans the state cannot complete because it lacks knowledge of what is really going on, or it assumes it is complete but is something else in practice, and the assumptions and the resulting disarticulation with reality are still productive in their own right. Particular relationships can be fleeting and vulnerable at the same time the state is powerful because it is present in many different ways. There are many consequences to how the current parameters do not really work to assure all they seem to for others, and residents in Huaycán are the subjects of something that is neither surveillance nor security. These realities parallel the almost separate idea that an official state exists and that it encompasses the local. Mbembe stresses the inadequacy of common models for understanding the complex reality of post-colonial states (Mbembe, 2001:5). He states that, “these processes do not move in a closed orbit; they are neither smooth nor unilinear, but point in several directions at once. Further, they are occurring at different speeds and on different time-scales, and take the form of fluctuations and destabilizations (sometimes very sharp ones), periods of inertia and spurts that appear quite random but actually combine several regimes of change: stationary, dynamic, chaotic, even catastrophic” (Mbembe, 2001:66). Huaycán failing as a municipal project but continuing to grow as a neighborhood shows how pertinent these more diffuse, multi-directional and heterogeneous processes can be.

## **Fleshing Out how Indirectness is Productive in the Margins**

All the approaches I have described above have influenced my research but I am especially interested in how the interrelationship between the universalizing dimensions of the state and the administrative aspects of power are productive at the local level. I argue that these two fundamental dimensions of the state help to create more indirect, partial or contingent realms of state influence. Although this space is overshadowed by the dominant frameworks for understanding the state, it is another dimension of how the state is enacted in the everyday. It is another field of power created between the state as a transcendental, omnipresent idea and the more limited scope of its administrative powers and presences. Everyday kinds of access are given meaning in this interaction, but some of their effectiveness and integrity is also divested by the contradictions and the way these two aspects of state power do not necessarily coincide or create the same thing.

In her research on Guatemala, Diane Nelson explains that the state has 2 faces. One face is rational and the other is magical (Nelson, 2004:135). Her approach also calls attention to how the state can be mobile and found in different places. Nelson wants to emphasize the disjointed, spontaneous and sporadic qualities of the state. She explains how,

In turn, the state, like a sideshow, has two faces: one legitimate, the other criminal, corrupt and murderous; one rational, the other irrational and magical. In one the state is the people, our representative; in the other the state is against the people, constantly assessing the risk of our rebellion, always ready to repress. With one face the state is regulator, creating and maintaining standards by normalizing; with the other it is a freak show functioning precisely through its abnormality, its awesomeness, its massive differentiation from the everyday' (Nelson, 2004:135)

My position on the state is different however because I think there is more depth to the processes, and it is not as if the state is one minute regulator, next minute abnormal, it is both of these dimensions (and more) at once. There is more dimensionality to the processes and the relationships than what the state itself puts forward. The ways these characteristics seem duplicitous are embedded in more complex processes -- divergent outcomes emerge in applying the same policies and acting the same way towards the population. In this way, steering towards the same set of values and operating in function of a standard set of ethics can still produce differences. There are cracks and fissures in the body politic itself, and the state is not always awesome and all powerful, it is contested and not the same for every citizen. Peru as a state is in conflict with a part of itself. The state is a modernizing force that has to play catch up to international standards with a large part of its population is socioeconomically disadvantaged. The state works at creating opportunities and meeting parameters set for growth by outside agencies like the IMF and World Bank while simultaneously trying to do its best to minimize the significance of the poverty experienced by the majority.

These examples of more local and specific experiences of the center are like the entanglements that Mbembe describes in *On the Postcolony*, where the different set of complex practices that are used to mask and re-package poverty create many gray areas surrounding specific state actions (Mbembe, 2001). Although corruption is another kind of opposition to how legitimate states are imagined, corruption can occur in tandem with processes that seem to promote legitimacy. Processes like electoral manipulation



for example that seem based on the corruption of particular politicians and the unscrupulous values of certain voters can actually be so entangled with legitimate practices that this kind of clientelistic politics is also enabled in important ways by legitimate processes inherent to the state. These practices are not the antithesis of the state, they are a reflection of the productiveness in the kinds of gaps the state itself creates in the everyday.

In her contribution to *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*, Deborah Poole argues that the state also is also present in the gaps between different qualities like membership and belonging (Poole, 2004:17). I want to stress how gaps like this are more significant and productive in their own right than it seems. Membership is determined on the basis of parameters like citizenship, but for Poole belonging is attributed to disciplinary forms of power. The difference between membership and belonging therefore is attenuated and cross-cut by factors like I described in Chapter 1 where Huaycán is impacted by the indirect effects of norms, shaped beyond the pale of what the law regulates because of the material poverty of neighborhood residents. Laws acting on bodies can work against inclusion, helping to open the places within where the laws are not effective for certain citizens. As Das and Poole explain, 'in these cases, juridical claims to inclusion are undermined in interesting ways by disciplinary forms of power that destabilize the very discourses of belonging that claim to bind subjects to the state and its laws' (Das and Poole, 2004:9). I believe this dynamic in Huaycán is complicated further because this gray area between membership and belonging (for

example) has a series of productive effects. The state can indirectly but still methodically push and direct different segments of the population, productively undermining the quality of their belonging while still claiming to include them.

The heterogeneity of Peruvian society further complicates the way marginal neighborhoods are understood. Exclusion is cast in simple terms as an absence of what comprises a modern society or the persistence of traditions that thwart efforts at administering society effectively. This eclipses the ways the state is also a part of how those differences are reproduced. Understanding the state as separate and lacking productive connections to everyday reality helps maintain models of governing processes based on absences, where democracy, transparency and even equality that are inherent to the model are either deficient or not even there in the first place. Although different than assumed in many respects from the center, what the state is vis-à-vis everyday life is the complete relationship that everyday citizens have with the state. Marginal citizens live the contradictions that are there but we find hard to see the relevance of with present models of government.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter established how varied processes are enacted in the name of the state, some that can even appear to operate at counterpoints. The state and government are productive beyond what is expressly planned and plotted in ways that have a profound effect on people's everyday lives. We need more ways to conceptualize the creative power of these indirect influences. While many concepts have staked the

agents of this multidirectionality – less has been done on the effects this multidirectionality has on subjects. In a community like Huaycán there are consequences to the ways the state falls short and does not incorporate local reality. Concepts that explore the state in less two-dimensional terms are needed, so that we can better recognize all the different ways the state influences and is influenced itself by other forms of politics. This is not to deny that the state remains a powerful universalizing force. Although it seems counterintuitive, there is an ambiguity inherent to even the most straightforward of government processes. Delineating territory and establishing sovereignty over citizens are complex and highly uneven processes, generating a deeper range of local and even divergent influences than is often recognized. This is part of what contributes to the kinds of included exclusion found in marginal communities.

Instead of framing the problem of the state in marginal neighborhoods in terms of an absence, we need to more fully appreciate and understand the dynamics that are created at the local level. The assumption there is necessarily less state in a shantytown community forces the reality of communities like this into an artificial and distorting binary between what is state and not state – as if local life is irrelevant to power, minimizing the significance of the connections built and the relationships created with the centers of power. There is a more complicated story to tell about the precise ways the state is there and not there, and what makes it seem so distant to the lives of marginal citizens. The contingencies and other small and fleeting examples of

government processes are a part of this dynamic. The absent presence of the state in Huaycán is locatable in how local police officers do otherwise than just enact the laws, and how local committees are compelled to organize and administrate programs like Wawa Wasi themselves for example.

It is thus that realizing the multidirectionality of the state is important because aspects of state practice can have their own origins and influence that are removed from the center – that emerge differently than the way the national and other dominant frameworks are supposed to encompass the local. Some programs can be inspired by local politics and projects, complicating how we understand power. The state can get inspiration from the grassroots and the local for national programs and as I will show in the next chapter, local activists and leaders can use different levels of access to political authorities in ways that seem to defy established hierarchies. Therefore the state's presence in Huaycán cannot be understood as partial, as if the state treats upper class citizens and the citizens of Huaycán with duplicity in a strict sense. The kinds of differences that lead to inequalities only tie back to the state as a concept through gaps in logics and inconsistencies in practice. Different state experiences might seem due to a lack, a lack the state can detach itself from because of the ways society and state are promoted as separate entities. NGOs work within this space as well, working to overcome inequalities and make improvements that appear to be external to or not of the state itself, as social, cultural or economic reasons, but less political (Mbembe, 2001:8).

If we see the state as a process fundamentally open to society then the margins are really not the alternate places closed off from the mainstream or center that we imagine them to be. What is more complex and what runs deeper even in peripheral places is that difference and inequality emerge through what are fundamentally the same state processes. If the problem is framed in terms of there being less state in neighborhoods like Huaycán, then we are not getting a very complete picture of state presence there. Somehow the state is vested in these marginal places to very much the same extent the state is vested in more affluent neighborhoods and for more privileged citizens. Casting the parameters of citizenship so wide and so elementarily means that inequalities are ambiguously incorporated along with the very equalities the state professes. Although they are not the obvious outcomes of particular government actions, inequalities are produced and elaborated alongside in the process, in ways that leave many inequalities in place and even work against more overt goals to challenge them.

## Chapter 4: Doubling Up on Local Leadership: Surprising Signatures of the State in Community Administration

The political and social marginality the people in shantytowns endure is usually understood in terms of lacking effective ties to official forms of politics and power. One of the major factors contributing to the perpetuation of the kinds of exclusion facing marginal neighborhoods is the lack of state presence in shantytown neighborhoods (Burt, 2007; Stokes, 1995). For this reason, the kinds of people/citizens/residents being discussed in this dissertation are usually referred to using concepts such as second class citizen and the Peruvian state is called a weak or 'failed' state – implying the absence of full citizen rights and incapacity to govern on the part of state (Burt, 2007:9; Stepputat, 2005:62).<sup>58</sup> Despite earlier work by scholars like Janice Perlman on shantytowns in Rio de Janeiro that challenge conventional understandings of urban poverty, this notion of marginality as a condition of lack or absence persists. In *The Myth of Marginality*, Perlman argues that understandings of marginality are based on the 'myth' that the marginality of sectors of the population is that they fail to adopt mainstream values and behaviors. Perlman explains how 'marginality theory seems to assume, whether naively or by calculation, that the adoption of middle-class culture (attitudinal consensus) will be rewarded by access to middle-class privileges. Its proponents do not recognize the

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<sup>58</sup> The term second class citizen is also a category used publicly in Peru by the government for example. In the recent confrontations in Bagua for example, president Garcia used the term to refer to the indigenous protesters. (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ekPeb6nMnw>, accessed June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2009.)

fundamental antagonisms between the interests of the privileged and non-privileged in the society, in the inherent asymmetry of the relationship' (Perlman, 1976:245). Today, our understandings of the underlying processes at work in creating inequalities are still largely trapped in this myth. Even the concepts we use to describe shantytown neighborhoods imply absence and lack. However, the system is fully productive of marginality and we need to be more attune to the multiple dimensions of these asymmetrical but still entirely complete relationships.

The inherent sense of something missing in the categories we use to research neighborhoods like Huaycán means that many of the processes that need to be examined remain taken-for-granted. The relatively 'weak' relationship shantytown residents have with the state is still a full set of relations and ties, enmeshed in its own complex set of politics. In previous chapters I explored different aspects of the relationship between marginal citizens and the state. Although a lot of causality is attributed to clientelism in Peruvian electoral politics, the simple and straightforward ways that politicians make political use of poor communities is just one aspect of that dynamic. The visit the First Ladies paid to Huaycán in Chapter 2 is another example. However, when looked at from the perspective of everyday politics, the state's impact is more than these most straightforward and obvious dimensions. The way that state programs and politics are made a part of community life is complex.

The present chapter will examine how various state programs and relationships to governments are pushed and used in surprising directions by community residents. I

focus on a particular period in Huaycán when there were at least two different groups claiming community leadership at the same time. Each group of local leadership made use of different government allegiances to legitimate their position, almost as if bringing national and municipal politics into competition on their local terms, and defying conventional hierarchies of governmental power. Although this influence seems particular and specific to Huaycán, I argue that local variations of influence are part of more ambiguous but meaningful dimensions of state power in Peru.

Local variations like this challenge conventional understandings of politics and show that the state isn't simply absent or weak in a marginal community like Huaycán; it has an absent presence (Chung Simpson, 2001; Herzfeld, 2002). Drawing on the argument I develop in chapter 3, part of the state's dynamism is that it is comprised of at least two far-reaching but sometimes antagonistic processes. The state has both omnipresent and administrative dimensions, and the way these different aspects interrelate in the day-to-day is far from coherent as assumed from above. These processes can attenuate the kinds of politics and policies that affect residents in the everyday context, influencing relationships in a neighborhood like Huaycán in directions that are often contradictory and conflictual. A shantytown is not a place where the state acts differently than elsewhere, but it is somewhere that the apparent integrity of the state comes undone, and the potential and actual gaps within the state's own internal logic and workings are revealed.



## Highly Political Margins

Huaycán has a local, community-level association that takes on many representational responsibilities for the community, in addition to the municipality of Ate, where Huaycán is located, and the municipality of metropolitan Lima, which encompasses all 43 districts of the city. Representation in Huaycán's local political structure is based on property ownership.<sup>59</sup> The 'zones' of Huaycán are divided up into UCVs (*Unidad Comunal de Vivienda*), which local leaders liken to the *manzanas* of other neighborhoods like Villa El Salvador.<sup>60</sup> The members of a particular UCV are the property owners, those officially listed on the property title of residences.<sup>61</sup> The UCVs are grouped into different zones. Zone A through Zone G were projected as an original part of the project. Today however there are 23 zones. For some idea of the size of a particular Zone, Zona G for example has 17 UCVs.<sup>62</sup> The UCVs vary in size but they were to each have 60 members originally.

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<sup>59</sup> The first two names on the title for the house or property are allowed to vote.

<sup>60</sup> Terminology like UCV comes from the initial municipal project. Originally, as envisioned by the planners and architects, residents were supposed to share a lot of infrastructure, bathrooms, laundry space for instance. The different terminology used in Huaycán is one remnant of its beginnings as a government project. There is also UCC Unidad Comunal de Comercio. Communal bathrooms and that they would share work. Idealized notions of the initial project. Also why lot size is smaller, some streets not initially planned for owning cars (Figari, 1987).

<sup>61</sup> Ideally or as originally planned there should be 60 interested parties per UCV, but as Huaycán has grown there are often more in practice.

<sup>62</sup> '...Huaycán tiene 23 zonas actualmente, anteriormente se está considerando 24, 25 con la zona Ñ y U, pero han quedado a un lado por la intervención de COFOPRI solamente hay 23 la Ñ se ha funcionado a la C y la U sale a nombre de la titulación de la E. Por decir nosotros en cada base se hacen asambleas, díganos que tienen un acuerdo esto es llevado al a asambleas de los presidentes y secretarios zonales, la zona prácticamente lleva el tema que se va tratar y prácticamente los representantes zonales hacen las coordinaciones a través de todas las zonas en una plenaria general de los presidentes y delegados

Each UCV has a governing committee that consists of positions like the president, the organization secretary, the treasurer, and those in charge of health, sports, auto defense, and communal work. The UCV governing committee (*directiva*) is similar to a neighborhood association, but it is also important to stress that these kinds of organizations have a special status in Peru, especially in neighborhoods like Huaycán. They are recognized as *Organizaciones Sociales de Base* (OSBs) like *comedores*.<sup>63</sup> OSBs take on representational responsibilities in the community and vis-à-vis government and they are recognized as an integral part of society in the Peruvian constitution (more on this below). The general secretaries of each zone are elected by the UCVs. In turn, the general secretaries of each zone elect a central council for all of Huaycán. The general secretaries and the elected central council (*junta directiva*) together form the *Consejo Ejecutivo Central* of Huaycán. There are 12 positions on the central council (*junta directiva*).

Huaycán has always had a singular relationship with the municipalities. In metropolitan Lima there are two-tiers of municipal government – there are the individual districts like Ate, Santa Anita, La Victoria La Molina, Miraflores and San Isidro

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generales que es la antesala antes del congreso, que es la máxima instancia. Ahí se pueden hacer los congresos ordinarios que son cada dos años y/o los extraordinarios cuando el caso lo amerita. También tenemos los “organismo naturales” que son la coordinadora de Vaso de Leche, después la presidenta de los comedores autogestionarios de Huaycán y Horacio Zevallos, actualmente es Guadalupe Chávez y del Vaso de Leche es Rosa Elías, también tenemos del club de Madres, otro organismo natural, la presidenta es la señora Imelda. También existen organizaciones naturales como asociaciones de productores, empresas de mototaxis de transporte.’

<sup>63</sup> Some believe that the term OSB refers specifically to organizations that provide alimentary assistance (see the campaign with the NGO Flora Tristan, <http://www.flora.org.pe/PaginasOBS.htm>, and Ley 25307).

to name a few – but there is also an over-arching administration for metropolitan Lima, which oversees the interests of the entire metropolitan area and incorporates all 43 districts in the city. Huaycán began as a project of the wider metropolitan government of Lima and not the municipality of Ate, where Huaycán is actually located.<sup>64</sup> From the outset then, Huaycán figures in a wider set of politics about housing for the poor in Lima.

Huaycán is also exceptional because it was a planned land invasion.<sup>65</sup> It was a calculated effort to create something like Villa El Salvador, a large *barriada* on the southern edge of Lima founded in 1971. Huaycán was an effort to try to overcome some of the trespass or illegality that invasions necessitate in order to create a viable experiment in housing for the poor that was sanctioned by the government.<sup>66</sup> The planning for Huaycán began with the inscription of interested people months before the ‘invasion’ and founding on July 15<sup>th</sup>, 1984. Huaycán therefore was a mutual arrangement between grassroots associations of potential homeowners, and the

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<sup>64</sup> There are two tiers of municipal administration in Lima, at the district level which in the case of Huaycán is the municipality of Ate, as well as the municipality of Lima, which administers the entire metropolitan area of Lima. Recent changes towards decentralization have given all municipalities more prominence. The municipality of Lima has a special status with powers like those of a regional government. There is a separate regional government for the province of Lima (those regions beyond metropolitan Lima, but still in the province of Lima).

<sup>65</sup> Some leaders would not agree with referring to the initial July 15<sup>th</sup>, 1984 occupation as an invasion at all, because it was sanctioned and planned. I choose to use it because I think this term is still applicable to the dynamics that were at stake. Huaycán was meant to be a controlled invasion, and it was a creative response to other invasions in Lima. This makes it possible to include Huaycán as a *barriada* as well, although the initial invasion had the backing of municipal authorities.

<sup>66</sup> Huaycán is often compared and contrasted to Villa El Salvador, even by its own leaders and residents.

municipal government of metropolitan Lima who were aspiring for party recognition and a chance at the national presidency (Muñoz, 1999:75).

The municipality carried a great deal of influence in Huaycán initially. Huaycán was an idiosyncratic invasion and this is significant to my argument in a number of ways. First, this arrangement between the municipality and neighborhood associations of residents intended to create a very close relationship between the grassroots and the government. For those tied to the original project, creating the community itself, even infrastructurally speaking, was claiming access vis-à-vis the government. In the early months of the project, community leaders would come knocking on the door to make sure people were actually residing on the lots they had laid claim too and weren't claiming a space in the project to later rent or sell. Politics therefore isn't just contained to parties and programs and officially elected officials in Huaycán, at least for those who claim ties to the original project. As one local leader expressed "Huaycán is characterized as being very political, there are different politics here. There are those of the left, and those on the right -- that's what it's like. This impedes consolidation here. Everyone wants to 'work things to their advantage (*jalar agua para su molino*).'" This local leader's comments further support the characterization of Huaycán in the Final Report for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2003) and in Hortensia Muñoz's work (1999) which both mention the very political nature of Huaycán's leadership in the beginning. The political nature of the initial project continues to be significant, not just because there are a number of older residents presently active in the community

organization and committees, but because the statutes for the community were written under the guise of the original project.

Municipal participation however was short lived, and by 1986 municipal involvement in the project had collapsed. The *Izquierda Unida* (IU) party ultimately failed at national significance, their goal after winning the municipal elections in Lima, and IU was also on the losing side in the municipal elections of 1986 in Lima (Schönwälder, 2002). The leaders from some of the founding grassroots associations that enlisted the first participants in Huaycán were those who would later become the initial leaders in Huaycán's local government (Arévalo, 1997:65).

Despite this administrative 'failure' however, Huaycán continued to grow. Huaycán grew from approximately 4000 families to a population today over 160 000 in the span of less than 25 years. Huaycán was also intended to be *autogestionario* from the beginning, where the community and neighborhood organizations would co-create Huaycán with the help of the municipality of metropolitan Lima. It is significant that the collapse of the municipal project did not translate into the end of Huaycán. Although it is tempting to say that Huaycán 'survived' this collapse because there was an *autogestionario* kind of logic built into the project from the beginning, it is at least as significant (and probably much more significant) that Huaycán was modeled on other *barriada* communities in and around Lima, and that this was a process the community and residents were already quite familiar with, independent of the municipal designs. Although Huaycán may be an exception to other communities in that it was a planned

invasion, it is still something different in an overall pattern of property provisioning and housing ownership among the poorer classes in Peru. That it was part of this pattern is how it continued to grow. The exponential growth of Huaycán also easily seems to invoke Jose Matos Mar's well known phrase, *desborde* (flood or overflow) *popular*. Matos Mar's argument about the city of Lima (and the *criollo* coast) being overwhelmed in terms of both population and culture by migration from the Andes and other provincial areas of Peru was very influential in how the *barriadas* were figured politically and sociologically in 1980s.

The failure of the initial project, coupled with Shining Path activity in the *Cono Este* and Huaycán itself, left Huaycán in a kind of political vacuum that could also be felt at the level of community leadership. Firstly, government involvement shifted significantly post 1986 in Huaycán – it shifted to a concern over *Sendero Luminoso* activity and the national government and military started to take action in Huaycán. A small military post was erected on the outskirts of Huaycán and within the compound partitioning the *zona intangible* of the archaeological ruins in Huaycán. The first official, government sanctioned *rondas vecinales* against Shining Path activity in city of Lima were in Huaycán (Arévalo, 1997:69; CVR Final Report, 2003:418). Huaycán's first (and to this date only) police station was built in the early 1990s on the edges of the *zona intangible* in Huaycán. This is an area deemed archaeologically and nationally significant by the state. Pascuala Rosado, one of the most well-known leaders (*secretaria general*)

of Huaycán is credited with doing the necessary political work to get a *comisaria* in Huaycán.

The kinds of vacuums and shifts created with these changes also paralleled many liberties taken with the original community statutes. One ongoing and repeating conflict over community administration in Huaycán is how the community should vote for its leaders. There has often been conflict locally over whether leaders should be chosen by delegate or universal suffrage in Huaycán. Pascuala Rosado for example was elected by general vote in Huaycán, meaning all registered property owners voted her in (Arévalo, 1997:71-72; Final Report, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003:623). The *Libro de Actas* however says that the general secretary should be elected by delegates (the zonal leaders). These kinds of tensions mean there are gaps in terms of the 'officialness' of local leadership in Huaycán post 1986, and for many years leaders did not formally register with the municipality as they were supposed to with the *registro civil* to ensure their *personería jurídica*. However, the tendency to not follow the rules for so many years also established a precedent in Huaycán, and allowed potential leaders to make the argument they do not necessarily have to register to claim leadership. This point will be significant for the more recent conflict between leaderships that I describe in a later section below.

There is also significant tension between the *partes altas* and the *partes bajas*, or the newer and older residents of Huaycán. The *partes altas* are the areas of Huaycán that are more recently staked and developed. They are further up the hillsides and

further away from the center of Huaycán, defined by the plaza and the *Avenida 15 de julio*. The *partes bajas* are generally the parts of Huaycán that were included in the original project (Zones A through G). They are more developed in the sense that the houses are older and therefore are more finished, there are more paved streets, there is more public lighting and general access to services. Reference to the *partes altas* usually insinuates that the residents there are recent migrants to Lima, and have come in large part because of the violence caused by *Sendero Luminoso* and the military in the highlands and valleys of the Andes. The *partes altas* also express discontent with the status quo in Huaycán because administratively it is still defined in terms of the old project. The old statute and old norms still hold sway despite the fact there are new problems and the population of Huaycán has increased exponentially. One tension emerging is how to integrate new zones into the area. Not just new migrants but a new generation -- children growing up need sources of employment and their own homes.

In Huaycán there is pressure for more housing, but there are few measures in place to deal with the issues of growth at the local level.<sup>67</sup> Huaycán is a city that still has a legal identity tied to the smaller project and the experiment it was in the beginning. The terms for how to change are not officially articulated. There are also different needs and interests for the *partes altas* and *partes bajas* (Final Report, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003:432-433). The *partes altas* for example still need

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<sup>67</sup> I recently found reference on the internet to problems in the zona cero (zero) in Huaycán.<sup>67</sup> This was not a part of the original scheme. Also some of the higher zones have ampliaciones, or areas of outgrowth beyond what was originally planned ([http://esp.habitants.org/campana\\_cero\\_desalojos/alerta\\_cero\\_desalojos\\_fichas/desalojos\\_en\\_ucv\\_24\\_de\\_diciembre\\_zona\\_cero\\_Huaycán\\_ate\\_vitarte](http://esp.habitants.org/campana_cero_desalojos/alerta_cero_desalojos_fichas/desalojos_en_ucv_24_de_diciembre_zona_cero_Huaycán_ate_vitarte)) . Accessed January 5<sup>th</sup>, 2009.



access to water and electricity in many cases, while the *partes bajas* have other concerns like paving streets, control of traffic and security issues. This causes further discord over how to seek out and delegate resources.

One prominent local leader in Huaycán also explained that the state agency for granting land titles under Fujimori, COFOPRI, had also confused and changed the terms of the process for granting lots in Huaycán and other neighborhoods like it. COFOPRI is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, but the pilot project for the nation-wide agency was carried out in Huaycán. This gave people the means to by-pass local procedure and authority and appeal directly to the national agency. Long-time residents remembered how in the initial months of the project, local leaders would go door-to-door, checking to make sure you were really resident there and not trying to stake a claim in the project to later rent or sell. Nowadays *traficantes de terrenos* are a serious problem in neighborhoods like Huaycán. They indiscriminately sell plots and add to the sense of disorder and chaos and they also take money from people unwittingly, cheating people into thinking they are getting a legitimate plot and taking their money – leaving local authorities and the state with the unwanted dilemma of what to do with people who were cheated into illegitimate projects and can now lose their investment and a place to live if the state and local authorities try to enforce the norms.

### **Missing a Middle: The (Relative) Lack of Community Organizations in Huaycán**

The difficult emergence of a clear-cut and representative leadership in Huaycán has had a lasting impact, and continues to shape the kind of dynamics the neighborhood

has with the state and NGOs originating from outside the community. The notion the state encompasses a civil society that emerges from the needs and pressures of a wider public is the prevailing way to visualize the different levels of politics. However, this is not quite the right imaginary for the relationship between these different components of society in Huaycán. The few NGOs that are active in the community for example do not generally emerge from grassroots projects within the community (although they might take up action in Huaycán after emerging from a grassroots kind of movement in other parts of Lima or Peru), NGOs and civil society organizations from outside the community are like another discreet actor that doesn't naturally or necessarily fit in between people and state on a community level, at least not without a significant struggle for support and pertinence in the community. As discussed in Chapter 2, in Lima and Peru more widely there are different instances of public political action, and *Organizaciones Sociales de Base* like *comedores* and *juntas vecinales* are different from NGOs and other social movements emerging from the activist, intellectual and middle classes in Peru. Any notion of a singular civil society or public does not encompass this important distinction in Peru (Fraser, 1997:85). Although OSBs and these other civil society organizations generally work towards the same values (apparently), there are important differences as well. While OSBs are active in Huaycán, NGOs have always had trouble gaining influence and having any substantive impact there.

Compared to other larger neighborhoods like Villa El Salvador and Comas, there are relatively few organizations engaged in this imagined 'middle' field of action in

Huaycán. There is one *junta directiva* for more than 160 000 people, a handful of very small and specific NGOs, the *parroquia* and evangelical church organizations, and particular associations among those residents with particular interests, like the associations that direct the *parque industrial* and the different markets interspersed throughout Huaycán. NGO workers have identified the relative weakness of this middle set of representative organizations as one of the fundamental problems facing Huaycán at present – this was one point stressed in my interviews with NGOs that had previously worked in Huaycán or that are working in Huaycán at present. A vibrant and energetic set of organizations that represent the community are important for effective NGO participation. That Huaycán seemed to lack this representation narrows the kinds of organizations that are going to try to initiate and carry out projects in Huaycán.

This shows there is a kind of disarticulation between some of the existent categories of civil society and representative organizations in Peru and how the kind of exclusion of a community like Huaycán perpetuates through redundancies– there are ways the problems layer into and feed off one another. As I will argue below, it is not that Huaycán lacks a middle ground in an absolute sense but that it is not articulated in the same way as mainstream concerns from outside at present. The NGOs that tried to or want to work in Huaycán are also helping to create this lack of an effective middle in Huaycán because they reinforce the idea that legitimate representation is missing in Huaycán. Outside organizations lament the lack of consensus, volunteerism and

enthusiasm for new projects in Huaycán. Fewer outside organizations are willing to consider Huaycán a possibility for future projects as a result.

Huaycán's overtly political level is misrecognized by some of these organizations to be relatively stagnant when compared to other neighborhoods like it, or too embroiled in its own legitimacy crisis to be the kind of community where a project can be executed successfully. These organizations, though few in number, are having an impact on the kinds of projects that are present in Huaycán. They are also holding Huaycán up to unwritten standards. Julia Paley for example explains that is it characteristic to see complacency after a high degree of mobilization; for example, in post-Pinochet Chile there was less participation and organization in poorer neighborhoods after periods of mobilization (Paley, 2001:5). However, this is still a limited view of the problem because it is not as simple as whether there are organizations or not. The reasons there seems to be a lack of organization at the community level are complex and that absence is never absolute.

This level of organization that seems to be missing in Huaycán, is not so much missing as different than the expectations from outside. The organization and the kind of politics that do exist are being misrecognized. There is an organizational and political level that emerges around local problems. It has a more longitudinal focus than the wider, broader reaching goals of the outside NGOs. As community problems persist, they change, becoming more complex and rooted, but are rarely overcome. Problems like crime and poverty shift and change in Huaycán, but they still remain. The difference

between the *partes altas* and the *partes bajas* that I described above is the most obvious reflection of this. Huaycán is re-living some of past problems as it grows and as the more established areas come into new dilemmas.

There is more depth and importance to this small and troubled middle than it first appears. The few organizations that do exist have spent many years in Huaycán, traveling a great distance with the neighborhood's complicated and evolving problems. The *parroquia* for example remained fully active, even during the *Sendero* years. It was able to carry out many community activities and programs. Most NGO projects have a beginning and an end. They also consider very specific problems. The pilot project for what would eventually become the state agency COFOPRI is one example. I discuss this example in further detail below. If there is a lack of concerted action in Huaycán, it is a political and complex absence. Although there may be only a handful of problems that the community focuses on, they are problems that get a lot of traffic. The questions of hunger and nutrition for example are approached on a number of fronts. Programs like *comedores* and *vaso de leche* help subsidize the cost and education campaigns within these programs encourage families to cook foods of greater nutritional value. This organizational level seems small and thin because of the relationship between local and government in the beginning. The checkpoints and surveillance and activity of the Shining Path itself also weakened the kinds of organizations the community was able to sustain. Huaycán was created by the leftist politics of the 1980s at its most local levels, and the significance of this to outsiders was erased because the top disappeared. Local

leaders and new leaders have re-invented themselves to create ties to the new politics. For example, the new leaders call the old leaders and advocates in Huaycán dinosaurs. A lot of energy is spent on the absence of articulation between groups by NGOs trying to enter into projects in the community. It takes a lot of work and convincing to gain a foothold in the community. It also takes a lot of work on the part of local activists and leaders who take part in NGO projects to do the convincing. Gaining a foothold in the community and creating enthusiasm for projects is no longer easy. NGOs come in sideways and try to lay stakes, making claims to a middle ground that they expect to naturally be there. There are also ways that the NGOs have to struggle to make their programs fit [or seem relevant to community problems. For example, Warmi Huasi came into the community with the goal of helping women who are subject to domestic violence. Getting the women to participate in programs, to come forward with their problems, and to take the time for themselves has proven very difficult. What the women asked of Warmi Huasi were workshops and ways to learn skills making crafts and things they can sell. Women were trying to prioritize and express a preference, but in questions of domestic violence for example it is not as simple as no participation means there is not any need. The intentions of the NGO and what the women prioritized were different, but it also doesn't mean that there was no need for work on domestic violence in Huaycán.

A few of the NGOs that do enter the community intend to work on the cultural level as well, with residents they know have migrated from the highlands and other

provincial regions of Peru. Some of these organizations even have names in Quechua (as does the state program Wawa Wasi). These organizations lament that the people of Huaycán have somehow lost respect for their own culture, and are doing little to actively maintain it. While this is obviously a valid claim and a laudable goal, I want to point out how this also adds to the sense that Huaycán is somehow missing something. It makes it harder still to articulate around presences rather than negativity. Not a lot of energy is being spent on a positive middle ground to move forward. The interests and intentions of NGOs and residents are different – and this creates a space where they are talking more about defining the problem, identifying the problem, than moving forward in finding viable solutions to the problem. There isn't necessarily a common vocabulary between NGOs and residents. Even just defining and understanding the problem takes massive amounts of work and time. They are talking around and past each other, about different dynamics, assuming they are the same.

In this way we can also see that the struggle between NGOS and local residents has an impact as well. This further contributes in a concrete way to the apparent absence and the way the different levels of politics sometimes work at counterpoints – carrying categories and understandings of hierarchies through different levels is difficult, and not always conducive to a full understanding of the relevant dynamics. Identifying and defining problems in the community are also struggles for meaning, control and representation, and these kinds of struggles can preface and accompany actions that seem to emerge from consensus. This creates another politically significant tangle of

meanings and tensions in what is known about local conflicts and analysis of the local dilemmas. What might seem like an absence of consensus is the problem of reaching consensus. One local leader explained how the complexities of local politics are sometimes transected by NGOs:

The bad thing is that they don't coordinate, there are bad leaders... it's good that the NGOs come in, but the need to coordinate. For example if someone comes in to work in my house they need to talk to the head of the family and not the kid. What the NGOs is that they go straight to the UCVs and sometimes because of the lack of experience of some leaders they accept, the need sometimes make them act this way, but that is not good. Everything needs to happen in the framework of respect, because unfortunately the NGOs live on the poverty of Huaycán. I don't share in this. I sometimes have a problems here and there (*casualmente*,) like they say, the one who is never questioned is the one who does nothing. If you do something they question you the same if you do nothing, that's how it is, there have to be contradictions, if not there is no development.

This comment is illustrative of the unexpected ways that ties to the state, local leadership and NGOs can be created. The man quoted above is a prominent local leader himself, and he is referring to the way that other local leaders, like *comedor* presidents, the leaders of particular zones or UCVs, can and sometimes do side step the authority of the General Secretary of Huaycán to foster their own relationships to NGOs and even government projects, as will be discussed below.

In this way it is made more obvious how the expected hierarchies of politics are also ways of knowing. In Huaycán, local leaders are complicating the ways that political action is expected to be channeled. Yet that there is little solidarity isn't an absolute. In the early days the local leaderships, the *junta directiva* would identify politically, and Huaycán first leadership was surprisingly identified with APRA, and not a leftist party or *Izquierda Unida* (Final Report, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003: ). This shows



the importance of the local *junta directiva* at that time and the scale of the role it was at least imagined to fill. It could become a kind of proto-party organization, making small claims to how that entity could interface with the community, mimicking the power of political parties, even national power in this instance. The *junta directiva* is also small for the size of the community, the idea that a city with 160 000 residents could still strive for relatively small-scale forms of consensus with a *junta directiva* of 12 members. Different influences traverse these spaces – they are not neat encompassing stories.

There is a lot of come and go to politics, some attempts to make connections and make changes work, others do not. We also need to consider the lasting impacts of the little and not so little failures, and how the community continues to grow and change in spite of them. There are ways that little incorporations and appropriations occur in spite of exclusions at other levels. In the following section I examine a how recent local politics in Huaycán uses different levels of politics in surprising ways.

### **Divisions in Community Leadership**

Every year, local leaders organize a celebration to honor the founding of Huaycán on July 15<sup>th</sup>. The local government administration organizes two to three days of concerts, dance recitals and other community events around the celebration, and many local schools give students a holiday, adding what seems like state and government officialdom to the local purpose of this event. The focal point of the celebrations is an organized parade. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of July, crowds of community residents start to gather in the late morning hours to watch the parade. As a part of the parade,

schools, daycares and other neighborhood associations march along Avenida Mariategui, one of Huaycán's main streets, in front of community leaders and invited dignitaries. Some residents turn the event into a money-making opportunity, selling food, pop or candies to the crowd. A few local business owners also record the festivities to later sell copies on DVD in their shops, and the local parochial radio station broadcasts live from the event. There is one man in the community who dresses up like an Inca for occasions like this. With long hair he wears big cut-out, gold-foil covered cardboard earrings, hide-colored clothing and sandals. He watches the events like any other spectator, standing in the crowd. He quietly aspires to make a statement but only to the people who happen to catch sight of him or find him standing nearby in the crowd.

The struggle over local leadership was even evident the day of the parade in 2002. Instead of just one local administration, representing the entire community, there were 2 different *juntas directivas*, (local governments/neighborhood associations), both with different sources of legitimacy.<sup>68</sup> The divisionism was such that there were two different center stages erected at the annual anniversary celebration of the community in 2002. Each administration emceed its own version of the same event. As the parade of local associations and school children marched past each stage, they were narrated and claimed in two different, simultaneous versions of local politics.

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<sup>68</sup> Both leaders started their tenure as community representatives respecting the process above, having been elected by the zonal leaders that represent the UCV. But both were eventually challenged at different points in their administrations, however they continued to remain active while the neighborhood government held new elections to replace them.

The division in leadership arose when a newly elected directive was challenged. Community leaders challenged the procedure followed in the election of the first *secretaria* general (No 1) and tried to elect a leader to replace him (No 2). But the first leader maintained a modicum of support. With a few loyal allies, No 1 brought a number of projects through to fruition in Huaycán, through the national program *A Trabajar Urbano* for example.

At the time of my research, the administrations of No 1 and No 2 both continued to work and lead their respective supporters. This divisionism was significant on a number of levels. The following is an explanation from one of No 2's most influential supporters:

Huaycán is divided at present. It has two leaders. No 2 was elected but there is also No 1, who is a negative influence (*persona negativa*) for Huaycán. [No 1] even resigned in a congress held by the community, but he turns around and continues because he has power that the government gives him, and it's true that the government gives him the *A Trabajar* program.... But now that I am working with the mayor (referring to the mayor of Ate who supported No 2 at that time); he [the mayor] understands, he is down to earth, he is honest.... I have noticed that this man [the mayor] wants to work with neighborhood organizations, because he knows what ideas we can contribute and that he can contribute logistically. There is no will on the part of local leaders to approach local government.<sup>69</sup>

The comment above was made by a well-known leader in Huaycán, who headed an association of *comedores* (dining kitchens), had important ties to International Christian

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<sup>69</sup> Ahorita Huaycán está dividido. Tiene dos dirigentes, el señor No 2 fue elegido y acá hay otro el No 1 que es una persona negativa para Huaycán, en un Congreso renunció y que pero nuevamente salga (de quedarse en el cargo, después de haber renunciado) porque él tiene poder que es el gobierno que se lo da y es cierto que el gobierno le da el programa "A Trabajar Urbano"(...). Ahora que estoy trabajando con el alcalde; él entiende, es sencillo, es honesto, no ha cabalidad que queremos, pero sí he notado que este señor quiere trabajar con las organizaciones vecinales porque sabe que ideas podemos aportar, y el puede aportar logísticamente, pero no hay voluntad de los dirigentes de acercarse al gobierno local

NGOs and was prominent in many other local endeavors. Her opinion above is interesting because it shows yet another level of the divisions in Huaycán – whereas officials from above decried the lack of consensus in Huaycán, the Mayor of Ate for example did not attend the annual ceremony in 2003, not wanting to openly contribute and take sides<sup>70</sup>-- the last line of her comments above also show that local people of influence were wary of ‘official’ local government because of the discord. The lack of unity was a reason for locally influential people to boycott local administration as well and to continue to foster their contacts and projects independent of local government. Therefore there were other avenues, even locally, where the non-participants in local administration could maintain their influence in spite of local government.

Both sides in the local leadership conflict had claims to legitimacy because of past discontinuities in the local political process. Not all leaders were registered officially with the municipalidad and el registro civil so that there is a significant lapse in official and legal acknowledgement of community leadership in Huaycán. From the mid 1990s until 2003, local leaders did not register with the municipalidad and registro civil. No 3 was the first leadership to be officially registered with higher levels of government since the administration that followed Pascuala Rosado in the early 1990s. Yet this was also a window of opportunity and the reasoning used by No 2. He could continue his work and challenge how much official acknowledgement was really the protocol locally, given that no one had been registered in at least 10 years, almost half of Huaycán’s existence at

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<sup>70</sup> Until about 3 days before the anniversary parade in 2003, the rumor was that the mayor of Ate would attend, and that he would stand with leader No 2.

that time.<sup>71</sup> This example shows how Huaycán's leaders were bringing even the community's own past to bear on the present relationship with municipal and national programs, making it a significant part of the conflict. Although Huaycán might have failed as a municipal project in 1986, the loose ends left still represent significant parts of the community.

Attempts to address the discord in local government seemed to encounter the same problems that caused the initial divide. No 2 was challenged on a significant technicality by another group of community leaders, many of whom represented the founding and long-time residents of Huaycán. Another assembly or *Congreso* was called, and a third leader was elected, seemingly to replace both the No 1 and No 2 leaderships, but many of No 2's supporters boycotted this effort. No 2 therefore challenged the legitimacy of the No 3 replacement. Although No 3 replaced No 1, No 2 remained in power as well, managing significant resources because of ties to the mayor of Ate and the local leaders that are more recent residents of Huaycán. When I left in 2004, there were still 2 juntas at work, No 2 and No 3 in this instance.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> The conflict itself is what is of interest to me analytically and it shows the complexity of politics in Huaycán. This account is derived from interviews with leaders # 1, 2, and 3 and a number of other local leaders directly involved in these disputes. These accounts are based on their role and self-serving opinion of the events, and I don't claim they represent any 'true' account of all that transpired. However, the discord itself shows how different simultaneous and parallel leaderships were indeed viable with different sorts of ties to government and state legitimacy at the local level.

<sup>72</sup> Hortensia Muñoz has emphasized that Huaycán has been the product of a number of antagonistic projects from its inception (Muñoz, 1999:75).

I want to draw attention to the variety of government and political influence in this example of multiple leaderships in Huaycán. The expected hierarchies of government --where the national state is above the municipality and the municipality is closer to the local than the national state -- is challenged in this local action. Each leader used different governments to ally themselves with so they could make progress politically at the local level. These apparently hierarchical examples of government are used in ways that become contingent on local politics as well. These programs have meaning in the more general problem of access and inclusion from a local perspective in neighborhoods like Huaycán. While this use is not absolute and does not supersede the hierarchies of the center, it does show how some state dynamics are contextual. It shows there are different directionalities to the state. Local leaders can also cast programs as their *gestiones* (and often in Peru, it is the initiative and work of local leaders that gets the program, school, or police station started in neighborhoods like Huaycán in the first place). This brings the state into a different relief than the center. Local politics contextualizes different programs like a Wawa Wasi and the police for example. These interfaces also contribute to what the state is in Peru.

Local politics do not fit neatly into the bottom of a hierarchy, and way the state and government are used at the local level are not well represented in that framework at all. Local politics articulate structured and official politics in different ways-- they are not an extension or a bottom to what is official. It is more like local politics are a different space where government and state are used. In this light, Huaycán being so

political is not just a fleeting detail. The lack of consensus means more than just missed opportunities for Huaycán. On a deeper level this shows one of the fundamental disarticulations between outside actors and the community. While the state and NGOs tend to view consensus as integral to community, the dynamics of local politics are often more longitudinal and consequently Huaycán has a lot of conflict. A lot of the energy getting things accomplished is spent in the way these two countercurrents do not coincide.

In this way the expectation of a consensus which provides legitimacy and a recognizable middle ground is held out like a prerequisite by groups coming and trying to establish projects in Huaycán [by NGOs? By whom?]. The alliances being built and the windows of opportunity for government projects used at present emerge out of the discord and not the expected consensus. The NGOs and government projects are helping take Huaycán further away from consensus, reproducing further exclusion. It will be very hard to re-set local politics into a consensus. The local leaders and activists are currently using what the state and government and relative lack of NGO involvement in Huaycán are at this moment – trying to create solutions and opportunities as best they can. . In this sense, alliances and efforts by local leaders continue to move local dynamics forward and further away from the pre-requisite of legitimate consensus. Alliances and efforts seem to take the local dynamics even further away from consensus.

The concept signature of the state that Veena Das explores in *Anthropology in the Margins of the State* is useful here. In her example from India, Das discusses how state laws and documentation take on a life of their own in a poor neighborhood and how they are used in surprising ways by the community. She analyzes the measures taken by the state after a riot in a particular community in West Delhi. A number of the protestors lost their lives and the widows of the victims were paid compensation for the death of their husbands by the state. However, Das explains that this group's convention is for compensation to be paid to the victim's father (Das, 2004:227). The widows compromised with their father-in-laws and shared the compensation, making it one example, Das argues, of state presence and influence used in unexpected ways; the state is made to conform to local traditions for example. In looking at marginal relationships to the state, this indicates an important point to take account of: how the differences between intention and practice have significance. Individual actors can maneuver through specific laws and legislation to receive mutual benefit. Thinking of the state's power as primarily panoptic doesn't allow us to reflect on these more sporadic and unscripted dimensions of government influence (Das, 2004:231).

The concept of signature of the state is a good explanatory tool to for understanding how the state is used in unexpected ways, but it still anchors the unexpected political and local outcomes in a way it can say something significant about the state and how it works. There is a difference or a gap created between the norm and how that norm is used and applied in reality, and within that difference there is still



a form of power. As Das explains, 'once the state institutes forms of governance through technologies of writing, it simultaneously institutes the possibility of forgery, imitation and the mimetic performances of its power'(Das, 2004:227). For Das, the state is more than rational administration, and these uses of signatures are evidence of what she refers to as the magical dimensions of state power. Signatures allow the government little and partial claims at incompleteness, because it continually and constantly comes into relationship with instances in daily life that are not state.

Similar to Huaycán's leadership problems described above, Das also mentions two different local authorities claiming leadership in the community she worked with. However, she mentions this in passing, and doesn't explicitly make it a part of her analysis of the state (Das, 2004:241). I think the double political personhood of the community is another example of how the margins are significant to state power. It is an example of how everyday politics shift around hierarchies, making them significant but in unintended and surprising ways. In this sense the local authorities involved were using different state programs in order to maintain their influence, vying for resources, and even those leaders who weren't officially registered could still claim a modicum of power by mimicking other aspects and procedures of local government. At the same time it demonstrates that one or more claims to representation in the community are viable. The real state of that local politics in Huaycán is conflictual; there is a complicated history of problems and important reasons why consensus is difficult. It's not the absolute absence of legitimate representation. Locally, people use the different

ways of accessing more official expressions of politics to legitimate their positions. What does it mean to elaborate and improvise in the margins of state politics like this? What does this openness vis-à-vis the local teach us about how we understand the state?

The simultaneous existence of different leaderships in Huaycán is significant. It amounts to more than just disorganization and local conflict perceived by both residents and outside observers – in this example of everyday politics it is also clear that the different levels of government also don't neatly or naturally encompass the local (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002: 982). The different local leaderships in Huaycán used simultaneous signatures of government; they used municipal, NGO or national support to help them in their particular struggles for legitimacy. Local governments tried to re-articulate these programs, almost bringing them down to the same level, spread wide and on the same local plane of action. Although these uses of the state and government are mostly unscripted, they are still about the state and state power; they enable a kind of politics, and create relationships to the state for the residents of Huaycán. In the close and now these different political levels don't naturally trump the other. Instead of projecting hierarchy onto how we understand everyday politics, everyday politics can teach us something interesting about the inner, day-to-day workings of particular states and governments.

### **Connections and Defaults:**

Although this chapter focuses on the local leadership crisis in Huaycán, on another level the crisis also contributed to making the local leadership rather marginal

to many community dynamics as well. Many everyday residents, many of the women I worked with in the *comedores* for example, were unaware of the local leadership crisis at all. Residents also don't need to be very aware of the local politics behind some programs at all. They can participate in government programs without knowledge of the behind-the-scenes kind of negotiations or the work that went into getting the program initiated.

In the initial chapters of this dissertation, I analyzed how everyday residents are undoubtedly experiencing and creating relationships to the state that are not necessarily in function of the articulation vis-à-vis the local government. The local leader I quoted above also made this point when she stated, 'There is no will on the part of local leaders to approach local government.' Although this leader was supporting No 2, she was interested in No 2 for his relationship to the mayor more than the local leadership itself. The legitimacy issues were also a problem on the community front for the local government. I want to show how this multidimensionality works more in conjunction with the state than against it. Together these different examples help illustrate the complexity of the process of everyday politics and the state in Peru. That two leaderships were able to claim viable grounds for some legitimacy is a product of that multidimensionality. However, local leadership can also be marginal to many of the local dilemmas in their own right as a result. It is not that the different leaderships were creating divisionism and chaos in local politics by their actions, the discord itself is a reflection of the complex problems that are present in Huaycán. This lack of consensus

also shows energy and a conflict over legitimate representation and a struggle to define the problems – that is anything but simple or bare-bones. This complexity made municipal and national level programs equally effective in helping local leaders legitimate themselves in this instance.

The various layers of government that co-exist and act simultaneously also complicate the idea that exclusion occurs because the state acts with duplicity towards the citizens of poor neighborhoods, or that the problem is the weakness or absence of government. National state power is a part of government that is about specific and intermittent encounters with citizens in widely different contexts, such as elections every 5 years or acquiring a passport. For most citizens in Huaycán these are less the foundation for all other relationships than it might seem in theory – getting a passport and even voting are the outer fringes of their state experience. These encounters with the state are not part of their everyday; some might never even acquire a passport in their lifetime for example. It is the in-betweens and more ambiguous relationships that become more prominent in the day-to-day, and this cannot be understood only in function of the structure as imposed or explained first by what seems fundamental to the way we understand politics as a hierarchy of institutions and a formal system. The criteria of equality and rights are less the foundations for a solid hierarchy of politics than we think. Equality and rights are not the building blocks for all other politics and relationships with the state. There are many more examples of politics that are highly trafficked and more transgressed spaces between everyday people and the state.

The local vis-à-vis the state is usually approached analytically by researchers and even politicians in a very two dimensional light; as if there existed an impermeable boundary between the state and the everyday and that the state only reacts to local problems. This is instead of considering how the state is also already a part of many dimensions of the problem on the society side. There is a whole space of politics that thinking so rigidly about the state and society separation writes out of its framework. The apparent boundaries are not so clear in reality. The unscripted aspects of the state are more than a shadow or parallel state that is detached and inconsequential to the formal system. We need to go beyond the self-drawn barriers of the state to the unexpected ways it also has some movement and life and productive power at the apparent margins.

### **Present without the Local in Huaycán**

The pilot project for what would evolve into an important state program called COFOPRI (Commission for the Formalization of Informal Property) was carried out in Huaycán.<sup>73</sup> Huaycán was one of the communities where *The Other Path* author Hernando de Soto's NGO called the Institute for Freedom and Democracy (ILD) carried out the pilot project for COFOPRI. Locally however, the ILD project had little staying power. It does not figure significantly in any local version of community history, and

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<sup>73</sup> The different programs and agencies of the state in Peru are referred to by specific names, but some of these do not translate very effectively into an English equivalent. COFOPRI for example was called a commission, but it was recently changed to *Organismo de la Formalizacion de la Propriedad Informal* (Ley No 28923, December 7th 2006). The Wawi Wasi service is called a program. I use terms like program, agency, organization and even institution interchangeably in some cases to refer to these different entities.

many residents who lived in Huaycán at that time do not remember the project.

Residents themselves make no link to that early research in their neighborhood and the later development of COFOPRI, although in a recent appearance on PBS, Hernando de Soto posed for a picture in the *zonas altas* of Huaycán, as if Huaycán were still a foundational place for his ideas.<sup>74</sup> When de Soto's and ILD's influence returned to Huaycán and many neighborhoods like it having inspired the state agency COFOPRI however, the ideas did have a significant impact.

Implemented under the Fujimori regime, COFOPRI is another instance of the state responding creatively to actually existing conditions. COFOPRI was an attempt to help incorporate the poor and extremely poor, giving them better property rights in the hopes of generating access to credit and other financial benefits. Although projects carried out by NGOs at the local level are expected to have a lasting impact for project participants and in the community more generally, the inter-relationship between the local, NGO and the state in this example was mediated in a different way. It was not as an NGO project but as a state program that formalizing property based on de Soto's recommendations had a great effect in Huaycán. While ILD is admittedly one of the most conservative examples of an NGO in Peru and largely a proponent of the status-quo, it is still meaningful that the significance of ILD's activity did not have any local staying power. It demonstrates how Huaycán is enmeshed in wider processes vis-à-vis the state and society more generally, and yet it is enmeshed in ways that can supplant

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<sup>74</sup>See the following commentary: [http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/tv/2009/10/10/2009-10-10\\_capital\\_idea\\_for\\_perus\\_poor.html](http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/tv/2009/10/10/2009-10-10_capital_idea_for_perus_poor.html). The PBS documentary is titled "The Power of the Poor" and continues to air.

the local, even in a shantytown. ILD's early presence in Huaycán was brought up as if it was little more than a coincidence when I interviewed an ILD official at their offices in Lima. The significance of what ILD did there as a pilot project had little to do with Huaycán itself. These kinds of misconceptions also tell us something about power and the relationship between government, NGOs and citizens in Peru. Like the Wawa Wasi example, ILD's research in Huaycán and other neighborhoods tried to find ways to systematize the forms of informality that appear to be more spontaneous parts of everyday life among poor and migrant residents of the city. As de Soto explains "when people talk about integrating formals and informals, some mean 'informalizing' the formals in order to free them of legal restrictions, while others mean 'formalizing' the informals in order to reduce the adverse consequences of informality. Such integration would, in fact, mean both: removing unproductive restrictions from the legal system and incorporating everyone into a new formality (de Soto, 1989:246.)

Although COFOPRI set out with the mission to systematically incorporate and include more in the category of the formal, it was not entirely successful and the results remain ambiguous. With *Techo Proprio* for example, a state program launched during the Toledo government that helped to finance homes for young couples and families, state functionaries were surprised to receive a lot of resistance to the idea from the banks, which refused to finance the program without state backing. Despite a generalized and outward rhetoric of anticlientelism and antipopulism post-Fujimori that the private banks publically shared, the state had to quietly back the *Techo Proprio*

program in order to secure bank involvement. The apartments and other dwellings to be financed under *Techo Propio* are formal by abstraction, but still in an elusive category of low payments and little equity that is little valued by the banks. More clearly circumscribing what is formal in legal terms did not undo other dimensions of informality that these discourses of inclusion are layered upon. Re-categorizations can finish short of intentions, building ambiguity between the different layers of government intent and actual outcomes.

The COFOPRI example is also significant because it shows some of the inter-relationship between Huaycán's level of association and outside organizations, how projects carried out by outside organizations come and go and may be only pertinent to relatively few residents. The relationship between the state and the NGO was much more important in this example and ILD effectively by-passed the local community while having a presence there. Huaycán also grew significantly from those early years when ILDD was active. Some of the original leaders of Huaycán actually fault COFOPRI and Fujimori for the way that Huaycán grew through the 1990s, saying the program indiscriminately gifted titles to properties, leading to Huaycán's exponential and relatively uncontrolled growth. There is no natural, 'middle-level' of associations between the local and the state in Huaycán.

The ILD project did not naturally settle into a middle-level of association between the state and residents in Huaycán, because that is not the nature of Huaycán's politics. It is as if Huaycán is expected to have its own civil society that



exhibits solidarity and is amenable to NGO involvement; the absence of this coordinated middle and problems with legitimacy at a community level has deterred NGO involvement in Huaycán. However, I argue that rather than missing, Huaycán's local level of association is contested. The activities carried out by different churches in Huaycán are another example of organizations trying to operate at a wider, middle range of action in Huaycán, however, the evangelical and catholic churches each work with particular memberships and have more impact on certain parts of the community than others. The churches also relate differently with the *partes altas* and *partes bajas* of Huaycán, with more charitable out-reach and events carried out in the *zonas altas*. Hortensia Muñoz explains how for the evangelical churches especially 'although they shared common demands and valued collective action, the evangelicals had difficulty consolidating a permanent level of coordination that would allow them to present their claims in a way that would produce lasting results' in Huaycán (Muñoz, 1999:74.) The Catholic Church is afforded more provisions vis-à-vis the state because it is a recognized service to the community in Peru (Muñoz, 1999:73). Land is usually set aside for the Catholic Church for instance. Furthermore, Muñoz explains that 'during its first years, the Huaycán settlement was the focal point of conflicting expectations and diverse, even antagonistic projects. One was the political expectations of the first leftist municipal government of Lima, the national capital. Another was the political-military project of *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) the powerful Maoist guerilla insurgency that terrorized the country from 1980 until 1992, to occupy the capital. A third was the demands of an increasingly dissatisfied urban populations for land, housing and

amenities (Muñoz, 1999:75).’ Therefore there was a lot of different interests vying for control and influence at a wider level in Huaycán, making solidarity as a community very difficult. However, it is not that there was really an absence of political will to coordinate or have outside interests participate in the community.

### **The Unscripted Power of the State**

Processes like mimesis and concepts like fetish are useful for understanding the more indirect influences that state and government can have because they can be centered in the particularity of the everyday and therefore help analyze unscripted uses of the state. However these concepts also seem to dissociate everyday phenomenon from the fact that these manifestations still continue to be a form of state power. The examples in this chapter and elsewhere in the dissertation do not take elements of the state and elaborate them in ways that remain detached, autonomous, or other than state. There is something more to be said because even these everyday and specific dimensions still represent a form of state power. In this way mimicking organizations or state processes, or treating state expressions like a fetish largely leave the boundaries between the formal and informal and between official and nonofficial intact. I want to emphasize that these processes are not unidirectional, that in mimicking or treating the state as a fetish there are still real connections created in the Wawa Wasis, in the comedores and by local governments that efface formal and informal distinctions, at least to a significant extent, in the way that these everyday uses of government and state power are used in a neighborhood like Huaycán.

It is therefore important to consider these examples from everyday politics as more than just politics otherwise — as if the different leaderships in Huaycán take the state up and perform it in a detached, alternate way — because these everyday dimensions that are an intricate part of the politics of Huaycán are also a part of how the state works. People make state programs relevant to their own reality in order to build more genuine or at least better access to the state; trying to influence and make it more relevant for them. This is the level of state power that concepts like fetish obscure because they reinforce the idea that local and everyday expressions are something other than authentic state power -- as if statolatry and fetishization could be independent, separate interpretations of the center (Gramsci, 1971). Baker-Cristales for example uses the concept of mimesis to explain the significance of migrant associations of El Salvadorians outside El Salvador, where these organizations are acting state-like and vice versa. The state also mimics migrant organizations to maintain influence over citizens who move abroad (Baker-Cristales, 2008:358). This however still represents the same sense of hierarchy, where ultimately it is an association acting as a derivative of the more central state; or the state trying to be more like a grassroots association in order to ultimately maintain some authority and influence over emigrants as a state. However, the concept of mimesis is also useful for understanding how some tactics employed purposefully defer to the local. Mimicking local forms of organization is another instrumentalizing form of power and shows that mimesis is also used within the territory and from the inside of state dynamics as well. As Baker-Cristales explains,

Mimesis is not mechanical reproduction; it is pursuit of the “magical power of replication” (Taussig 1993:2), a magical appropriation that seeks the power of the original through manipulation of the copy. The particular magic of the state lies in its absolute conceit to monopolize not simply the legitimate use of violence, as Weber suggests, but all legitimacy. Revolutionary movements and migrant activists, arguably pariahs of the state system, craft elaborate replicas of state operations hoping to reproduce the magical legitimacy that state-based forms bestow. State actors also enter into these magical pursuits, replicating the fraternal and democratic rhetoric and organizational forms of migrant activists and NGOs, a cannibalistic consumption of the other that seeks to conceal the vertical and exploitative nature of social relations under the state (Baker-Cristales, 2008:358).

However there exist examples like the Wawa Wasi Program I discuss in Chapter 2 where the state mimics and seeks to reproduce local energy, where the state is trying to make use of local energy on their own terms. There are aspects of the local and everyday life that are at least partially or somewhat elusive to the state as well, where the state is not so much in a vertical relationship (in this instance) as present and intimately productive of everyday reality.

There are important lessons about the nature of the state inherent in a more inclusive vision of state power that includes the indirect and everyday kinds of effects it has on marginal populations. Huaycán shows there really is no formal state that Huaycán is somehow distant from; as if bringing Huaycán closer to the state would lead to more inclusion. The idea that a boundary exists between the formal and informal makes us think of Huaycán as intrinsically separate from the center, reinforcing the notion that the problem is a lack of state presence and order in shantytown neighborhoods and that a boundary and distance exists in the first place. The center might be more ordered; where the same principles can be applied more straightforwardly than at the margins -- but the same processes that comprise the

center are at work throughout the informality of the margins. The same ordered state processes at the center help produce many of the kinds of gaps and inconsistencies that are a part of everyday politics and everyday life at the margins.

These more fluid dimensions of the state are not often considered in analyses. In interpreting the state we look to the most obvious and institutional manifestations. Yet citizens can hold onto more intangible aspects of the state, how previous acts can continue to have influences at the local level, allowing them to continue to have an impact beyond what their significance and sometimes even their duration are at the center. The statutes that restrict Huaycán to a single leadership that were drawn up in the original project are a case in point. This reproduces the influence of past governments at a different level. The less directed way Huaycán continued to grow after the original municipal project failed is another example. The everyday sense of the state in Peru shows how the center wrestles with precariousness too; it is not a solid distance from the informality and everyday. There is a dimension of the state that makes only slight claims and little victories out of the apparently chaotic political and everyday landscape. The government is often only a few steps ahead or above, it has to do the dis-engagement from the complexity of the everyday at many levels. It is also surprising the extent to which everyday people can make the state a part of local problems. The existence of 2 different leaderships in Huaycán shows how the pull on the state can come from local problems themselves. At the margins you have an inroad into a form of state power that is very close to what we conceive of as the center; it mirrors in

moments but also in others eclipses the imagined hierarchy. People use national programs to address local problems, or municipal power to wage new or different claims against the national government. In this it is sometimes local politics that seems a few steps ahead or beyond – weaving national and other wider *coyenturas* into local problems.

It is also very easy to overestimate the coherence and intentionality inherent to government acts and what seem like the result of a controlled conduct. Another important project the early leaders of Huaycán carried out for example was their own survey, collecting data and information about the people who were living in Huaycán themselves (CUAH, Informe Estadístico Autoempadronamiento, 1985). Does the fact the residents of Huaycán engaged in a self-survey mean that the residents of Huaycán are subjects of government in the governmentality sense?

On the one hand you could argue that practices like the self-survey have their own genealogy, that they represent the evolution of a relationship between the Peruvian state and its citizens (albeit with marginal citizens,) tied to the Velasco years or before. However calling this governmentality still seems forced onto a model that is not emphasizing the right flow of power, or delimiting the right direction of the action at hand.

I argue that there is an emphasis to be made in these kinds of connections that is different than what is meant by governmentality – it is a willing connection where some of the connections to government itself, that you would expect to find in a

governmentality approach to this, are tenuous and empty. The state is not systemic and all seeing in Peru, and the 'apparatuses of security' central to a governmentality perspective are either empty of real effectiveness or faked (Foucault, 1991). While the basic elements or components of governmentality are there, it is not entirely the same kind of relationship being created. There are too many ways that the relationship is often by default and not of the government's intentional doing. There are many aspects of the relationship between marginal citizens and the state that you have to qualify and explain in order to make a governmentality argument apply. Here I could use the mimic metaphor rather comfortably. Doing things for themselves, like the self-survey or building their own public schools, the residents in Huaycán are trying to be instigators of a governmentality-like relationship with the government. The directions of conduct and control here are different enough that it is something other than 'the conduct of conduct' per se (Dean, 1999:10). There are only a few key aspects of daily life, like health, education, and the limited effectiveness of police that the government is directly engaged in. In other aspects of daily life there are the indirect and omnipresent influences of government that make this distinction ambiguous. There is a lot about the health, education and security of residents that goes relatively unregulated in shantytowns. We have to look at how knowledges of populations are not as tightly seamed at the margins, how there are gaps and spaces left -- how these typical dimensions that seem consolidated in other groups of citizens are only entry points in neighborhoods like Huaycán. Governing practices are one kind of fringe of daily life in

Huaycán, a bare characterization of all the dimensions of everyday life in poor neighborhoods.

At the same time, although it seems that Huaycán developed haphazardly and largely on its own, the lulls and breaks in government engagement do not really represent abandonment or absence, at least not in any simple or absolute way. Governments also have some effect in delimiting aspects of daily life indirectly; helping shape the spaces where other kinds of actors besides the state are to intervene for example. The control the state has over what is possible and not possible is complexly incomplete – it is a tangle of different levels, and a mix of hierarchies where the messages can get crossed or even lost – making communication across such a tangle of different influences and opinions difficult. That is how community actors, NGOs and state functionaries often have different goals in mind in their discussions even locally about the same things. NGOs that enter Huaycán with the intention of working on self-esteem for women and against domestic violence are disappointed and surprised that the women seem to value handicraft more than self-esteem workshops. . The visit the First Ladies paid to Huaycán that I discuss in Chapter 2 shows how there is also a level of discomfort with the everyday; the everyday is something to hide from the distinguished visitors. In this example the women and children were made to perform in ways that do not truly represent how the program works every day – so they had to present some sort of ideal of the less than ideal that the outside world expected. During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation visit of world leaders to Lima in 2008, there were similar



stagings done by the state. During a visit to Pachacamac that included Laura Bush and other dignitaries, the vendors who work at the ruins everyday were kept away from work that day and replaced with other outside vendors of local crafts that were brought in especially for the event. What was supposed to be an experience of the real for the visitors was contrived, an example of the state trying stage social reality for a very specific purpose. Little spectacles like this show the state's own sense of discomfort with the margins – obviously aware on some level that Peruvian reality doesn't live up to a model – it is more comfortable or easier to embellish or fake the everyday than to make a showcase of all the emptiness and misconnections.<sup>75</sup>

It is easy to understand inequality vis-à-vis the state in terms of duplicity, believing the state treats marginal citizens differently than it treats middle class and upper class citizens. In *The Politics of the Governed* for example, Partha Chatterjee argues there is a fundamental difference between the politics carried out in the name of civil society and the politics for the rest of society in countries like India, or 'most of the world' as he puts it, including all the Global South. Chatterjee argues that liberal civil society in India that talks of rights and justice is limited to a very small and specific set of organizations, intellectuals and middle upper classes (Chatterjee, 2004:38). On the other hand, politics for everyone else is heterogeneous – the residents of shantytowns for example are more the subjects of what he refers to as political society than civil

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<sup>75</sup> While I recognize that planning and polishing up for guests is normal or natural behavior (i.e. you would never not prepare for an important visitor, there are still assumptions being made that need to be analyzed in these examples. There is also something about reality that is being passed over or dismissed in these examples.

society. They enter into a political relationship with officials because of elections and needed access to services, but they are not the subjects of rights that we envision by civil society (Chatterjee, 2004:40). This is similar to my argument that politics in shantytowns are governmentality-like, yet there are gaps within these very practices where government really has few claims of control, and people themselves seem to perform services and accomplish tasks for the government in the hopes of creating better and more genuine access. However Chatterjee's emphasis still suggests a kind of duplicity at work, as if the government is treating first class citizens better than second class citizens and that a conscious and different set of practices are deployed. Duplicity however is only the way it appears, it is focusing on the result or outcome instead of the processes that run more deeply. It seems as if two different consequences of administration must mean that administrators are treating these groups differently. That however only really engages the outward levels of how subjectivity works.

I agree with Chatterjee on the point that elite civil society (if we want to frame it that way,) is not the model being applied in state relationships to citizens. The state is not trying and failing at making universal the kinds of lifestyle and privilege enjoyed by first class citizens, or even the principles of liberty and justice for all. The process is more profound than that and is productive through the margins as well, and the problem of inequality in political terms goes beyond there being just a lack of what the more privileged have in shantytowns. Through the parameters of citizenship, in making everyone apparently equal, the state is promoting indifference, and not just in

shantytowns, but everywhere (Asad, 2004:282). To understand how the same processes of indifference can end in such a different set of circumstances for people in Huaycán we need to defy the tendency to see inequalities as the result of the state acting differently. It is not precise enough to claim the state is trying and failing to rectify inequalities. The inequalities come through and perpetuate at times even in spite of creative and good faith practices, because attention is not given to the terms of incorporation and belonging themselves. The fact inequality persists must be a shortcoming of society at large that continues to discriminate, or even a shortcoming of the person themselves -- instead of recognizing the consequences brought about in applying the measures themselves. Consider for example how easy it is to use the notion of first and second class citizenship as the point of departure to explain the difference between the residents of marginal and more privileged neighborhoods. We do not go deep enough to question the indifferent terms of citizenship themselves. We keep our discussions at the level of the seeming duplicity, without seeing how it is actually in being held to the same minimal (but not different) criteria that allows even extreme forms of poverty and political equality to encompass, co-exist and have productive effects all throughout the margins and peripheries as well(Asad, 2004:283).

It is not really a matter of opening a center up and to allow more into the terms of inclusion, innocuously extending values piece by piece to the margins over time from there. Establishing indifference is a process also fully engaged at the margins as well – where governments and people live and govern through the contradictions this kind of

framework of belonging creates. We want to think the deficiencies in this process are because we are working towards a someday; as if little by little people were actually acquiring more rights. But talking of the state as some kind of center creates an artificial sense of absence at the margins. The state only seems closer, more present and to work better in more privileged sectors of the population. We are all potentially subject to the violence of these kinds of parameters; more privileged citizens might notice it less but it is there and always a potential threat nonetheless; like the uncertainties they face when they also visit marginal neighborhoods or when they cross borders.

In Huaycán and Peru more generally, the rule of law, the monopoly of violence and other characteristics of the state do not necessarily supplant what goes against them; they can and do fully co-exist with corruption, impunity and other injustices. Layered on this is the basic framework of indifference already established as the basis of the relationship between citizens and the state. Programs designed specifically for poor citizens are created within and on the basis of this framework of indifference. The state is not so much absent in marginal neighborhoods as applying citizenship minimally (as it does everywhere) – using broad categories of inclusion that keep shantytown residents dealing up and front with the ways the state and society are largely indifferent to who they are and how they live. In being applied everywhere citizenship parameters are another instrument that locks people into a cycle of belonging but not belonging at the same time. The power in the minimal criteria of this is that belonging and not belonging

is not even a real contradiction. It's a condition that is fully produced and that people actually live.

### **Conclusion: Different Levels within the Same**

By considering the citizenship of everyday citizens as somehow lacking – that in order to improve state access and guarantee rights for poor Peruvian we need to extend the same kinds of opportunities afforded first class citizens -- we are putting too much emphasis on just a small part of the dynamic, and distorting where the real parameters of the problem lie. The residents of Huaycán are not lacking in some aspect of their citizenship, nor are they guilty of misanthropic behavior that explains their own marginality and exclusion (Chatterjee, 2004:40) Perlman, 1979: 245). Civil society groups, NGOs and even some state programs themselves come into communities like Huaycán expecting to have to teach about citizenship rights. However, communities like Huaycán are already complex and multidimensional, and the problem is not a lack of awareness or faults in their practices per se. There are community leaders and other influential residents that are very aware and resourceful, and a series of state and/or municipal programs, some of which are actually creative and good-faith attempts at addressing everyday problems for residents. Sometimes the paradigm of citizenship rights can seem even wasteful in its most zealous examples, not because of where Peru stands on an imaginary scale that compares Third World countries to first world countries, or because there is no need for help, but because the apparently necessary elements for a more just society are not really missing. What is more complicated is that

many of the parameters are essentially there. In this way sometimes the community basis of a project can eclipse reality, missing its mark and projecting onto the community what the organization imagines and wants to achieve.

In this way an ethnographic approach is more than just a nuanced example of the state as process, there is also a conceptual point to be made about the state and its margins. In a community like Huaycán, it is more obvious how the cohesiveness that apparently cements state programs to particular goals at the center are more fleeting and fragile than they appear. As you move away from the center, it is more obvious how a number of state logics do not naturally coincide in every context. Norms for example can have independent and different effects in neighborhoods like Huaycán. Programs can have politics and processes that diverge from original intentions when implemented at the local level as well. There is more openness and a lot that is unencompassed by different governing practices than it first appears. In the next chapter, I will discuss how governments end up managing and articulating through the openness at the margins in recent debates about *gobernabilidad* or governability in Peru.

The ideas presented in this chapter stake how significant dimensions of state dynamics are locatable in the everyday. Assuming that government dynamics are different at the margins because the state becomes something else in poor neighborhoods is not pushing the analysis far enough. This only recognizes the surface elements, the contradicting outcomes of practices that run deeper into the everyday relationships between citizens and the state. The state's idiosyncrasies as a system are

what lead to the apparent absence of the state on the margins, it is an absence that is lived and made; where the same processes at the center lead to different outcomes on the margins. More than arbitrary, it is also in simultaneously allowing all it does not delineate on purpose that citizenship for example creates uncertainties and contradictions about belonging at the same time it apparently includes.

## **Chapter 5: The Politics of Unrealistic Expectations: Governing and Marginal Citizens in Lima**

The previous chapters of this dissertation have explored a series of difficulties in articulating a middle level of politics for the people of Huaycán, a middle level in terms of the kinds of associations and solidarity that are expected to develop in communities between people and the state. There are at least 2 different tensions in this dilemma for Huaycán. Because Huaycán was a government experiment to begin with, Huaycán's local government was conceived of initially with a more direct association between the residents and government in mind. When the municipal project collapsed, the succession of local leaderships that followed were forced to improvise other ways to maintain their influence and to engage with authorities. Secondly, the fact that outside organizations see the discord over the middle ground in Huaycán as a lack also has a real impact on the possibilities for Huaycán. This problem is now reflected in how Huaycán can sustain more than one local leadership, as addressed in the last chapter. While one association had ties to the national government and the other to the municipality of Ate, each of these different local governments in Huaycán had its own relationships with different *Organizaciones Sociales de Base* (OSBs) and with different NGOs and other civil society organizations active in the community. This is significant to conceptualizations of the state and government because it shows that there is no clear cut encompassment of these levels in the day-to-day. Although the relationships between these examples are



usually conceived of in terms of hierarchies of authority, everyday politics in a community like Huaycán demonstrates that the relationships between them can be circumstantial, changing and more equal than hierarchical in influence in many respects. The relationship that the community has with these different forms of government can be spread thinly and/or far apart in an everyday politics that is complex and where there are many actors trying to create opportunities with what connections they can make. Therefore power itself seems to undo or at least challenge schemas of authority in some instances.

I also established in previous chapters that the way the state is manifest in everyday politics is important. Although everyday politics takes the state and governments in directions that may be un-intended, everyday politics show us other dimensions of how the state is lived and how it influences people. Although one of the more technical definitions of politics is the art of government (Dean, 1999:18; Gordon, 1991: 47), there is also something to be said about the state beyond the strictly formal reaches of government in communities like Huaycán. Politics is often talked about as if it is always an external force applied from outside. Yet there is also a political energy at the neighborhood level. There are more omnipresent dimensions of the state like basic citizenship parameters that no citizen seems to escape, but these are not necessarily tied to other levels of government as straightforwardly as it seems. There is surprising room to maneuver and play with the parameters of government at times. Huaycán would not have continued to grow after the original project collapsed if there were no

other connections and ways for residents to build alternate relationships and grow as a neighborhood in addition to those of the particular government that initiated it.

Huaycán would not have continued to have some political and changing dynamic today – its own longstanding debate about how to manage the community and how to relate to different governments -- if it was not able to re-create other kinds of relationships to the state there in spite of the setbacks and failures.

### **Governability: The pragmatics and politics of social demands**

One term widely used in the discussion of politics and informality in Peru by policy makers and NGOS today is governability. The concept figures in many recent studies of politics and participation by NGOs in Peru (see for example publications by the Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, an initiative of the IEP, DESCO and other well-known NGOs). However, the analysts use the concept with different emphasis and the meaning of governability varies from researcher to researcher. On the one hand, governability can signal the willingness of people to cooperate with and accept governing authority. Governability in this sense is a measure of citizens' willingness to participate in constructive ways in the practice of governance. In contrast, other studies use governability to emphasize the government's ability to meet social demands. In this perspective, it is not just a question of the population making reasonable demands, or acting in ways that undermine their own government. It is also necessary to assess the institutional capacity to meet social demands. Studies stressing this aspect of

governability emphasize that governments that are effective in achieving governability have the necessary institutions for attaining social goals in place (Escalante, 2006:6).<sup>76</sup>

Because governability is a relatively new framework for debate over the dynamics between government and the social demands that citizens make (emerging first in the 1990s in discussions about Latin American countries,) there is still a lot to be explored in terms of its explanatory power. The term is used in different ways by NGOs, policy makers and academics. Policy makers for example gain at least some rhetorical control over what populations do to distance and disagree with government in using the term. In such interpretations, the idea of governability imparts some culpability to the public or the masses for making unrealistic demands that prevent their government from doing its job. For example, the residents of Huaycán recently protested the call the mayor of Ate made to make even the residents of marginal neighborhoods in the district pay their back taxes or risk even further fines (RPP, December 2008). Hundreds of residents and local leaders from Huaycán and other marginal neighborhoods in the district held a protest at the municipality. While the people protesting claimed paying back taxes would be a further burden on them economically, the mayor's office argued that the contributions are necessary to make the needed improvements in municipal government and services.<sup>77</sup> In the national news radio report about the protest, the

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<sup>76</sup> <http://palestra.pucp.edu.pe/portal/pdf/286.pdf>. See also the work published and carried out by the IDEHPUCP.

<sup>77</sup> In the municipality of Ate there was a protest against the mayor on December 15<sup>th</sup> 2008 because the mayor announced that he would not give amnesty to poor residents in paying local taxes. Many of the protest participants were reportedly from Huaycán (RRP, December 15<sup>th</sup>, 2008).

practicality of the mayor was contrasted with what was cast as the resident's unwillingness to contribute. Protests like this are even considered a vestige of Fujimori's influence with marginal citizens, when deferring debts or not enforcing loan qualification criteria in the *Banco de Materiales* (BANMAT) programs for example was used as a political tool. As a BANMAT official explains to the newspaper *El Comercio* '... in the 1990s, during the government of Alberto Fujimori, some BANMAT functionaries gave credit to people who lived in extreme poverty without ever having qualified for access to any kind of financing before. That was a populist measure because officials knew that they would never be able to pay and they were tricked into signing documents when a lot of them do not know how to read or write" (*El Comercio*, December 1st, 2006). Many of the demands that marginal citizens make of government are portrayed as intractable or unreasonable in this way.

I also want to stress how the idea of governability brings very disparate kinds of dissent and critique together in a directed way. It frames what people ask of government as demands, which suggests urgency and at least a measure of power to destabilize the government. It is also interesting how that sense of urgency displaces the discussion from the specificity of the problem at hand. It switches the discussion to a general dynamic of appeasing the population and having the ability to make them conform. Governability is about convincing and inspiring confidence or satisfaction in certain sectors of the population and not about the social problems per se. At the same time it acknowledges, albeit in an indirect and unintended way, that people have if not

the right, than at least some power to destabilize and make demands of their government, to throw particular designs off course. I think the sense of urgency is something useful to take from this otherwise very neoliberal interpretation of dissent, because this new term is also a framework to talk about the more immediate need for change whereas development or modernization goals are long and far-reaching. Governability at least acknowledges there is some demand from the people themselves to produce tangible improvements and real results for poor and marginal citizens in their near futures.

The term governability is therefore a new articulation of the relationship between government and citizens. It closes some of the conceptual distance between action and outcome in analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of governments. The use of the term is also interesting because it is an attempt to categorize and even include transgression and dissent in the same context as government, in a framework meant to explain why some efforts at establishing particular government programs or policies do not work.

### **The Relationship between the Municipalidad de Ate and Huaycán**

In anthropology there has been little focus on the role that municipal governments play and even less in terms of how the municipal level of administration impacts the political subjectivity of everyday citizens. Although on a political level, decentralization in Latin America is a long-standing debate, the impact on the political subjectivity of citizens is usually spoken of in broader, more national terms. In Peru one

of the recent powers granted to municipalities is that they are beginning (or are projected to begin) administering key social programs for the poor – tasks that used to be carried out by the central state are being delegated and rearticulated to municipal authorities (Escalante, 2006:1). This is illustrative of the recombinant kind of logic used in neoliberal government – where it is considered possible to shift and reassign the administration of programs and services on the assumption that the goals and basics principles stay the same – that these programs continue to function in the general interest and the well-being of the population no matter what entity is administering them. Are the goals of the central government and different municipal governments the same?

Ate, the municipality where Huaycán is located, is one of the oldest districts of Lima. Ate has played an important role in the history of Lima. Ate was an important corridor of industry since the 1880s. It is where Peru's first union was formed and where the first workers' strike occurred <sup>78</sup> There were at least 2 periods of industrial development along what today is known as the Carretera Central, the main highway that runs through Ate connecting Cerro de Pasco and Huancayo to Lima ( in the 1880s and the 1950s). The old center of the district, based largely on the presence of a parochial church and the power of the hacienda families of the region is located about two or three kilometers from what is today the Ovalo Santa Anita. In the aftermath of a

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<sup>78</sup> <http://www.muniate.gob.pe/historia.htm>

large earthquake in 1940 the municipal buildings were moved to Vitarte.<sup>79</sup> Parts of Ate's old plaza still stand but they are obscured by the side streets that orient towards the main highway that have been built up around the old plaza, sectioning it off from the main arteries of the district like the *carretera central*, Javier Prado and Avenida La Molina. These shifts led to great changes in the district but old centers like the plaza are engulfed by the new dynamics of the district and are almost forgotten. The neighborhoods and commercial areas of Ate; for example Santa Clara, Vitarte, Salamanca, Ceres, Los Ángeles and Huaycán to name just a few, were all established during different periods and under very different circumstances, making the district very eclectic. Like other parts of Lima the population of Ate has increased since the 1950s, but in terms of the establishment of *barriadas*, the Cono Este where Ate is located saw most of this kind of urbanization in the 1980s, somewhat later than the Cono Norte and Cono Sur of Lima.<sup>80</sup> With the increase in population has come the attrition of territory for Ate. The districts of San Luis, Santa Anita, Chaclacayo, and La Molina were all once a part of Ate.

Huaycán was an experiment carried out on the part of the Municipality of Lima to address the lack of affordable housing for the poor in the city (Ricou, 1988:65).

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<sup>79</sup> In 1940 many of the colonial and early republican period buildings in the district were destroyed in an earthquake. Residents moved the municipal documents to Vitarte, although Vitarte didn't become the official seat of the municipality until 1951 (Villacorta, 1999).

<sup>80</sup> <http://www.muniate.gob.pe/historia.htm>. The exception to this is El Agustino which is usually included in what is considered the cono este and was one of the first *barriada* neighborhoods in the city (*El Plan de Desarrollo Integral Concertado: El Agustino 2014*, 2004:3). El Agustino however is much closer to the center of Lima than either San Juan de Lurigancho or Huaycán.

Beginning in the 1950s, many poor migrants had trouble finding affordable housing in Lima. People then started coming together in associations, invading property in disuse in strategic parts of the city (Driant, 1991:18). Modeling itself in many respects after Villa El Salvador, in 1984 the Municipality of Lima experimented with Huaycán and tried to steer an invasion from above. The *Izquierda Unida* party and mayor *Alfonso Barrantes* backed the project and wanted to use the mayoral role held by Barrantes as a springboard to national politics (Muñoz, 1999:76). The way the municipal government wanted to use a local project to build credibility and popularity in national politics is one example of the way Huaycán was used and took on significance beyond the local as well.

Given that Huaycán was originally a project of the wider municipality of Lima and not the municipality of Ate, Ate's relationship with Huaycán has often been strained and awkward -- especially after the party associated with the municipal government of Lima changed and the original project collapsed. The collapse significantly weakened local leadership in Huaycán. There was also a significant Shining Path presence in Huaycán in the mid to late 1980s which further challenged and weakened local leadership (Muñoz, 1999:75; CVR Final Report, 2003:419). However, as a municipal authority, Ate was still accountable to and responsible for the people now living in Huaycán.

Although the overarching project coordinating local leadership and municipal authority failed, Huaycán continued to grow. Huaycán was still a neighborhood in an everyday sense and it continued to increase in population and function like almost any other marginal urban neighborhood in Lima. Local leaders and community organizers



indirectly emulated the path that Villa el Salvador and other shantytown communities took. Piece-meal development and some rather disjointed relationships with different authorities through the 1990s contributed to the state of everyday politics in Huaycán today (Muñoz, 1999:90). A lot of what influenced Huaycán came alongside and from parallel efforts in the city in this instance or from other levels of authority that defied expected hierarchies. This subverts the expected scales of authority and the neat boundaries that seem to locate citizens at the bottom of a hierarchy of politics with the government and state spatialized above the everyday (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002:982).

The way political hierarchies of authority can be subverted and applied differently in practice plays out on the ground in Huaycán. Rather than a straightforward and orderly process, relationships with the different levels of government are often more like negotiations -- national programs can be used against municipal designs for example -- creating tensions on the local level that are not evident from other perspectives, but that are still productive in local politics. Although the local mostly cedes to the arbitrariness of change from above, the consequences of those arbitrary actions or decisions still nestle into more local politics in ways that often diverge from the original intent (Taussig, 1993:218). In this way local politics is another site where the divide between formal and informal politics is drawn because energy is spent in the work local leaders do in the implementation of different programs. The example I discuss in chapter 4, where one leader in Huaycán used the national program *A Trabajar Urbano* and another leader used the backing of the municipality to generate community

support for themselves is one example of how programs can take on other levels of significance at the local level. This creates a complex interface where local motives are worked into the expression of specific government programs and vice versa. There are local and contingent levels of significance that are not necessarily coterminous with what emerges or is intended by the more central and conventional centers of power. There are different dimensions to the general problems of government at an everyday level.

### **Political Participation with the Signals Crossed: Voting Elsewhere in the Municipal Elections**

The way that the residents of Huaycán vote in municipal elections parallel the ways I have been talking about the relationship between the local, the government and the state in interesting ways. In particular I focus on the municipal elections of 2002 and their relationship to Huaycán below.

Peruvians register to vote according to the address that appears on their National Identity Cards (DNI). They need to actively file to change the addresses on their identification. The result is that many Peruvians end up traveling elsewhere to physically cast their votes. The travel that accompanies Election Day is commonplace and the transportation companies use it as another opportunity to make money.<sup>81</sup> Some of the transportation companies even raise their fares in the days immediately preceding and following elections, like they also do for official holidays. The streets of Huaycán were noticeably quieter in the days leading up to the municipal elections in 2002. Around

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<sup>81</sup> Election Day is on a Sunday in Peru, when the fares are usually higher as well.

election time there was less foot traffic and fewer mototaxis on the street. The hot afternoon sun intruded through the bars of gated storefronts while those tending shop watched TV or snoozed, tending to the few customers they had off and on through the bars of their locked gates.

There are a number of reasons why many residents of Huaycán have yet to change the addresses that appear on their DNI. Some residents in Huaycán fear there is a lingering stigma against the neighborhood because the Shining Path was once active in the area. This was certainly a reason for the people of Huaycán not to list it as their permanent address in the 1990s, and the perception that the rest of Lima still carries that image of Huaycán remains strong (Muñoz, 1999). Residents say potential employers still think negatively of Huaycán and using an address in Huaycán is another strike against you when looking for work. There is also a cost (22 soles) associated with the change that is a deterrent to some.<sup>82</sup> Changing the address on your DNI also takes time. It requires going and standing in line at the RENIEC office, the kind of government procedure (*trámite*) that takes hours both when you apply to make the change and again when you need pick up the completed identification.<sup>83</sup> Although the cost to make the change is nominal, it is still at least a day's worth of food and transportation costs for the poorest families.

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<sup>82</sup> <http://www.reniec.gob.pe/portal/Faq.jsp?codigo=00015&seccion=02>

<sup>83</sup> More and more services are available online, but they also require either pre-payment in person at the Banco de la Nación or the Banco de Crédito or a credit card.

The result of this discord between actual and official addresses however is that those who voted physically in Huaycán in the 2002 municipal elections were a very specific part of the population. There were mainly young residents who had recently reached the age of majority, and were largely in their late teens or early twenties.<sup>84</sup> There were very few voting stations established in Huaycán given the size of its resident population.<sup>85</sup> There were 2 separate stations for an estimated 120 000 to 160 000 residents. Most other residents of Huaycán were still voting outside the community.

The fact that most residents of Huaycán vote outside the community means the actual procedures and enfranchisement embodied by Election Day are something very marginal to everyday politics; the anomaly is not of substance because the municipal elections are a formality in this instance. Ironically it seems that for Huaycán and other similar regions of the city, the enfranchisement the municipal elections are meant to represent is not the real basis of the relationship between the municipal government and the citizens of these marginal neighborhoods. Although a significant number of Huaycán's residents were registered to vote in Vitarte, and therefore at least vote in

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<sup>84</sup> There also so seemed to be a significant number of elderly people who registered to vote in Huaycán.

<sup>85</sup> Most of my field research during the 2002 municipal elections was conducted as a volunteer for Transparencia. Transparencia is a prominent NGO in Peru that analyzes and assesses the procedures followed during elections. They ask for volunteers at election time to monitor the elections, and foreigners are the perfect candidates as we do not have to vote ourselves. Volunteering entails documenting whether proper procedure was followed at particular voting tables in order to provide an overall picture of how transparent and fair the particular elections were. Interestingly, Transparencia doesn't just provide monitoring of the state and government. Organizaciones Sociales de Base and other civil society groups may approach Transparencia to help them in the selection of their authorities.

<sup>85</sup> In 2009 when traveling through Manchay, a relatively new and poor community like Huaycán on the Southern edge of Lima, I saw political signs painted on walls and other structures urging residents 'Cambia tu DNI,' or 'Change your DNI' in English.

the same municipality and for the pertinent authorities in Huaycán, others were registered elsewhere, like Salamanca, La Molina, San Luis, and other areas of the city beyond the municipality of Ate.<sup>86</sup> These residents were voting for municipal authorities in other districts. Some residents of Huaycán were even still registered to vote in provincial towns.<sup>87</sup> Performing like a democratic system produced an odd result for Huaycán, where citizens responding to state obligations on Election Day were compelled elsewhere.

The actual patterns in the voting process reflect something of Huaycán's community history. The people participating in the initial project were recent or second generation migrants living in other areas of the city, and the Shining Path activity made it difficult to have Huaycán as an official address. The election process as a specific example of a state and citizen relationship takes residents away from Huaycán itself.

It is also significant that Huaycán's everyday relations with the municipality transpire despite the fact the voting process takes them away from the community.

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<sup>86</sup> Vitarte is the name of the neighborhood where the municipal buildings for the municipalidad de Ate are located. It is the center of the modern day municipality of Ate. Many residents of Huaycán haven't changed their addresses from Vitarte because of the stigma of living in Huaycán, as discussed above (Muñoz, 1999). Others were still residents of Chosica, San Luis, Santa Anita, La Molina, El Agustino and Rimac. Others were still residents of their home towns in provincial cities or towns like Jauja or Cerro de Pasco for example.

<sup>87</sup> If you are delegated a member of a table, there is a more substantial fine for not participating at around 180 soles (5% of the UIT, see below) (see ley 28859). There are procedures to avoid having to be a member of the voting table, but they are restricted to people with medical and physiological impairments. You can circumvent paying fines for not participating elections to some extent, but if you want to travel, bank, or notarize anything where you have to present your DNI you will be made to account for the fines. Fines and fees vary in Peru because they are referenced in legislation as a percentage of the UIT (Unidad Impositiva Tributaria) a standard that is modified every year. The fines for not voting are now based on poverty level, and range from .5% to 2% of the UIT.

Local politics in the community largely ignore this little anomaly, and relationships with the municipal authorities are built regardless. I argue that this occurs because the wider meanings and practices of democracy eclipse these comparatively small and specific examples of incongruence. An anomaly like the fact many poor residents of marginal communities vote elsewhere does not affect the way the system is considered democratic at other levels, and neither is it something that administrators are actively campaigning to change at present. Local problems like these that are related to particular aspects and deployments of the state can perpetuate without administrators even acknowledging awareness of it.

This shows how government action does not always create what it intends to. The municipal elections are not what they should be for many citizens, because they also do not give citizens the kind of direct say in municipal authority in neighborhoods like Huaycán that voting for municipal authorities is supposed to. Residents continue to vote elsewhere while the daily politics in Huaycán continue largely in spite of the municipal elections, taking voters out of the district. Residents participate in Huaycán in other ways – in NGO projects for example. Governments foster participation by encouraging the formation of Regional Committees in the Fight Against Poverty (Mesas de Concertación en la Lucha Contra la Pobreza) that bring municipal authorities and NGO officials together. This anomaly regarding municipal elections continues while at the same time the state and citizens maintain everyday relationships through social programs like Wawa Wasi and the comedores. From the perspective of Huaycán it is

easier to see the way the state as practice is significant because even some of the state's most basic manifestations, like elections, are present in different ways.

The municipal elections then are not the foundation of local politics in Huaycán; they are at the margins of many everyday political relationships. The elections themselves actually represent something that is at the fringes of a more complicated local process. However, there is still a local politics with state and municipal involvement in spite of the fact that most people vote elsewhere. It is like enfranchisement is further from Huaycán than politicking – and the supposed framework is skewed otherwise, where procedure is more ethereal at times and personalized politics the more concrete and real. Municipal elections therefore are not always the building block between the states and citizens they seem to be, they are removed and elsewhere to what really makes up everyday politics in Huaycán.

I am not arguing however that Huaycán is more marginal than other communities because of this particular anomaly. That is not something you can effectively demonstrate because there are so many other idiosyncrasies at play. What we can explore, as I have done in earlier chapters of the dissertation, is how people carry on politically and build many different relationships with authorities despite these kinds of anomalies. The fact that many residents of Huaycán still vote away from the community is surprisingly insignificant to both residents and authorities. This scatters one of the most basic building blocks of democracy, the duty citizens have to vote for authorities to points outside the community. At the same time however the relationship

between government and the residents of Huaycán is continually created beyond Election Day and built back home, far from where they voted, and in spite of the elections.

Furthermore, the fact there is no simple coherence between the election process and local politics is more than an example of disjuncture -- the disjuncture is something to take into account analytically because it is a window into the nature of everyday politics and the day-to-day importance of other kinds of connections. The fact that the municipal elections continue to be reproduced as marginal to everyday politics in Huaycán shapes the local landscape of power; it is part of the multidirectionality and complexity of this level of politics addressed in the last chapter. The disjuncture is sustained from both sides of the dynamic, albeit in different ways. Right off the top these kinds of inconsistencies are obviously not significant to the national system and show the way the different levels of government authority are multidimensional. The state doesn't actively try to rectify this anomaly because the legitimacy of the election process is not challenged by the movement of voters. From the institutional level, legitimacy is established by giving every citizen the right to vote and being transparent about the process.<sup>88</sup> On a national level the incongruence between residency and voting is not a problem because citizens still have a say in national politics even if they go to another neighborhood to vote. For the entire municipality of Lima they are also represented, as long as they still vote within metropolitan limits. There is more

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<sup>88</sup> See for example <http://www.transparencia.org.pe/pagina.php?pagina=1124>. Accessed June 28<sup>th</sup> 2010.



significance to this movement and it is not just a question of whether this makes the process less legitimate per se. I am arguing that local politics and what the state is at the margins is about more than elections -- the movement shows that elections are not foundational to everyday politics like they seem. Local dynamics eclipse institutional parameters in productive ways. This has an impact on what the state is at the margins. These kinds of anomalies are as valid and a productive part of politics as the study of political parties or policy. In Huaycán there is a lot of unofficial and unintended in how the state governs.

Although these kinds of inconsistencies are ultimately insignificant to the national system, they still show how hollow the apparent foundations of that system are. These practices have a local impact that is overlooked but still alternately productive at the local level. Disjunctures like these are sustainable at a local level because municipal elections are also marginal and relatively irrelevant to everyday politics in Huaycán. This is significant because a kind of politics is produced in the gaps of this dynamic. It is one of the ways that that despite being political, with local leaders engaged and active and working daily at representing and creating ties that are of benefit and solve problems for the residents of Huaycán, these kinds of anomalies are still a part of the reality that politics has to work with, and the mistakes and misunderstandings are a large part of what the state is for many people in Peru. The state is less a reflection of an organigram with clearly established hierarchies, and more the juxtaposition of different albeit interrelated systems. In this instance the municipal

is less local than it should be for example. Despite the many and different relationships built, people outside Huaycán still see Huaycán as disconnected, but disconnected more for the lack of a legitimately representative local government than the elections. In this way too these organizations focus more attention on the local and everyday between elections, and what they perceive as shortcomings of the community itself. The election issue is not noticeable because it occurs only once every 4 years (for municipal elections), and it is eclipsed by the flexibility and informality of everyday politics.

A second and related point is that different local processes can also be incongruous and only complexly inter-related in their own right; having the local focus in common does not make them necessarily less antagonistic. Local politics and municipal politics for example are quite different in their scope, even on the local level. Local politics is far from homogenous. These examples from Huaycán show that many of the ways we understand the political participation of citizens do not do enough to challenge underlying assumptions about that participation. Even a number of local leaders and community activists who spend a lot of their energy supporting particular mayors and working with municipal officials vote elsewhere. They do so with it barely standing out as an inconsistency at all. The fact that many who live on the peripheries of Lima vote elsewhere only surfaces haphazardly from time to time in official politics. For example candidates from neighboring municipalities like San Luis come to campaign in Huaycán -- confirming that enough residents in Huaycán are registered to vote for authorities in

San Luis that it is worth the candidate's time to come and campaign there.<sup>89</sup> This is an example of the kinds of relationships possible and created through these disjunctures.

This incongruency is made even more important because of recent efforts at decentralization across Peru and in other countries in Latin America (see for example Shakow, 2008 about Bolivia or Wilson, 2008 about Ecuador). It is clear however from many of the examples in this dissertation that any claim to represent Huaycán is complex and partial. The women I worked with in the Wawa Wasi program discussed in Chapter 2 for example were wary of decentralization reform. They were skeptical of the claim that decentralization and the transfer of certain administrative powers over programs like Wawa Wasi to the municipalities would translate into a more transparent politics. Municipal authorities therefore have their own micro dynamics of legitimacy at the local level. Shifting administration and governing responsibilities to municipal regimes in such a multi-directional context can inspire new forms of political patronage and clientelism – for example, the mayor's people are not the women working in the local comedor, and the local comedor members are not the President's or President's Party's people. It was very clear throughout my research that the municipal government was also something other than local for most of the residents of Huaycán. The fact that Huaycán has such a labored relationship to the municipality demonstrates that relationships between the municipality, local everyday politics and citizen expectations are complex. The dynamics of each of these spheres are quite different. It seems that

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<sup>89</sup> One of the other consequences of this movement on Election Day is that people are casting votes for local authorities where they do not reside. They would not be as aware of local and specific campaigns for example.

Huaycán passed through periods where the local municipality was really not that present, not even managing to come and pick up the garbage for periods of time. With decentralization reform however, the role the municipality plays was recently revived and is presently very active in Huaycán. In 2002 the mayor of Ate built a new building for the local leadership next to the municipal agency in Huaycán (while the other set of leaders discussed in the last chapter met at the old Casa de Piedras, which had almost fallen into disuse through the 1990s). When I did my field research the local *dirigencia* was emerging again from a period where it was just a shadow of its former self.

I also want to draw attention to the fact the anomaly in voting in neighborhoods like Huaycán is not actively targeted as a problem by the Peruvian state. The data readily available concerning the 2002 elections from ONPE or even Transparencia for example present the participation and population data from the elections in terms of the entire municipality of Ate -- you cannot easily assess or recreate variations in voting patterns within particular parts of the municipality itself from the information that is made public.<sup>90</sup> The necessary statistics to measure and quantify the problem therefore not accessible to the public.<sup>91</sup> The state does not help to point to this as anomalous behavior; it is just something that people do that day that has little meaning. That many residents of Huaycán and other neighborhoods like it vote elsewhere is hardly palpable

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<sup>90</sup> See for example the results for the municipal elections in 2006 at <http://www.web.onpe.gob.pe/modElecciones/elecciones/resultadoserm2006/index.onpe>. Accessed June 27<sup>th</sup>. 2010.

<sup>91</sup> One of the post doctoral projects I intend to carry out would analyze the data available from the ONPE, JNE, or the INES to see how perceptible this kind of movement is.

as a problem. It is barely discernable and not made an issue of. You need to witness the actual election process for individual citizens in neighborhoods like Huaycán to see it happening. In Huaycán, it is not even made a significant problem at the local level, at least not yet.

There are a number of ways this example is significant to what I have been arguing about governmentality and the state in Peru. Mimicking models of participation and legitimate, transparent elections gives surprising results in this instance, as if the meaning of democracy at higher levels can overpower the little inconsistencies and drown out the actual events, practices and patterns of citizen participation on Election Day. The elections might be largely irrelevant, but there is a process and significance to that irrelevance that needs to be understood and analyzed as a full part of politics. The state and political organizations are rarely analyzed from the community perspective -- discussion of how the people think, feel and experience is kept thin and what does not fit is explained away instead of related to how although divergent or different it is also a part of how politics work. As Dean explains 'the key point to underline here is that, unlike many analyses in the social sciences, an analytics of government grants to these regimes of practices a reality, a density and a logic of their own and hopes to avoid any premature reduction of them to an order or a level of existence that is more fundamental or real' (Dean, 1999:22). The fact this anomaly is not targeted as a problem, but will eventually resolve on its own (as I will discuss further below) will be

significant for my argument about governmental practices in Peru at the end of this chapter.

### **Incongruencies in the Localness of Municipalities**

The incongruousness of elections and everyday politics in marginal neighborhoods like Huaycán is made even more relevant to current politics in Latin America because of the push to decentralize state administration in recent years. These policies give municipalities more responsibility in administering services and allocating funds (Wilson, 2008, 131; Shakow, 2008:69). Decentralization reforms operate on the premise that municipal governments better reflect the local than national governments. Being closer to the local, municipal administration is considered more transparent, participatory and more democratic by association.<sup>92</sup> The reforms allow the municipalities to assume roles that used to be under the control and representative of the power of the central state.

The new push towards decentralization in many Latin American countries show that debates about neoliberal government and the retreat of the state are changing. How are governments trying to bridge the gaps created by opposing forces? Citizens are making demands of government but there is pressure on governments to be more austere in terms of social spending. Decentralization holds promise because it could

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<sup>92</sup>As Fernando Villarán explains 'In October 2006, the government launched an initiative of 20 ways to help in the decentralization of the country. These included a greater transfer of functions to the regional and local governments, the transfer of some national programs ( like FONCODES) and special projects, a national training (capacitación) plan, among others, although not all initiatives were well thought out but they were wholly applied, they revealed the positive intention in undoing the concentration of power in Lima. (<http://cies.org.pe/files/active/0/villaran.pdf>). Accessed July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

potentially make government more efficient at spending on those who really need assistance, delegating so local governments have more responsibility in decision-making. Monies might also be spent where they are most needed if municipal authorities (who apparently know the local better) make the spending decisions. Anthropologist Patrick Wilson calls the new centrality of municipalities an example of 'roll-out' neoliberalism (Wilson, 2008:128). The proliferation of NGOs and other civil society organizations has also interested anthropologists, leading some to argue that NGOs also practice governmentality (Baker-Cristales, 2008:355; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002:991). This is a further dimension of how the dominance of neoliberal ideals have changed the patterns and agents of administration.

Municipalities contribute to the energy of local politics and the kinds of relationships that are developed between municipal governments and local leaders are another set of relationships that help shape the nature of everyday politics. Municipalities are assuming more of a role in citizens' lives through the administration of services and social programs, a role beyond the more public works focus of municipalities of previous years. Other reforms that encourage more citizen participation are also this kind of filling-in. There are new election reforms (like gender quotas) that also direct our attention to change and the increasingly inclusive direction that government seems to be taking. The ONPE (Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales) for example, which is now a solid part of the institutionality of the election

process in Peru, was only created in 1993.<sup>93</sup> There are constant new beginnings and first tries that divert attention away from the way the status-quo is also maintained. Municipalities do not always compliment national designs as straightforwardly as it seems.

The assumptions that accompany decentralization reforms also have their own effects at the local level. Decentralization practices are based on strong ideas about the nature of local and political practice, and some of those assumptions are powerful enough that they obscure everyday practices that deviate from what is expected in concrete ways. The way that decentralization agendas are supposed to fill in and elaborate what seems 'natural' to the local help eclipse the fact that citizen relationships often do not coincide in the way the reforms assume in communities like Huaycán. This helps buttress the vision of the municipality as something that encompasses the local and that the municipality can and does effectively represent the more grassroots local levels below it (Gupta and Ferguson, 2002:987). This supports the idea that municipal authorities (less problematically than the national government) represent local politics. These assumptions are strong enough they even effectively trump reality in some cases, like we see with voting elsewhere in municipal elections. Legitimacy and transparency seem to outweigh representativeness in this instance.

It is thus that the assumptions behind dominant frameworks are powerful and little inconsistencies like those I outlined in Huaycán seem insignificant. The new and

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<sup>93</sup>RENIEC, the agency in charge of identity and civil status registration in Peru has existed since 1995 (<http://www.reniec.gob.pe/portal/AcercaReniec.jsp?id=3>). Accessed June 26<sup>th</sup> 2010.



different decentralization policies that are being encouraged from above obscure the anomalies and problems of local legitimacy in neighborhoods like Huaycán. The Peruvian state is re-articulating itself based on these basic assumptions about its own local and its own grassroots; where the state operates on the premise that the crux of decentralization reforms is apparently the representativeness of municipal governments (see for example ley 27783).

A more multi-directional and ethnographic approach to municipal power and decentralization would be concerned with how municipalities interrelate with citizens, acknowledging that the institutions of a state change and shift, sometimes being dismantled or stopped altogether or changing course over time. The filling-in and the kinds of adaptations made are important as well; layers of complexity and new relationships are added to existing programs by introducing new legislation and tweaking existing laws. For example, the municipal elections in 2002 formally added a regional component to the hierarchy of political authority in Peru and citizens voted for regional authorities for the first time in those elections. Changes like this may help direct attention away from the parts of the state that have failed to change or have even diminished in importance. These kinds of reforms are made to make state politics more participatory and more local.

There are important disjunctures in the decentralization measures themselves that are productive. In Peru, municipal governments are elected on a majoritarian basis and not proportionally like the national government (Schmidt, 2003:7, 14). So local

activists and leaders forge relationships and build connections with the new elected leaders, often regardless of which candidate or party they supported in the elections. Particular local leaders may have backed a losing candidate during the elections, but they re-position themselves vis-à-vis the incoming municipal government following the elections. There is therefore a different quality to municipal representation, and this is one more blind spot in the nature of these state reforms. Transferring some administrative power and duties away from the national ministries to the municipalities is not as straightforward as it might appear.<sup>94</sup> The move to decentralize is going back over some significant disjunctures and differences in representation and political practice between the municipal and national levels. The municipalities are not just microcosms of the national state, and they do not represent politics on the same terms as the national government. Municipal government is something different even representationally vis-à-vis the population than the national government, and this means there is even more change entailed with the notion of decentralizing certain services. In what ways will municipal governments begin to mimic the central government in trying to assume some of this power? How will these changes from the national-level to the municipal-level impact citizen subjectivity?

There are other ways that the relationship between Huaycán residents and the municipality of Ate are tense. For example, local Huaycán authorities recently claimed that close to 80% of Huaycán residents do not pay their municipal taxes. This is because

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<sup>94</sup> The census is another level to the kinds of administration that occur. In volume 51, No 5 (May 2010) of *Anthropology News*, Kristin Skrabut from Brown University discusses the Peruvian census in the article titled *Recount! The Social Life of the Peruvian Census*.

most residents are very poor and paying taxes would mean going without something essential like food, transportation or medicine. However, residents themselves also point out that they do not feel compelled to pay their taxes to the municipality of Ate because they do not experience the benefit of those funds in Huaycán. If they were to pay, the money is spread across an extensive district with very different neighborhoods; it is not directly spent back on Huaycán. It can be spent on services or works that are closer to the neighborhood of Vitarte in Ate, where the municipal buildings are located. This creates a cycle where residents of Huaycán do not pay their local taxes, the municipality does not feel they need to pay attention to the community because the residents contribute little, and the people feel even more neglected by the municipal government. This is a further way that the substance of the everyday relationship between the municipalities and residents challenges our understanding of local and the nature of politics at this level. Here the actual relationship, how it is supposed to be according to the model, is misplaced in everyday ways that have consequences. It shows how prevalent and important these more diffuse and multidirectional relationships are to an understanding of how politics actually work and what the state is.

This calls for an analysis of what kind of ties are created between citizens and the state that does not take the hierarchical framework of power for granted -- where citizens are always at the bottom and a citizen's say in day-to-day government cedes to the state in a one-directional way. The degree of orchestration the Peruvian state does accomplish on Election Day is impressive; private citizens are even conscripted to man

the polling stations and political party members watch procedures followed at the polling stations to assure transparency and accuracy, but there are also significant disjunctures. From an ethnographic perspective there is a lot of filling-in with surprising sorts of practices, making the process more complex or even changing the intention of certain reforms in the interim. For example, despite the anomaly concerning how Huaycán residents largely vote elsewhere, the elections were present in other ways, in the kinds of sideways relationships Huaycán can have to the government as well. A business in the *parque industrial* won the contract to make t-shirts for ONPE workers to wear on the day of the elections. They subcontracted out work to other businesses in the *parque industrial* in order to meet the deadline and get the quantity of shirts needed done on time. This is one example of the way Huaycán's relationship is filled in other ways to the business of elections.

Decentralization reform has brought a new focus upon the relationship between citizens and municipal governments, even if these are still primarily potential relationships because many of the proposed reforms are yet to be applied. The examples above demonstrate the multidirectional nature of the state and the multifacetedness in government in Peru. Even potential change has a real and concrete impact in day-to-day government and citizen will as everyone starts to anticipate it, making future plans with the changes they have in mind. The impact of the decentralization proposals at present have shown that. Many organizations and activists in and around Lima have taken a lot of interest in the possibilities inherent in

decentralization reform and re-positioned themselves in anticipation of these changes. Politics often do not fit neatly inside a framework where the national encompasses the municipal and the municipal encompasses the local. That framework itself is often preceded by different kinds of struggles, even contemporaneously or simultaneously.

### **Decentralization and the Misuse of Power**

One rationalization for investing so much energy in decentralization reform is that it makes authorities more locally accountable to their constituents. It follows that with the more direct participation and accountability that decentralization entails, there is also better transparency. The local focus in politics can act as a deterrent to corruption (Lessmann and Markwardt, 2010:631). The municipal relationship in the case of Huaycán however shows how the government at that level can also be disengaged from what transpires locally, while also maintaining the authority to speak for the local at the same time. It is not just a case of everyday people doing otherwise with the system or explicitly trying to corrupt it; the system already operates on the basis of partial assumptions about reality allowing many contradictions and irregularities to perpetuate down through the grassroots level. It is also a transgression of sorts when norms fail to achieve what they set out to do and the state also has a kind of power in the way these slight anomalies and incongruencies shape the lives of everyday citizens.

In this way corruption is not just the misuse of power, it is a consequence of politics and it is inherent to the relationships that can be built in Peru (and elsewhere). Corruption is not something external and isolatable that taints politics, it is more a kind

of politics itself. Current reforms that address corruption act as if it is possible to purge the system of corrupt leaders, like there is some kind of cure. But in its more mundane manifestations, the system itself is a form of transgression through dimensions of daily life that it is either unaware of or abdicates the responsibility for while it also regulates and produces, making all kinds of changes that do little but rearrange how people are marginalized. This is why some residents of Huaycán and other poor citizens of Lima are wary of decentralization and believe it will do little more than bring more opportunity for corruption.

Corruption is also treated like it can be endemic to a region or people. One of the fundamental principles of decentralization reform is that services will be administered less clientelistically if there is more local accountability. This also means that in cleaning up their own act, the central government is displacing the potential for clientelism onto the municipal governments. Furthermore, via decentralization reform the central government is displacing precisely those programs that are most problematic in terms of clientelistic association; those that provide social services to the poor like the Wawa Wasis. Operating on the presumption that such programs will be more transparent if more local, at the same time it makes even local citizens more accountable for any transgressions. If clientelistic relationships persist at the municipal level, it will make everyday citizens themselves seem more accountable for participating in them as well, for not holding their own municipal authorities more accountable or letting themselves be manipulated. The fact there were 3 different leaderships in Huaycán each with

different ways to claim legitimacy in the last chapter is like a form of corruption to some, (in fact, confusion and discord over the norms was one justification to deny legitimacy to them all) but each leadership also had different ways of finding a legitimate leg to stand on vis-à-vis other elements of the system and the community at the same time.

Politics in marginal communities are often construed with totalizing brushstrokes. Partha Chatterjee for example characterizes illegality and transgression as a defining feature in improvised relationships with the state, as if this fact also makes all other relationships exceptional by nature (Chatterjee, 2004:61) However, in Huaycán the different local leaderships existed in tandem with the official governments and NGOs and continue to do administrative work despite the fact none was truly legitimate. The legitimacy point was made smaller and less significant, pushed into the background through everyday politics. There are ways to circumvent these kinds of illegitimacy in Lima and build a functioning if informal and non-official legitimacy. The dynamics of marginal neighborhoods are not necessarily confined to some bottom or outside, or exceptional in every respect because of one instance of illegality that cannot even be enforced. As discussed elsewhere, in Peru squatter settlements are not entirely illegal, and their ambiguous beginnings are not the defining reason that the citizens who live there remain marginal.

## **An Influence a Few Times Removed**

The examples outlined above demonstrate that there are significant gaps created in the processes of governing. Some governing practices even fold back on themselves, creating a series of surprising effects that transpire without real intention or by default, that are also consequences of being governed. For example, people can move elsewhere so that their National IDs no longer reflect where they really live or where they participate in politics everyday. I think these kinds of incongruencies are present in force in Peru, although most governmentality studies focus their energy on the government being above and acting on citizens, so the impetus of the relationship between government and citizens appears largely one-way. Citizens in Peru can be a few times removed from this kind of government intentionality, where people that live in poor and marginal neighborhoods like Huaycán have their lives shaped just like anyone, but indirectly in many respects. In the beginning, the residents of Huaycán even conducted their own survey in order to make the state know who they are and to know more themselves about the people living in their community.<sup>95</sup> But the way practices like the self-survey are a consequence of specific attempts to govern is different than what is meant by governmentality -- it does not emerge from clear-cut or directed techniques of governing per se. For Huaycán these kinds of practices come from emulating other landowner associations and modeling what their parents and predecessors did in other regions of the city. I believe there is a willfulness represented

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<sup>95</sup> With the help of the NGO Centro Ideas, Huaycán conducted its own census in 1985.



in these examples that is significant, where everyday citizens approach and make demands of government in ways that are not quite what governmentality entails.

Important dimensions of well-being are also mostly the responsibility of the residents of Huaycán themselves. Instead of practices that spread out from the government and into the population, it is largely pressure and challenges from the citizens that come back to be made on the state. The governmentality process is different enough in places like Huaycán that it warrants more careful explanation. Governmentality applies in qualified instances but in general, people's awareness of government action is more conscious and explicit than taken-for-granted, and the taken-for-granted aspect is something that is key in most definitions of governmentality (Dean, 1999:38; Rose, 1999:87). What about the kinds of relationships between citizens and governments that are not entirely or precisely governmentality-like today?

Moreover, In Huaycán, many of the sites and instances that we usually associate with governmentality are sites that the residents themselves have had to fight and struggle for. The first school in Huaycán for example was built with materials donated by residents themselves. Local teachers who responsible for starting the administrative process necessary to make the school official by petitioning the government (Final Report for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003). While this in itself is something like governmentality, the residents are also mimicking the process of state access and local infrastructural development in other poor neighborhoods, making demands of the state in terms of what is expected in similar neighborhoods and partially

fulfilling their own expectations of inclusion. In this instance there is a more indirect relationship between government and particular communities than governmentality implies and it is not taken-for-granted. These ideas come with a marked independence of the center, but I want to hold onto the ways that demands made also represent their own kind of closeness to the state rather than a distance. The state tries to avoid situations where demands will be made, and citizens have learned, especially from fellow citizens, that to get the state to act pressure has to build. They need to get closer to the center themselves.

Therefore, the procedures and processes in everyday politics are not exactly what we understand by governmentality. I think this shows how governmentality should not be a starting point or a departure for analysis, but treated more as a sometimes precarious result. The conduct of conduct in Peru is concentrated into very specific goals, like public health for example, or childhood education. There is also at the same time a responsibility established in the very vague sense that anyone born in Peru is a citizen. What about the bulk of daily interactions that arise between these two explicit notions of government? Government failures at incorporation continue to resonate and have effects for example, even if they do not resonate with the same kind of purposefulness as implied by governmentality, even if the knowledges generated are self-knowledges with some significant independence of those adopted or promoted by the state.

This more citizen-focused perspective on the influence of government also challenges how we understand and analyze governmentality. Most studies of governmentality seem to take government action on their word, and where there are discussions of how this impacts everyday life for citizens, they adopt an analysis that remains within the confines of the state program's own vision how and why it works (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002:987). I argue that the balance of how such programs impact citizens is also important. There is a space created between what governments want to conduct, what governments think they are achieving and what they actually achieve. With this voting example we see the government achieving otherwise – where through the techniques and practices directly applied residents actually go elsewhere to vote, while at the same time the government is on a mission to decentralize the state on the strong assumption that the local is more representative.

It also challenges the applicability of the governmentality framework in this example because the problem will eventually resolve itself, without the state having a direct hand in all aspects of conduct in these kinds of neighborhoods. Eventually this problem will take the form it is supposed to. In the future more residents of Huaycán will have their addresses there, and the framework will come into alignment and be as we expect. But this is something different than governmentality. When this change is made elsewhere in the city, it seems to come politically because of citizen will. In Manchay for example there is currently a campaign encouraging residents to change their addresses to Manchay so that local government can have more power vis-à-vis the

municipality. In this example it is the residents and local leaders who are making the effort themselves, to pull Manchay into what it should be, and increasing their potential to become an independent district more quickly. This is another example of the kind of removed and indirect way the Peruvian state achieves governability in these neighborhoods and through their own politics. In Peru there is a fundamentally political element to being included as urban-dwelling poor in the national framework. At the same time this is one of the ways some of the exclusions persist. There is little uniformity and there is not much energy spent on the common connections across class and ethnic differences.

Many of the procedures we identify as examples of governmentality include this kind of happenstance – they can misdirect more than conduct behavior, deviating from what even they believe they are achieving. We tend to take the processes of power for granted, that if we see it applied it also must produce the intended result. But authority can be awkward in places, and it can misshape. The actual intersections in communities can miss their intended mark and produce otherwise. Sometimes the state is engaged in a way that slips, leaving gaps as it also continues to function in terms of an overall goal. I argue that state power is such that how it misses its mark is also a part of what the state is. Even in applying power with no result has an effect. It is energy spent. At least it seems the government did something. It is also something tangible to the citizens expecting change if a procedure is implemented although the intended results are not achieved.

Incongruencies like this therefore are entry points into understanding this other dimension of state power. There are consequences to these practices and this lived experience is part of what the state is in an ethnographic sense. Politics and a relationship to the state continue in spite of the fact that many in Huaycán live somewhere other than where they vote. It might be an anomaly but it is also significant for the way the state does not intersect with the community in expected ways. What seems excluded, distant and outside is still intimately a part of politics – Huaycán is still the state's responsibility to manage or not manage. While it is tempting to understand the problem on the state's own terms, and treat the residents of Huaycán like they are outside and out of reach of something, it is not that simple. Huaycán is not outside the system, it is of the system. It is not other, what seems other-worldly and of their own doing is just our own ignorance of this part of what is inside.

I want to draw attention to how indirect the influence of government can be. This is not to that government is not governmentality-like -- or maybe representative of another form of governmentality -- or still a kind of governmentality that includes other actors like NGOs who help the state fill itself in and achieve its goals vis-à-vis its citizens. I think we need to be more precise about the nature of these processes and what governments actually achieve. The case of Huaycán shows that ill-placed assumptions have the power to derail projects and produce failure and waste of opportunities. We do not have a good understanding of what the state has actually achieved and what it actually is in these neighborhoods. We know even less about why the present terms of

citizenship for the residents of these neighborhoods do not work to produce change as fast or as completely as we would like.

The new power the municipalities have raises interesting questions about Peruvian citizenship. These changes may reassign the ways that municipalities and central governments each impact citizen and political subjectivity. What impact will the municipality's greater role have on citizenship? As various analysts in Peru have discussed, the public, particularly in poorer districts of Lima, have been skeptical of decentralization reform. Will this reform really change anything in terms of incorporation, or is it increasing the distance and access by creating more barriers between poor citizens and the state?

### **Evolving into what you are Supposed to Be: Local Governments as Proto-Municipalities**

The relative indirection exhibited in the kind of conduct expected of citizens in Huaycán is important in other ways as well. One possible future path for Huaycán is for it to become a municipality itself. Villa El Salvador for example was once an *asentamiento humano* and it is now its own municipality.<sup>96</sup> The possibility that Huaycán might someday become its own municipality is openly acknowledged by some leaders in Huaycán, but it is usually envisioned as a possibility that is still a long ways off. Becoming a municipality however would bring some of the disjunctions discussed earlier into alignment, particularly the taxation issues and having the ability to spend more funds

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<sup>96</sup> Villa El Salvador was created in 1971. Villa El Salvador's relationship in those early years with the Ministry of Housing was conflicted ([http://www.munives.gob.pe/Ves\\_historia.htm](http://www.munives.gob.pe/Ves_historia.htm), Accessed June 28th, 2010).

within Huaycán itself. Leaders who support Huaycán becoming a municipality believe that it would allow Huaycán to more directly control its own resources, so that a lot of what the population contributes in terms of taxes is not spent elsewhere. Huaycán is the most populous region of Ate however, so strategically it is also important to Ate as well.<sup>97</sup>

The way that neighborhoods like Huaycán have evolved into their own municipalities around the city shows how the formal Peruvian political system is fairly open to informality. These cases do not represent a clear distinction between legal and illegal as they do in the work by Partha Chatterjee in similar neighborhoods in India for example (Chatterjee, 2004). The stamp of illegality does not preclude eventual officialdom for large shantytown communities in Peru. It is not something expected but still quite possible -- these local governments might eventually evolve or branch off into municipalities themselves, eventually conforming to the formal standard for local administration in the city on their own.

Local governments in marginal neighborhoods act a lot like proto-municipalities in and around the city, holding their own elections and creating statutes that define the terms of their power and activities. Local governments also have procedures to follow to aspire to legal recognition as community associations in Peru (this is called *personeria juridica* in Peru). However, there are also leaders in Huaycán that adopt the position that Huaycán is not yet ready to become a municipality, the main reason being that

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<sup>97</sup> Wikipedia entry for Huaycán (<http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huayc%C3%A1n>), The municipality of Ate website (<http://www.muniate.gob.pe/>).

residents do not feel compelled to pay their municipal taxes. As a municipality Huaycán would lack the kind of revenue it needs. It is also in Ate's interest, at least for the time being, that Huaycán remain a part of the municipality because it is the most populous neighborhood in the district.

Mimesis might be useful to discuss how communities like Huaycán are influenced by the success that communities like Villa El Salvador have enjoyed in leveraging demands from the state. In some way Huaycán mimics Villa El Salvador. But mimicking does not quite take us all the way in explaining the significance of this because it tends to cut the associations that are built by instigating a similar project. As if further expressions of the same dynamic in this particular context are less authentic and less important than the initial example. Mimesis might help us analyze how local energy is important and it allows for different directions in political relationships, but it frames this in ways that keep it largely independent from the state machine. The original seems unaffected by the fact it is being mimicked. In Chapter 2 however, I discussed how the state sometimes (especially in terms of what constitutes participatory politics and creative inclusion), in fact tries to mimic and reproduce a number of local dynamics from the urban poor. These examples are not other and independent of the state. This realm of more informal politics and non-institutionalized relations is still how the state works.

Decentralization assumes that local political order is more redistributive and democratic -- but the nature of membership in Huaycán's neighborhood association is



based fundamentally on property ownership, not representation. Local leadership is expected to embody community and represent the interests of Huaycán. The scale is misunderstood in the perspectives from above. Huaycán is in effect a city, with well over 100 000 residents. Local politics are grossly oversimplified vis-à-vis the national and municipal governments. Without wanting to evoke the *desborde* metaphor in its entirety, it is applicable in the limited sense that the problem of housing provision in the greater Lima area is getting ahead of local leaders like those in Huaycán (Matos Mar, 1984:17). But to categorically apply the *desborde* metaphor to Peru's class history oversimplifies a complex problem. The *pueblos jóvenes* are that – a new or “young” dynamic. The stark antagonisms of cultural difference in Peru crisscross but they are not just profound historical ties, there is also movement and change and factors that contribute to the dilemmas that are contemporary and of the present.

The fact that Huaycán was a planned shantytown but that it will one day likely be a municipality like the other *barriada* neighborhoods in Lima is another example illustrative of how the governing tactics are different in Peru. These kinds of problems will work themselves out; eventually a greater proportion of Huaycán's population will begin to vote there. People will begin to change the addresses on their DNIs on their own and younger generations will grow up registering with an address in Huaycán. Without much effort on the government's part, they will get the same result more indirectly, eventually. What does the lack of specific direction and intention in this space mean for politics now? What is the substance of these relationships then in Peru at

present? This puts a certain distance between the citizens of Huaycán and the state. The problem will resolve on its own without having to pay much attention to it and eventually become what it is meant to reflect now. This is illustrative of the kind of spaces and gaps there are in governing practices. With time the anomaly will correct itself. This is how future expectations have a present day impact.

### **Second-Class Citizenship: Not Taking Governing Practices for Granted**

Although theories of political subjectivity are tied more widely to deeper historical and even 'unconscious' processes like nationalisms, colonial conditions, class struggle and grand state designs, there are smaller and more specific realms of authority that influence citizens. Can we always link people's sense of political subjectivity back to wider nationalisms? Municipal functions for example are rarely considered in theoretical discussions of political subjectivity; yet one potential impact of decentralization reform in Peru is that articulations of responsibilities and the applicability of citizenship rights will be tailored more concretely to localities and to differences in ethnicity and socioeconomic status. We need to explore the kinds of recombinant changes in governing practices that are being made with decentralization reform in Peru: how are these new forms of administration going to re-articulate questions of class and ethnicity, demands for social justice and the existing political system? To what degree are new decentralization reforms another effort to fill an apparent void for poor citizens, instead of bringing the full dimensions of the inequality experienced by shantytown residents to light?

The anthropology of Peru usually focuses on the ways that disadvantaged groups are systematically excluded from white *criollo* society in Lima. Without denying that those exclusions remain trenchant and continue to act as barriers for lower class and poor Peruvians, there must also be some significance in recent steps to include (at least to some degree) those who have been traditionally excluded, and give marginal communities more of the infrastructure, programs and access to the state they need. What have the various successes and failures of these different kinds of creative and productive efforts meant to Peruvian society more generally? Is there a clear sense of what the different levels of government are building? In what ways do these practices contribute to really changing the kind of society Peru is today?

At present there appear to be many competing visions of what Peru should be. Alan Garcia's government is interested in promoting a very narrow sense of progress, geared towards indicators of macroeconomic growth. Decentralization reform, granting more power to the municipalities, has been adopted as a way to further democratize institutions and to discourage corruption, but there are also ways that decentralization reform might reproduce more than challenge existent inequalities by focusing and even institutionalizing (to some degree) what already makes marginal communities different from the rest of Lima. Officials in Garcia's government even openly refer to the category

of second class citizen in recent conflicts in Bagua for example, as if they have less responsibility to these citizens, and less ability to meet their demands.<sup>98</sup>

In anthropology, governmentality is the dominant framework used in the study of governing practices. Governmentality is used widely to examine the intricacy of relationships between citizens and governments and the influence that NGOs have on citizens in different countries and communities around the world. Governmentality describes the processes whereby certain kinds of knowledge and practices make it possible to govern (Dean 1999:17). Partha Chatterjee for example uses governmentality to explain how the Indian state treats citizens in marginal neighborhoods differently, arguing that shantytown dwellers are more the subjects of governmentality than democracy, or a politics that is more pragmatic and about the improvement of populations than rights-laden (Chatterjee, 2004). In anthropology, governmentality is also widely used to characterize how non-governmental agents take on the functions of governments, particularly in terms of NGOs and new forms of association for migrants and other groups of people that transgress traditional geographical and political boundaries, where states are trying to maintain a modicum of control over mobile citizens (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Baker-Cristales, 2008). This is an association made

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<sup>98</sup> See for example the Facebook group called Ciudadanos de Segunda Categoria (Second Category Citizens). They explain that: 'Our nation is facing one of the greatest moral crises in its history. The situation of poverty and exclusion of millions of Peruvians is worsened by institutionalized corruption and the monopolization of the State by private interests. This system based on auctioning off the country [basado en el remate del país,] the predation of natural resources and the criminalization of protest, is fertile ground for corruption to continue. Everyone who opposes the mercantilist logic is victim of the repressive instruments of the State and considered a 'second category citizen.' The sad events of the 5<sup>th</sup> of June, 2009 in Bagua are there to demonstrate this (accessed June 30th, 2010).

on the basis that organizations acting government-like must be exercising governmentality too.

Governmentality is also a useful framework for my research, but I think there are dynamics essential to the kinds of politics that transpire in the example of Huaycán that are not captured by how the term is typically used. For instance, many studies that use the governmentality framework emphasize the forms and the means of governing applied over the conduct of the citizens themselves, without devoting much analysis to the way that subjectivity is impacted by governing processes. Subjectivity is important for understanding the impact of governmentality processes --the extent to which relationships shaping conduct are taken-for-granted by citizens themselves – and what behaviors or forms of conduct governments (or other agents) seek to influence. If these are not taken-for-granted but more conscious relationships -- explicit connections and objects of desire even -- how does this alter the notion of governmentality in marginal contexts like Huaycán?

Using a governmentality framework to describe governing processes the world over attributes all governing practices with universality, as if we can generalize about the processes as all neoliberally opaque in the same way.<sup>99</sup> But governing practices are not ahistorical and they are not as universal as they appear. Following Mbembe, they may also be universal more in emulation than substance (Mbembe, 2001:147-148). The way that governmentality is applied unilaterally obscures this. Historical experience and

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<sup>99</sup> See for example Mitchell for the example of Egypt (1991) or Gupta's analysis in India (In Gupta and Ferguson, 2002).

cultural difference are also inherent to these governing processes, making governmentality more than technocratic. Governmentality is applied less like a technique engaging with difference in anthropology and more like it is a form of knowledge itself; like it embodies all the intentions and desires for particular outcomes because it is resolutely neoliberal. However, there is still difference inherent to trying to influence the conduct of populations. It is therefore important to also consider what it is that governing agents want to alter in terms of people's conduct and the extent to which they are successful in making those changes. Although Foucault argued there were other agents of governmentality and not only the state, because of socioeconomic problems and the general lack of resources, there are few (known) agents that create knowledge and influence conduct in places like Huaycán and they are not all working towards a clearly defined or a common goal in Peru. There are less entities contributing in the creation in a coherent or more singular forms of knowledge. There are much looser associations between the different forms of knowledge. For example, between what we know about women's associations and what interests are represented in municipal offices.

I have made the argument in this dissertation that a governmentality framework applies to Huaycán but in very specific instances like public health campaigns, childhood nutrition, state-led education and to certain aspects of policing. However, there is a lot of conduct more generally that is only tangentially of interest or managed by the state, as if it is a few times removed in terms of influence over citizen behavior in these other

realms. Other forms of knowledge about marginal populations are not linked to dominant frameworks other than in a very diffuse and limited sense of making slight improvements in regards to poverty-level (and these are most often measured macroeconomically, very far from the specifics of individual lives). The implementation of security apparatuses in Peru seem more obviously preoccupied with security for the state itself, and not a day-to-day or all-seeing power that regulates the daily lives of the everyday citizen. This is where the notion of governability (in contrast to governmentality) is interesting because it helps to articulate how governing processes in Peru have different effects. In making the comparison here I am not trying to argue that governmentality and governability mean related or similar things – but I think the notion of governability identifies the degree to which citizens conform to government, or qualifies the power governments have to make citizens conform. It also makes the knowledges needed about the population more directed to appeasing that population. The notion of governability raises questions about the nature of citizen subjectivities vis-à-vis government and it helps to articulate how the nature of citizen and state relationships are different in Peru.

Governability is also an interesting concept because it makes the ability to influence the conduct of citizens an explicit goal. In this way governability identifies where citizens are not participating in the system as anticipated or desired. Studies in governability, most of which are at the NGO level at present or in policy-focused perspectives, propose how governments might better convince citizens to conform to the status-quo (Borón,

1996). At the very least, the widespread use of the concept of governability in Peru is acknowledgement there is something different about the forms of knowledge and control countries like Peru have over certain segments of their population. Other forms of knowledge and control, like security for instance are not the easiest, most efficient means of gaining influence with marginal populations at present.

## **Conclusion**

The kinds of anomalies that I have discussed in this chapter are also an important part of what the state is and how politics transpire in Peru. As demonstrated above, even the most straightforward of state and citizen relationships like voting can present these kinds of anomalies. At the same time, there is another significant dimension of this dynamic. Anomalies like voting elsewhere are underplayed and this is a further manifestation of state power; the state can refuse to acknowledge many aspects of its own ambiguity, making these kinds of examples more ambiguous still. These different layers and directions to the state create a lot of indirection towards daily life, and they build into the gaps or distance that seem to exist between “second class” or excluded citizens, and the state. The informality and apparent singularity of these examples are uneasy conditions; they cannot exist independently of what is formally considered the state in this regard. Although decentralization reforms are celebrated by authorities because they encourage more participation and discourage corruption, the women I worked with in the Wawa Wasi discussed in chapter 2 were skeptical.<sup>100</sup> The

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<sup>100</sup> See ley 27783



women who work in the Wawa Wasi felt that decentralization would grant the municipality more power to administer the program, shifting the program from national control but also giving municipal authorities more opportunities to use the program to their own advantage. Political claims are partial like this, they have an underside with unexpected consequences. There are understated effects of such processes that make it possible to be participatory and exclusionary at the same time. These competing views on decentralization are not so much contradictory as a part of the myriad consequences of applying neoliberal and austere politics in a marginal neighborhood like Huaycán.

The everyday politics of neighborhoods like Huaycán can teach us about what the state is for marginal citizens. The state has the power to legitimate one part of a relationship at the expense of what is not known or what is not brought to light about it, but those indirect or hidden kinds of consequences still have many effects on residents. Many of the little transgressions that are part of government practice pass by unperceived. There are more secretive ways even the most transparent power is applied in Peru. Instead of encompassing and incorporating daily life in taken-for-granted ways, it is possible to perceive some of the limits of state action, what it does but also what it does not do in Huaycán.

Many of the frameworks we use to approach reality in places like Huaycán are such a part of our thinking that we miss acknowledging or recognizing where the system takes on a dynamic that deviates from the impact it is assumed to have, or where people are able to influence programs and political authorities enough to make them

something different in the local context. In a local, poor and urban context, the higher levels of government also use different forms of knowledge that help distance them from the suffering, precariousness and sacrifice of residents like those who live in extreme poverty in Huaycán. As much as there are little successes and hope, living in a marginal neighborhood still exposes residents to the kinds of gaps that I have described in this dissertation. The sophisticated ways to measure the utility and effectiveness of projects or programs are more about charting the successes and assuring the survival of the project and programs themselves, layering different motives and outcomes without overcoming the sets of gaps and incongruencies discussed here. These attempts can be like the non-functioning tracks and would-be stations of the electric train that still stands through parts of Lima more than 25 years later, because no one can or will spend the money to take them down. They are concrete and steel evidence of the way that past failures and waste can linger with no viable plans to deal with the consequences of that failure. 25 years later, the government is again trying to resuscitate the transportation project, salvaging what they can to make at least parts of the system run again.

## **Conclusion: Different Entailments in Governing Everyday Citizens**

Nothing guarantees that these struggles will automatically lead to more frugal forms of government, or that they will result in a state governed by law and more democratic forms of citizenship, at least in the classic sense of these notions. Against those theoretical approaches that would reduce the range of historical choices gestating in Africa to a stark alternative of either 'transition' to democracy and the shift to a market economy, or descent in to the shadows of war, we must stress again the *role of contingency*, and reassert the hypothesis that the organizations likely to emerge from current developments will be anything but the result of coherent premeditated plans (Mbembe, 2001:77).

In this dissertation I described a number of disparate experiences that citizens encountered with the state. I want to draw attention to the multidimensionality of the state -- not just in the obvious and empirical sense of there being different realms of state action and influence, but also in a conceptual sense because that multidimensionality is another way that the state has the power to be productive of subjectivities and politics. I want the differences between the police, the Wawa Wasis and the local government to stand out and get analytical attention for the productiveness there is in their interrelationship. The tensions that exist between them are an interface that also produces politics, as well as citizens' subjectivities in important ways. To understand that multidimensionality and the different ways that power is used everyday you need to employ a number of different frameworks at once.

To describe the productiveness of this multidimensionality I argued that the state has an absent presence in Huaycán. By this I mean there are levels of continual but partial attention paid to daily life in such neighborhoods. Neighborhoods like Huaycán are incorporated on the state's terms; but it is also significant, and also a substantial aspect of governing practices, that there are many things the state does not know about everyday life in places like Huaycán. The level of inertia the state manifests in not knowing about certain aspects of everyday life also has lingering effects. This leads to layers of different entailments and numerous different undersides of state influence that are consequential but often overshadowed and obfuscated by the state's own version of what is relevant and for what it is accountable. Instead of one action leading necessarily or naturally to another, there is marked unintentionality in many governing practices. It is in this sense that I argue the state has what on one level might seem like a partial presence in Huaycán; but what is partial on the state's terms is full and complete on the citizens' terms because their subjectivity and relationship vis-à-vis the state can only be entire and real. Even when particular programs fail to meet their goals, these relationships are still a necessary influence on local politics because many of the local authorities and residents have also banked on the program's success. In this way, specific programs can continue to resonate in communities in ways that are not intended by the center, although the relevance of such effects is often downplayed and that energy is lost to most dominant ways of understanding the relationship between the state and society. The incongruencies between everyday reality and administrative

intentions need to be taken seriously as a significant dimension of what the state process is.

Yolanda, the woman I discuss in chapter 1, kept putting the situation in terms that reflect aspects of how I describe the state above, but that I also found hard to reconcile. She said that more people need to know about Huaycán -- that more politicians and authorities need to come and see the reality in Huaycán and that seeing or knowing in this regard would create more change. To me however the situation seemed much more ambivalent. It is not as if officials are ignorant of Huaycán or that they never come. Indeed, public figures and authorities do visit Huaycán and quite often. Yolanda believes that making the people with power more aware of local dilemmas would lead to more action. Yolanda too felt like there was some kind of distance that had to be bridged between authorities and the everyday reality of Huaycán. There is a distance perceived even by citizens themselves despite the fact that authorities do visit and that administrative entities and programs are present in Huaycán.

Yolanda's opinion of authorities vis-à-vis Huaycán also resonates with another example related to me during my research. When campaigning for president in Huaycán in 2001, a damaging rumor about Lourdes Flores, the only female candidate running in the elections, began to circulate. Local women said that Flores was seen rushing to wash her hands after visiting *comedores* in the *barriada* neighborhoods. Local women expressed indignation at this. It drove a further wedge between Flores, as a member of

the political elite, and the everyday women of Huaycán, who do all they can to clean and prepare for the visit of important guests. Neighborhood women know how to navigate their own daily realities and care for their families and neighbors, and they were insulted at the suggestion they were unkempt and dirty enough to justify the leader's compulsion to wash her hands. Flores' actions reflect the assumptions and the unknowns that pervade the relationships between social classes and people of different ethnic backgrounds in Peru. The existing tensions between authorities and everyday citizens are largely maintained even when there are efforts to bridge them.

Although such actions on the part of authorities seem to be characterized by duplicitousness, much like the First Ladies visit discussed in chapter 2. One reason shantytown residents are excluded is because the state treats them differently than they treat other populations. Neighborhoods like Huaycán also seem liminal or exceptional because people are trespassing formal rules. However, there is more to this process. We are really only seeing the surface of the problem if we look at the state, government and politics in marginal neighborhoods as somehow inherently different from the politics and terms of membership and belonging for the mainstream. This dilemma is not reducible to one group being treated better than another. Processes of differentiating are evoked at a deeper level because it is the universalizing state system that treats difference in this way. It is very much the same state in wealthy, middle class and poor neighborhoods, although it produces otherwise. There are different programs

geared towards poor populations but those emerge on the basis of a deeper set of processes, where the preoccupation with quantifying poverty comes from the center.

In this way too assumptions are made about another absence. It is not a question of extending what privileged citizens have to those that are less privileged -- as if the state is primarily neutral in the productiveness of inequalities. More than equality, it is indifference to the differences between citizens that the state tries to achieve (Asad, 2004). Single and small improvements among poor populations seem to contribute towards a common and society-wide sense of well being – as if COFOPRI or the Wawa Wasis are making progressive changes overall despite the specific nature of their scope. But there is already a framework that engages with elements of the status quo, that has helped to create neighborhoods like Huaycán and inequalities are not just the result of a simple lack of what the more privileged groups have. The state helps to produce places like Huaycán in all its indirectness too. The very terms of citizenship help assure this at a more fundamental level as well. Exclusion is already an inherent part of the system.

The few arenas in Huaycán where conduct is regimented and administered for everyday citizens are intermittent and specific, and they do not seem comprehensive, the overall sense of purpose in their interrelationship is unclear. There is not the sense of integrity to governing practices, that the state is all-seeing or pervading all parts of everyday life. Programs like the Wawa Wasi program, for example, are one small effort at understanding the realities of poor citizens and one way to try to systematize them,

creating a space where some citizen behaviors can be modified and directed. But these are specific, they are on the state's terms even if the terms are simply to assert the state has no real responsibility to poor citizens in this instance, and that they should use the opportunity to help themselves. Inclusion today depends on citizens finding their own way to beat the odds. There are many poor parents who do not use the Wawa Wasi program. These programs are just exemplary of even more diffuse and less engaged relationships to the state for all the other families out there. What is their subjectivity like? When state officials decided to script everyday reality for visitors to places like the Wawa Wasi in Huaycán or control their interactions with artisans and vendors at the ruins at Pachacamac, the government seemed anxious that exposing visitors to the really real and everyday Peru would be exposing them to something unexpected and uncontrolled, beyond the conduct of government. There is discomfort and maybe, in principal, even fear that everyday citizens are incapable of being or even defiant of the selves the state wants them to be.

Like Mbembe expresses in the quote that opened this chapter, contingency plays a larger role in these relationships than is often ascribed. I want to call attention to the productiveness of these processes that seem less than systemic but that are still a consequence of the system. We could also understand the state more fully in terms of the instances where it does not work. Instead of understanding state presence in terms of an absence, it is important to weigh how even undesired outcomes and unintentional processes also create certain subjectivities and impact daily lives.



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